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Negotiating Bioethics
The sequencing of the entire human genome has opened up unprecedented possibilities for 
healthcare, but also ethical and social dilemmas about how these can be achieved, 
particularly in developing countries. UNESCO’s Bioethics Programme was established to 
address such issues in 1993. Since then, it has adopted three declarations on human genetics 
and bioethics (1997, 2003 and 2005), set up numerous training programmes around the 
world and debated the need for an international convention on human reproductive cloning.
Negotiating Bioethics presents Langlois’ research on the negotiation and implementation 
of the three declarations and the human cloning debate, based on fi eldwork carried out in 
Kenya, South Africa, France and the UK, among policy-makers, geneticists, ethicists, civil 
society representatives and industry professionals. The book examines whether the 
UNESCO Bioethics Programme is an effective forum for (a) decision-making on bioethics 
issues and (b) ensuring ethical practice. Considering two different aspects of the UNESCO 
Bioethics Programme – deliberation and implementation – at international and national 
levels, Langlois explores: 
• how relations between developed and developing countries can be made more equal;
• who should be involved in global level decision-making and how this should proceed;
• how overlap between initiatives can be avoided;
• what can be done to improve the implementation of international norms by sovereign 
states;
• how far universal norms can be contextualized;
• what impact the effi cacy of national level governance has at international level.
Drawing on extensive empirical research, Negotiating Bioethics presents a truly global 
perspective on bioethics. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of sociology, 
politics, science and technology studies, bioethics, anthropology, international relations 
and public health.
Adèle Langlois is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University 
of Lincoln. She has conducted fi eldwork in India, Kenya and South Africa. Her research 
interests include the regulation of human genetic and biomedical research, polio eradication 
and normative theories of global governance.
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Foreword
The research for this book springs from two sources. First, it comes from Adèle 
Langlois’ research for a doctorate, and subsequently, her early postdoctoral work. 
As such, it is a perfect exemplar of what can be done by an enthusiastic, highly 
competent and very hard-working young researcher. But second, it shows the 
result of one person’s commitment to learning more about the global governance 
of bioethics. It focuses on crucial questions, such as: Can bioethics be global? Is 
a UN-led intergovernmental approach the best way to construct global governance 
for genomic science?
The framework for this book is the science and social science of genomics from 
the sequencing of the human genome at the turn of the millennium. But unlike the 
many books already written within this context, Adèle Langlois has chosen to 
focus, unusually, if not uniquely, on intergovernmental relations, but more 
particularly, on relations between developed and developing countries. She also 
goes a step further by researching intergovernmental relations around ethical 
issues, and the even more tricky ethical questions concerning the ethics of life: 
stem cells, human cloning, and so on.
There is plenty to mull over and debate in the chapters of this book, and I have 
picked out a few issues that had cadence for me – but there are many others. In 
particular, one insight I gained is that crucial issues can be both ‘high-level’ think 
issues, while also relatively mundane and grounded.
At a ‘higher’ level, there is the question of whether the focus of research on the 
international politics of ethics should be different in the South from the North. 
The book suggests that bioethics in the South are closely intertwined with the 
ethics of poverty and global power. Langlois shows us that ethics committees are 
not new to Africa – that there have been ethics committees for many decades in 
South Africa and Nairobi. It would be easy to jump to conclusions about how poor 
countries deal with ethics, but relative weakness in terms of professional bioethical 
skills does not translate as having no capability or evidenced argument. There are 
voices with something important to contribute. It is important to listen – as Adèle 
has done.
At a more ‘mundane’ level, Adèle points to the unequal relations within 
UNESCO, part of the UN intergovernmental system. At one level there is ‘equal’ 
representation of groups of nations. But if poorer nations have lower human and 
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fi nancial resources they will not be able to travel to ‘join’ the tables of ‘equals’. 
Adèle addresses this and similar issues through the ‘lens’ of her detailed studies 
of South Africa and Kenya.
Other important ethical issues go well beyond the resources to travel and 
engage in UN bodies, such as the huge gap between research on diseases of the 
poor and diseases of the more affl uent, and how to avoid poorer countries 
becoming a ‘research sweat shop’ for clinical trials that are no longer placed in 
developed countries. 
Langlois’ research fi ts squarely into the category of ‘engaged research’. She 
shows here that she is an ‘expert’ engager among experts of many types (UN, 
scientists, social scientists, ethicists, policy-makers). Such engagement did not 
come at the end of her research process but at the beginning. This has infl uenced 
her rigorous collection of data of various kinds, including large volumes of 
published and grey materials and extensive observations at meetings, and enriched 
her research analysis and results.
The chapters of this challenging book will engage those who are serious about 
the important details of how to build global governance of science and technology, 
but it is also a key text for those who want to know more about the international 
politics of treaty negotiation, and those who are keen to learn about bioethics 
issues in developing countries. Every reader will fi nd something of importance in 
these pages, and something to debate with their colleagues.
David Wield
Director, ESRC INNOGEN Centre, 
Open University and the University of Edinburgh
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1 Introduction
The sequencing of the entire human genome has opened up unprecedented 
possibilities for healthcare, but also ethical and social dilemmas about how these 
can be achieved, particularly in developing countries. How competently such 
dilemmas are managed will dictate whether the fruits of genetic and other 
biomedical research exacerbate or reduce inequalities of health between North 
and South. UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural 
Organization, addresses such issues through its Bioethics Programme, established 
in 1993. Over the past two decades the Programme has negotiated bioethics in two 
ways. First, it has navigated the twists and turns of an evolving moral discourse, 
in tandem with developments in science and technology, particularly in relation to 
the human body. Second, at the formal intergovernmental level, it has formulated 
three international declarations on human genetics and bioethics. This book 
examines how these declarations have come about, their impact on bioethical 
thinking and practice and the future prospects of the Bioethics Programme.
Although the term ‘bioethics’ can be used to cover ethical issues across a broad 
spectrum, UNESCO has focused mainly on the human impact, as the titles of its 
three declarations demonstrate: the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights (1997); the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 
(2003); and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005). 
Each declaration embraces well-established bioethical principles, such as 
autonomy and informed consent, as well as newer ideals of knowledge sharing 
and capacity building between developed and developing countries. These norms 
and principles are designed to deal with pressing issues in genetics and bioethics. 
Genetics presents new ethical problems, or at least new perspectives on existing 
ones. That members of families and communities may share genes poses a 
challenge to the recognized bioethical principles of privacy and confi dentiality, 
for instance. Relatedly, if the human genome is the common ‘heritage of 
humanity’ (as UNESCO terms it), this begs the question how the benefi ts that 
might accrue from genetic research should be distributed. At the same time, 
understandings of what constitutes a bioethical concern are broadening. As 
inequalities in access to medicine and healthcare between North and South 
enlarge, what should be the focus of research becomes in itself an ethical question 
(aside from how it should be carried out). Most recently, UNESCO has been 
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asking this question in the context of whether human reproductive cloning should 
be banned worldwide.
UNESCO is one of several organizations working in the area of bioethics. This 
raises another question: is the UNESCO Bioethics Programme an effective forum 
for (a) decision-making on bioethics issues and (b) ensuring ethical practice? The 
book seeks to answer this question both theoretically and empirically. Based on 
original research conducted at UNESCO headquarters and in member states, it 
draws on international relations theory to assess the effi cacy of the Bioethics 
Programme. International relations theory, in its various forms, seeks to explain 
world affairs and expound how they might, if possible, be better governed. 
Governance, in this respect, constitutes decision-making on the management of 
collective issues and the subsequent implementation of regulations and policies to 
effect those decisions. At national level, these tasks are often undertaken by 
governments. At international level, governance is conducted in the absence of a 
formal world government, partly through institutions such as UNESCO. Effective 
governance of human genetic and biomedical research would contribute to the 
protection of individual research participants and, more broadly, the harnessing of 
this research to tackle global health needs. It would entail, fi rst, high-quality 
decisions on how these goals could be achieved and, second, comprehensive 
implementation of those decisions.
Fieldwork data, collected in 2005–6 during doctoral studies and followed up in 
2010–12, will shed light on whether the Bioethics Programme provides effective 
governance. Fieldwork included the following: close observation of meetings of 
UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee and Intergovernmental Bioethics 
Committee (which discussed, inter alia, the drafting of the 2005 Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights and the possibility of a convention to 
ban human reproductive cloning); analysis of offi cial records of these and other 
bioethics meetings within the organization, as well as national policy documents 
from Kenya and South Africa; 77 interviews with UNESCO staff and delegates, 
policy-makers in relevant government ministries, geneticists, ethicists, members 
of civil society organizations and industry professionals; and questionnaires.
2005–6 saw 30 interviews conducted in Kenya, 33 in South Africa, two in the 
United Kingdom (with people involved in the negotiation of the 2005 declaration) 
and two in France (at UNESCO headquarters in Paris). Seven further interviews 
in Kenya in 2011 augmented the initial fi ndings. Questionnaires sent to former 
interviewees and other key stakeholders from Kenya and South Africa in 2012 
sought to gauge their views on (a) progress in genetics and bioethics at national 
level (b) UNESCO’s capacity-building activities in ethics and (c) human 
reproductive cloning. Kenya and South Africa were chosen as the major fi eldwork 
destinations because of their signifi cant activities and involvement in bioethics 
and genetics locally, nationally, regionally and internationally. In Kenya, the 
Kenya Medical Research Institute carries out vaccine and drug trials for diseases 
such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and leprosy, while in South Africa geneticists are 
conducting research of both medical and evolutionary interest. Both countries 
have a long history of ethical review. The Human Research Ethics Committee of 
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the University of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), established in 1966, is one of 
the oldest in the world. Not far behind, the joint Kenyatta National Hospital and 
University of Nairobi Ethics and Research Committee was set up in 1974. 
Questionnaires were also sent to the UNESCO National Commissions and Paris-
based Permanent Delegations of 23 English-speaking sub-Saharan African 
countries. Seven National Commissions and three Permanent Delegations replied.
The book considers two different aspects of the UNESCO Bioethics 
Programme – deliberation and implementation – at international and national 
levels. Chapter 4 charts the international negotiation processes for the three 
declarations, focusing on the power dimensions between (a) developed and 
developing countries and (b) UNESCO member states and other actors, namely 
United Nations agencies working in related fi elds, non-governmental organizations 
and independent experts in bioethics. Power differentials between North and 
South surfaced in spite of formal procedures aimed at containing them and 
several non-state actors felt excluded from the process. Chapter 5 examines the 
take-up of the declarations around the world and how this has been infl uenced by 
their content, their non-binding status (in international law, declarations are by 
nature non-binding) and UNESCO’s efforts to encourage implementation through 
dissemination and capacity building. It also explores the relationship between 
UNESCO and other international bodies working in bioethics, particularly the 
World Health Organization. The choice of non-binding declarations enabled 
consensus among member states, but the pay-off is that adherence is harder to 
ensure. Engaging with stakeholders at national level is vital if the declarations are 
to have meaningful impact.
Chapters 6 and 7 peel back a layer to assess the impact of the declarations in 
Kenya and South Africa specifi cally. Chapter 6 asks who decided on each 
country’s negotiating position during the drafting of the declarations, how the 
declarations are perceived by the respective bioethics and scientifi c communities 
and whether they have been incorporated into national laws, regulations and 
policies. Chapter 7 outlines UNESCO’s capacity-building endeavours in Kenya 
and how these have been received, whether similar activities would be welcome 
in South Africa and the ethical challenges each country must confront. While the 
impact of the Bioethics Programme in each has been markedly different – Kenya 
has embraced it wholeheartedly, whereas in South Africa it barely features – both 
countries have instituted similar systems to improve ethical review of research. 
They also face similar challenges, in terms of protecting vulnerable populations, 
ensuring the benefi ts of research are shared equitably, training researchers and 
ethics committee members and educating and engaging with the public in ethical 
and scientifi c debate. 
In examining deliberation and implementation within the UNESCO Bioethics 
Programme, from these two different levels, the book addresses the following 
broad issues: how relations between developed and developing countries can be 
made more equal; who should be involved in global level decision-making and 
how this should proceed; how overlap between initiatives can be avoided; what 
can be done to improve the implementation of international norms by sovereign 
4  Introduction
states; how far universal norms can be contextualized; and what impact the 
effi cacy of national level governance has on that at international level. In this 
light, Chapter 8 reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the UNESCO Bioethics 
Programme, drawing on international relations theory to suggest how the latter 
might be addressed. It also considers the implications of the book’s fi ndings for 
the future of the human cloning debate and makes some practical recommendations 
on how the Bioethics Programme might move forward. First, though, Chapters 2 
and 3 outline the parameters of the analysis to follow. Chapter 2 introduces the 
fi elds of bioethics and human genetics, the governance dilemmas they raise and 
how the UNESCO Bioethics Programme tackles these. Chapter 3 then presents a 
theoretical framework through which UNESCO’s endeavours in bioethics 
governance can be investigated.
2 Bioethics
Human genetic and 
biomedical research ethics 
at UNESCO and beyond
Every scientifi c revolution brings with it a host of ethical and social questions. The 
so-called genetics revolution is no exception, giving rise to a broad international 
debate on how the undoubted benefi ts of progress in this area can be reconciled 
with certain core human values.
(UNESCO 2002a: 1)
Bioethics
Bioethics as a fi eld has evolved from two separate disciplines: medical ethics and 
moral philosophy. Concern for ethics in terms of patient welfare fi rst appeared in 
the form of the Hippocratic oath, while moral philosophers have come to refl ect 
on dilemmas faced by modern society alongside more abstract meta-ethics (Harris 
2001: 1–2). Bioethics is now seen to cover a wide range of issues, including 
genetics, reproductive technologies and biomedical research. John Harris (ibid: 4) 
gives a succinct defi nition in his introduction to Bioethics, part of the Oxford 
Readings in Philosophy series: ‘In short, bioethics investigates ethical issues 
arising in the life sciences (medicine, health care, genetics, biology, research, etc) 
by applying the principles and methods of moral philosophy to these problems.’
At international level, research ethics were fi rst laid down in regulatory form in 
1947, in the Nuremberg Code. This codifi cation was a response to the human 
rights abuses that had taken place through experimentation on human subjects 
under the Nazi regime of World War II and enshrined a key principle in bioethics, 
that of informed consent: a person agreeing to take part in research should do so 
voluntarily and with suffi cient knowledge and understanding of what is involved 
(Fluss 2004: 596–7; National Institutes of Health 2009). The Code also encom-
passes what have come to be known as the ‘four principles’ or ‘Georgetown 
principles’, formulated by philosophers Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in 
the 1970s, namely respect for autonomy, non-malefi cence, benefi cence and 
justice. Although contested, these principles provide a normative framework that 
is widely used by researchers and medical practitioners (Beauchamp 2001: 
479–80; Holm 2001: 494–5).
There have been several further attempts to codify good research practice, to 
ensure, as far as possible, that the rights of those who take part in research are 
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protected. In 1964, the World Medical Association produced the Declaration of 
Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 
which refl ects the four principles. Updated regularly, most recently in 2008, this 
is generally considered the foremost document globally on medical research 
ethics (Carlson et al. 2004: 695; World Medical Association 2008). The 2008 
version presents a signifi cant change in that it binds physicians to its provisions 
above all other international and national ethical, legal and regulatory requirements 
(the 2000 version set itself above only national obligations) (Rid and Schmidt 
2010: 143 and 145). The Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences’ International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects (CIOMS 2002) are intended to complement the Helsinki 
declaration. They give guidance on how its principles can be applied, particularly 
in developing countries. At other levels, many countries and research institutions 
have their own legal or regulatory instruments on bioethics, albeit usually based 
to a large extent on one or more of the international documents. The UNESCO 
declarations are the latest additions to this array.
Governance issues in bioethics
One of the main requirements of these various instruments will usually be that 
proposed research projects should be reviewed by a research ethics committee 
(REC). To ensure that a research project will be conducted ethically, RECs must 
determine whether the procedures for obtaining informed consent and the 
predicted risk/benefi t ratio will be conducive to the protection of research 
participants, in terms of privacy, confi dentiality, autonomy and safety (Benatar 
2002b: 1134). How such concerns should be met has warranted renewed refl ection 
in recent years, in the context of the growing frequency of research projects 
involving more than one country, including developing ones. The need to build 
capacity for ethical review in developing countries has also been noted. The 
extension of biomedical research beyond national borders renders international 
standards on bioethics necessary, so that research participants are treated equally 
and fairly, whichever country they are in (Gevers 2001: 293; Benatar 2002b: 
1135; Berlinguer 2004: 1087; Isasi and Knoppers 2006: 24).
Since these universal norms are likely to be realized in different cultures, it is 
important that their application be contextualized (Ateudjieu et al. 2010: 95). The 
Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics (2002: 51), an independent body based in the 
United Kingdom (UK), highlights the diffi culties that ensue if sponsors fail to 
familiarize themselves with the cultural traditions of the countries in which they 
fund research. Solomon Benatar and Peter Singer (2000: 826) recommend that 
international researchers should be sensitive to local social, economic and political 
contexts, while Zulfi qar Bhutta (2002: 116) suggests that communities should be 
involved in decision-making about research to be conducted in their locales.
Elsewhere, Benatar (2004: 576) stipulates that contextualization should only go 
so far: ‘respect for democracy should take precedence over the preservation of 
cultural traditions that undermine democracy and human rights’. Other ethicists 
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would disagree, believing the idea that universal norms exist at all to be erroneous. 
‘Agreement at the level of general norms has no inherent practical signifi cance 
since it is possible to derive markedly divergent policies and practices from the 
“same” principle, maxim, or moral intuition’, writes Leigh Turner (2003: 195). 
He argues that historical and anthropological evidence for a common morality 
(including the notion of universal human rights) is scarce (ibid: 194 and 197). 
Similarly, modern bioethics has been criticized for deeming universal what some 
consider to be merely Western notions of ethics (Benatar 2004: 575).
Ruth Macklin (2003: 475) highlights the need for effective oversight of 
research: ‘If a country lacks a mechanism for identifying and sanctioning 
researchers who violate laws, regulations, or fundamental ethical standards in 
carrying out the research, then all research subjects are potentially vulnerable.’ 
Singer and Benatar (2001: 747), in an article on the World Medical Association’s 
Declaration of Helsinki (the 2000 version), contend that building capacity in 
research ethics will have far more impact on ethical standards than ‘revisions of 
this or any other research ethics code’. Similarly, Bhutta (2002: 117–18) argues 
that strengthening local capacity in bioethics is key to promoting ethical health 
research in developing countries. Benatar (2002b: 1136–8) also stresses the need 
for research to be effectively monitored once it has been approved. He and 
Christopher Vaughan (2008: 439) cite lack of resources and expertise as the two 
main barriers to effective ethical oversight in Africa. Several studies conducted 
over the last decade on African RECs and national bioethics committees bear this 
out (Kirigia et al. 2005; Kass et al. 2007: 28; Nyika et al. 2009: 189; Rwabihama 
et al. 2010: 248; Ijsselmuiden et al. 2012: 1).
Capacity within RECs is not the only issue. Joses Kirigia et al. (2005), Sylvester 
Chima (2006: 849), Nancy Kass et al. (2007: 29) and Jean-Paul Rwabihama et al. 
(2010: 248) all found that committees need national as well as international level 
guidelines and policies to steer them, which do not always exist in developing 
countries. In the context of genomics research, Dave Chokshi and Dominic 
Kwiatkowski (2005: 12) link the need for local capacity with the need to 
contextualize universal principles: ‘Improving local capacity in bioethics in 
developing countries is essential to ensure that the philosophical principles of 
genomics ethics are informed by a practical understanding of what will work at 
the local level.’ With regard to developing capacity for research itself, as well 
as its review, Bhutta (2002: 114) suggests that developing countries should 
be enabled to carry out research relevant to their needs. Petros Isaakidis et al. 
(2002: 4) assert that local researchers should play a substantial role in defi ning 
what these needs are, rather than have research priorities dictated to them by the 
global North. Kirigia and Wambebe (2006), in a review of health research policy 
in 10 African countries, recommended that governments should develop strategic 
plans for health research, in collaboration with stakeholders from the public and 
private sectors.
Medical research is largely market driven, to the detriment of those in poor 
parts of the world where infectious diseases are rife. Debates in research ethics 
thus spill over from micro level regulatory concerns to the broader issue of how 
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inequalities of health between North and South should be addressed. Bhutta 
(2002: 118) deems these ‘vital components of the same equation’, as does Benatar 
(2001: 337): ‘Medical research, health care, conditions of life around the world 
and how humans fl ourish may seem separate, but they are all interdependent. 
Taking such a comprehensive global perspective adds complexity to the task of 
crafting universal research ethics guidelines.’ In 2000, in what was considered a 
radical article in the British Medical Journal (BMJ), Benatar and Singer advocated 
‘a new, proactive research ethics’, aimed at addressing the global health inequities 
they see as being the greatest ethical challenge (Benatar and Singer 2000: 826). 
Writing in The Lancet a few years later, Harold Varmus (2002: s4), former director 
of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the United States (US), expressed a 
similar view.
Like many commentators, Benatar and Singer (2000: 824) referred to the 
‘10/90 gap’: in 1990, approximately 90 per cent of annual health research funding 
was concentrated on only 10 per cent of the global disease burden. Similarly, a 
well-known study by Médecins Sans Frontières and the Drugs for Neglected 
Diseases Initiative showed that of the 1,556 drugs marketed between 1975 and 
2004, only 21 are for diseases mainly affecting the global South (Chirac and 
Torreele 2006: 1560). The fi gures have changed signifi cantly for the better in the 
last 20 years, through the efforts of, inter alia, the World Health Organization 
(WHO), The Wellcome Trust, NIH, the European Union and the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, but the ‘gap’remains symbolic (Benatar and Singer 2010: 194; 
Global Forum for Health Research 2011; Ijsselmuiden 2012: 74). In a follow-up 
to their BMJ paper, Benatar and Singer (2010: 195) acknowledged the 
improvements, but maintained that ‘the global medical research agenda remains 
skewed away from the needs of poor people’.
While those in developing countries have, until recently, seen relatively little 
benefi t from medical research, they may well have participated in it. Factors 
including open access to patients, lower costs and fewer regulations conspired to 
produce what Benatar has termed a ‘research sweat shop’ (Benatar 2001: 337; 
Emanuel et al. 2004: 930). Some people in countries with poor healthcare 
provision may have become research participants in order to receive treatment to 
which they would not normally have had access (Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics 
2002: 4). Giovanni Berlinguer (2004: 1087) has thus warned against medical 
research becoming a new form of exploitation. But if research in developing 
countries was to stop, for fear of abusing vulnerable populations, even fewer 
resources would be devoted to addressing their health concerns than is currently 
the case (Macklin 2003: 478; Clarke and Egan 2008: 44). The challenge is to 
develop means by which ethical research in developing countries can continue 
and grow.
Benatar and Singer (2000: 826), in their BMJ article, suggested as criteria that 
any proposed research should be relevant to the host country and likely to be of 
long-term benefi t. In the 2010 follow-up they called for intensifi ed efforts to 
ensure that research promotes social justice, through improved research capacity 
and healthcare in poor countries (Benatar and Singer 2010: 194–6). ‘Benefi t 
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sharing’ agreements, by which funders and researchers commit to sharing any 
gains from scientifi c or technological research with participants or the wider 
community, whether directly in terms of profi t or product or indirectly through 
capacity building and healthcare provision, may be one way to achieve this 
(UNESCO 2005s: article 5). Berlinguer (2004: 1088) summarizes the need for 
such measures as follows: ‘Benefi t-sharing and equal access to advances in 
biomedical science are now urgent and universal issues’ [italics added].
Genetics and genomics
The term ‘genomics’ derives from the word ‘genome’. A genome is the sum total 
of all the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) in any given individual or organism. DNA 
is made partly from four chemicals or bases, adenine, guanine, cytosine and 
thymine (abbreviated to A, G, C and T), which are sequenced in pairs along a 
genome. The human genome, for example, contains around 3 billion base pairs 
(Metcalfe et al. 2001: 71; US Department of Energy Offi ce of Science 2011). 
Humans have approximately 99.9 per cent of their genome in common with each 
other, with differences in the remaining 0.1 per cent being responsible for genetic 
variation between individuals (Schmidt 2001: A26).
Genes are particular sequences of DNA within the genome that determine certain 
characteristics of an organism, such as eye colour and contribute to others, such as 
health and behaviour (Metcalfe et al. 2001: 8). There are just over 20,000 genes 
within the human genome, accounting for less than 2 per cent of the genome’s 
DNA (Richards and Hawley 2011: 421 and 427). Some of the residual DNA 
supports genes by, for example, activating them at the correct time (Metcalfe et al. 
2001: 105–6). Geneticists have now discovered ‘some sort of function’ for around 
80 per cent of the genome, but there is much still to learn (Maher 2012: 46).
Geneticists can determine the order in which base pairs appear in a genome 
through a process called DNA sequencing. The end result is a ‘map’ of where 
each gene is positioned, as well as the supporting and non-functioning DNA. The 
most famous example of DNA sequencing is the Human Genome Project, which 
published drafts and a completed version of the human genome sequence in 2000, 
2003 and 2006 respectively (US Department of Energy Offi ce of Science 2006).
Some are keen to draw a clear distinction between genomics and genetics, as 
follows:
Genomics is the comprehensive examination of an organism’s entire set of 
genes and their interactions (as distinct from genetics, which is the study of a 
single gene or a small number of genes to determine specifi c gene roles in 
diseases or physical characteristics of an individual).
(Smith et al. 2004: 385)
Since, however, a genome contains genes (as well as the other types of DNA) the 
terms are often used somewhat interchangeably. In 2004, for example, the World 
Health Assembly, the decision-making body of the WHO, adopted by resolution 
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WHA57.13 the following defi nition: ‘genomics is the study of genes and their 
functions, and related techniques’ (WHO 2004: 21). Similarly, the Human 
Genome Organisation describes itself as ‘the international organization of 
scientists involved in human genetics’ (HUGO 2012). For the sake of simplicity, 
this book henceforth uses ‘genetics’ as a collective term for both genetics and 
genomics.
Genetics in developing countries
Genetics has the potential to transform health and healthcare, in both developed 
and developing countries. As knowledge of both the nature and functions of the 
human genome increases, genetic infl uences on human disease patterns will be 
identifi ed (Giallourakis et al. 2005: 399). While the principal cause of many 
diseases may be environmental, a growing pool of molecular data has led to the 
belief that there is a genetic component to almost all human diseases. A decade 
ago Kwiatkowski (2002: 1) predicted,
For example, genetic variation may partly explain why one child develops 
fatal cerebral malaria, or kwashiorkor, while other children living in the same 
compound are equally exposed to malaria parasites and to poor diet but do 
not develop these severe clinical syndromes. A huge amount of scientifi c 
effort is now being put into investigating the many different genetic factors 
that infl uence susceptibility to common diseases, in the hope that this will 
provide fundamental insights into molecular pathogenesis and ultimately 
lead to better methods of disease prevention.
Infectious diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis may involve 
several hundred genes, interacting both with each other and environmental risk 
factors. Genome-wide research enables the study of these complex diseases, 
affording valuable information concerning the molecular and cellular basis of 
disease in the search for effective vaccines and treatments (ibid; Kwiatkowski 
2000: 1062).
Benatar (2002a) questions whether biotechnology will really help the poor, if 
drugs that have already been developed have not been made available to the very 
many people in the global South that need them. With Gopal Sreenivasan, he 
advocates a more holistic approach, predicting that scientifi c advances in 
biotechnology will have little impact if broad disparities in wealth and health are 
not addressed with equal enthusiasm (Sreenivasan and Benatar 2006: 3). This was 
also the fi nding of a 2002 WHO report entitled Genomics and World Health. The 
report, which received considerable attention worldwide,1 stated that ‘the science 
of genomics holds tremendous potential for improving health globally’, but 
stressed the importance of ‘fundamental overarching strategies to improve 
health’, such as poverty alleviation, health systems development and education, 
alongside genetic science (WHO 2002: 3). Thus the value of any investment in 
genetics must be assessed relative to current approaches to healthcare and medical 
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research, such that these more conventional mechanisms are not neglected (WHO 
2003: 1–2).
The report also cautioned that it would take time for the possible health benefi ts 
of genetic research to come to fruition and that, because these are likely to be 
expensive, they have the potential to increase disparities in health. This was all the 
more concerning because most developing countries did not have ‘either the 
technological capacity or skill base to reap the potential benefi ts of genomics 
research and apply them to their health care needs’. Hence the report recommended 
that developing countries should develop clinical genetic services, which would 
be the simplest means of building the necessary capacity, as they use well-
established DNA technologies. These services would also enable early intervention 
to control hereditary diseases such as sickle-cell anaemia, which is particularly 
prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO 2002: foreword, 6, 83, 187 and 189). A 
2010 WHO consultation on community genetics in low and middle income 
countries found that provision is still inadequate (WHO 2010: iv).
Like the WHO report, bioethicists Abdallah Daar and Singer have warned that 
biotechnology could widen the gap between rich and poor. In a 2001 article in 
Science, they campaigned for an increase in investment, infrastructure and 
expertise to enable developing countries to capitalize on the promise of 
biotechnology and thus prevent a ‘genomics divide’ (Singer and Daar 2001: 87). 
Although the number of studies on non-Western populations (particularly African 
ones) is still comparably low, the last decade has seen an increased interest in 
genomics in developing countries (Hardy et al. 2008b: S23; Séguin et al. 2008: 
487; de Vries and Pepper 2012: 474). The African Ministerial Council on Science 
and Technology (AMCOST), established in November 2003 to coordinate and 
implement the science and technology programmes of NEPAD (the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development) and the African Union, under Africa’s 
Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action, sees great potential in 
genetics (and the life sciences in general) to fi ght diseases such as malaria and 
contribute to poverty reduction and economic growth (NEPAD 2005).
AMCOST has also identifi ed factors that could constrain the development 
potential of genetics and biotechnology, including insuffi cient scientifi c and 
technical capacity, infrastructure and funding. To address these, NEPAD established 
the African Biosciences Initiative in 2005, consisting of four regional networks of 
centres of excellence (NEPAD 2005; NEPAD Offi ce of Science and Technology 
2005: 7–9 and 2006: 5–6). In August 2007, a High-Level African Panel on Modern 
Biotechnology (set up, like AMCOST, under the auspices of the African Union and 
NEPAD) suggested that each African region should specialize in a particular area 
of biotechnology through ‘long-term “biotechnology missions”’, refl ecting existing 
expertise. Southern Africa could thus focus on health biotechnology and East 
Africa on livestock (Juma and Serageldin 2007: iii and xvii).
The most prominent programme on human genetics in Africa is the Human 
Heredity and Health in Africa Initiative (H3Africa), sponsored by The Wellcome 
Trust and NIH (de Vries and Pepper 2012: 475). This grew out of a proposal for 
an African Genome Project at the 2007 meeting of the African Society of Human 
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Genetics (Newport and Rotimi 2009: 251). The initiative has a budget of USD 
70 million for 2012–19 and aims to ‘catalyse’ genomics research in Africa, 
through investment in infrastructure, training, research projects and clinical 
services, in existing institutions and new centres of excellence. Collaborative 
networking will also be key. The ultimate goal is to improve health, by increasing 
understanding of the genetic and social determinants of communicable and non-
communicable diseases common in Africa (H3Africa 2011; H3Africa Working 
Group 2011: 1–2).
Why genetics needs governance
Human genetic research, like biomedical research in general, stretches beyond 
national borders: ‘An orders-of-magnitude increase in scale of genetic data 
collection has created the need for establishing diffuse international partnerships, 
sometimes across developed- and developing-world countries, with ramifi cations 
for assigning research ownership, distributing intellectual property rights, and 
encouraging capacity-building’ (Chokshi and Kwiatkowski 2005: 1). While 
genetics holds great promise, then, it also carries new ethical dilemmas, concerning 
both individuals and communities, which require international governance. 
Governance at national level may also be an issue. The WHO report Genomics 
and World Health found that many developing countries did not have regulatory, 
ethical or policy frameworks in place to deal with genetics (WHO 2002: 187–8).
One general concern in genetics is to balance freedom of research with 
individual rights. Anne-Marie Duguet (2001: 203) expresses this concern thus:
An acknowledged principle in our democratic societies, freedom in research, 
is viewed as inherent to freedom of thinking and it is therefore accepted that 
its fi nalities be unrestricted. However, genetic research explores a very 
sensible domain. Indeed, what is under investigation is a person’s intimate 
inheritance, origins, future and progeny.
Fears of discrimination on the basis of the information their genome contains may 
render some people reluctant to participate in genetic research. Thus confi dentiality 
must be protected (Reilly 2000: 489; Anderlik and Rothstein 2001: 404–5). A 
complicating factor is that, while each person’s genome is unique, it also carries 
information about their families (and possibly communities) (Knoppers 2002: 
86). This has consequences for how far someone’s right to autonomy should allow 
them to control personal genetic information (Laurie 2001: 1).
Other issues requiring guidance include the transfer of samples and data 
across national borders and the ensuing implications for ownership, particularly 
given the increase in international research projects. This affects developing 
countries disproportionately, as they have less capacity for in-house analysis. 
Standardization of procedures would enable both better protection of individual 
rights and further transnational research cooperation (Godard et al. 2003: S104). 
One trailblazer is the MalariaGEN project, a network of malaria researchers 
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across 21 countries. The project has set up rigorous materials transfers agreements 
between partners, as well as training for young researchers from all sites and the 
development of software enabling data analysis from anywhere in the world, 
without the need for expensive infrastructure (Parker et al. 2009: e1000143; de 
Vries et al. 2011).
Chokshi and Kwiatkowski (2005: 1) capture a major dilemma in genetic 
research with the question, ‘What is the structure of an equitable and fair system 
for distributing the fi nancial and scientifi c rewards of research?’ Some scientists 
are concerned that the patenting of gene sequences, including human ones, could 
be detrimental to both scientifi c advancement and healthcare provision (Andrews 
2002: 803). Researchers may be reluctant to share fi ndings for fear of precluding 
possible patents, while the cost of licence fees for gene-based products could 
render some treatments unaffordable. Others argue that, without the legal protec-
tion of intellectual property, there will be little incentive for companies to invest 
in research (Schmidt 2001: A29). The human genome itself is in the public 
domain, but data on the products derived from the information therein may not be. 
Richard Dahl (2001: A32) writes, ‘the mapping of the human genome opens huge 
potential markets for pharmaceutical and biotechnologic product developments, 
which take time and money. The question is, how much patent protection should 
those efforts enjoy?’
Some are concerned with the idea of gene sequencing at a more fundamental 
level. Eike-Henner Kluge argues that the patenting of human genes is ‘ethically 
indefensible and amounts to an unjustifi ed appropriation of a general human 
heritage’ (Kluge 2003: 119). The characterization of the human genome as the 
‘common heritage of humanity’ (HUGO Ethics Committee: 2002) promotes the 
idea of benefi t sharing (Knoppers and Chadwick 2005: 77). Who exactly deserves 
to benefi t is complicated, however, given that several parties will have contributed 
to the process of deriving a gene-based health product, from those who have given 
genetic samples, through to those who take it to market. Chokshi and Kwiatkowski 
(2005: 10–11) give the following example:
It is . . . unclear who deserves to gain fi nancially from, for instance, the 
discovery of a novel anti-malarial molecule from studies of national genetic 
diversity. Any of at least fi ve groups can make a claim: the subjects themselves, 
the health professionals who diagnosed and treated them, the epidemiologists 
who managed the study, the geneticists who produced the result, and the 
company that makes the end product. As Chadwick and Berg have pointed 
out, while our moral intuitions may sympathize most with the subjects’ claim, 
it is the scientists who have actually made the subjects’ samples ‘valuable’.
They thus advocate a broad approach to benefi t sharing in genetics:
If we assert fi rst that the reference human genome sequence belongs to 
mankind and second that, given the positive-externality effects of vaccines 
and therapies for infectious diseases, research is of potential benefi t to all, it 
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follows that the aims of benefi t-sharing should shift from purely local interests 
to broader interests.
(Chokshi and Kwiatkowski 2005: 11)
Between 2001 and 2006, Daar and Singer, with colleagues at the Toronto 
Joint Centre for Bioethics, promoted the idea of a global governance mechanism 
to ensure the benefi ts of genomics are enjoyed equitably. This was to sit 
outside the traditional intergovernmental structures of the UN, which were seen to 
be too slow-moving to keep pace with genomic innovation. The proposals 
went through various iterations, from a commission on genomics and global 
health, to a network-based Global Genomics Initiative. The idea was to bring 
together stakeholders from various sectors – industry, academia, governments and 
civil society – to promote global dialogue, collaboration and norm-setting (Singer 
and Daar 2001; Acharya et al. 2004a and 2004b; Dowdeswell et al. 2003, 2005 
and 2006). Although the initiative never formally took off, Daar, Singer and 
colleagues (now at the Sandra Rotman Centre for innovation in global health at 
Toronto) continue to publish widely on ways to promote science and technology, 
including genomics, for development. Ruha Benjamin (2009: 346) credits the 
Centre with establishing the fi eld of public health genomics, stating, ‘Through 
tremendous visibility and strategic collaboration, this relatively small group 
of health policy entrepreneurs is playing a principal role in the growing political 
will among governments to sponsor genomic initiatives and implement 
genomic sovereignty legislation’ (that is, legislation to protect the DNA of their 
populations).
The UNESCO Bioethics Programme
UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization) 
is a long-standing agency of the United Nations, comprising 195 member states. 
It was founded in 1945, aiming to ‘build peace in the minds of men’ through 
education, science, culture and communication. Its remit has now expanded to 
include poverty eradication, sustainable development and intercultural dialogue, 
in line with the Millennium Development Goals. It has a mandate to advise 
member states on developing national capacities (UNESCO 2007f; UNESCO 
2011e). UNESCO ‘functions as a laboratory of ideas and a standard-setter to forge 
universal agreements on emerging ethical issues’ (UNESCO 2011q). The ethics of 
science and technology is a priority within Social and Human Sciences, one of 
UNESCO’s fi ve specialized sectors. UNESCO aims to consolidate the universal 
values of justice, freedom and dignity, while acknowledging pluralism: ‘scientifi c 
and technological progress must be placed in a context of ethical refl ection rooted 
in the cultural, legal, philosophical and religious heritage of all our communities’ 
(UNESCO 2012j).
The UNESCO Bioethics Programme,2 part of the Division of Ethics and Global 
Change, began in 1993 with the formation of the International Bioethics 
Committee (IBC). Then Director-General of UNESCO, Federico Mayor, decided 
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that the organization should set up this committee so that it could ‘reply to the 
main ethical preoccupations raised by advances in the life sciences’ (UNESCO 
1994). An Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC) followed in 1999. 
Each committee has 36 members, the former made up of independent experts and 
the latter of representatives from selected member states (UNESCO 2012b). 
UNESCO also provides the secretariat for the UN Inter-Agency Committee on 
Bioethics, established in 2001 (UNESCO 2011a). Beyond UNESCO Headquarters 
in Paris, many of UNESCO’s activities are administered through National 
Commissions in each member state (UNESCO 2004m: 6).
One of UNESCO’s key activities is the setting of international standards, on 
which member states can subsequently draw to establish regulatory or legal 
frameworks at national level. Koïchiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO 
from 1999 to 2009, expressed the need for standards within science and technology 
in terms of transnational practices and benefi t sharing:
Present-day scientifi c practices cross national borders. Hence the imperative 
need to take action together at the international level – not to erect barriers 
against these practices, but to provide the necessary oversight so that the 
benefi ts of science may be enjoyed by all humanity. . . .
(UNESCO 2004n: 10)
UNESCO sees itself as particularly well-suited to standard setting in bioethics, as 
the only UN organization with competencies in both human and social sciences 
(ten Have 2005: 745; UNESCO 2012k). Publications, speech transcripts and the 
UNESCO website all emphasize its unique or leading role in this fi eld. As science 
and technology advance, its ‘ethical watch mandate’ becomes more and more 
pertinent (UNESCO 2012b). 
The UNESCO declarations
In recent years UNESCO has produced a series of declarations on bioethics and 
genetics: the 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights (UDHGHR), the 2003 International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 
(IDHGD) and the 2005 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
(UDBHR). These declarations have stemmed from the tremendous increase in the 
profi le of genetics and the extension of biomedical research beyond national 
borders. The three declarations are to be ‘treated integrally’; indeed, there is much 
common ground between them (UNESCO 2005a: 3). As a set, they prescribe how 
human genetic and biomedical research can be conducted ethically and encourage 
capacity building and knowledge sharing in science and ethics, particularly 
between North and South.
The IBC’s fi rst task was to prepare an international instrument on the human 
genome (the eventual UDHGHR). It appointed a Legal Commission to propose 
what form and substance the instrument should take, which met regularly between 
April 1994 and December 1996. An international consultation was launched in 
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May 1995. After receiving a progress report in November 1995, the twenty-eighth 
UNESCO General Conference requested that a draft declaration be developed, to 
be fi nalized by a committee of government experts appointed by member states 
(as per established protocol within the UN). The resultant draft was adopted 
‘unanimously and by acclamation’ at the twenty-ninth General Conference, in 
November 1997. A year later the UDHGHR was endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly (UNESCO 1999a: IV, 1–2 and 67). 
The UDHGHR was adopted in order to facilitate a balance between progress in 
genetics and protection of human rights. The preamble states:
The General Conference, . . . recognizing that research on the human genome 
and the resulting applications open up vast prospects for progress in improving 
the health of individuals and of humankind as a whole, but emphasizing that 
such research should fully respect human dignity, freedom and human rights, 
as well as the prohibition of all forms of discrimination based on genetic 
characteristics, proclaims the principles that follow and adopts the present 
Declaration.
(UNESCO 1997)
Although the declaration covers human genetic data in a general sense, it was felt 
that their collection, processing, storage and use needed to be addressed more 
specifi cally and as a matter of urgency. Growth in the number of human genetic data-
bases and international research programmes, increasing private sector involve-
ment and the need to protect vulnerable populations were all contributing factors 
to this decision. The IBC had already produced two reports on this subject when 
the Director-General requested in May 2001 that it look into drafting an inter-
national instrument thereupon. The thirty-fi rst General Conference endorsed the 
initiative the following November and the IBC duly set up a drafting group. After 
widespread written and verbal consultations and further scrutiny by various 
UNESCO bodies – the IBC, the Executive Board (elected by the biennial General 
Conference and constituting 58 member states), an intergovernmental meeting of 
experts and a working group – the draft IDHGD was adopted ‘unanimously and 
by acclamation’ on 16 October 2003, at the thirty-second General Conference, as 
‘an extension of and means of implementing’ the UDHGHR (UNESCO 2000a; 
UNESCO 2002a; UNESCO 2003c: 1 and 3; UNESCO 2012i).
In 2001 the General Conference had invited the Director-General to look into 
the possibility of elaborating a universal instrument on bioethics. On the basis of 
the IBC’s subsequent report, the 2003 General Conference declared the setting of 
universal standards in bioethics to be ‘imperative and desirable’ (Berlinguer 
2004: 1088). The drafting process for the UDBHR was launched in January 
2004. As with the previous two declarations, a drafting group was appointed 
and an extensive consultation process initiated, involving UNESCO, member 
states and other stakeholders. It was decided that universal guidelines on ‘all 
issues’ in bioethics were needed (UNESCO 2003h: 2; UNESCO 2004o; UNESCO 
2005q).
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The UNESCO website (2012e) has for several years defi ned bioethics as 
follows:
Stem cell research, genetic testing, cloning: progress in the life sciences is 
giving human beings new power to improve our health and control the 
development processes of all living species. Concerns about the social, 
cultural, legal and ethical implications of such progress have led to one of the 
most signifi cant debates of the past century. A new word has been coined to 
encompass these concerns: bioethics.
The fi nal text of the UDBHR contains no reference to issues such as stem cells, 
however, because they proved too controversial to enable consensus. Thus the 
original aim proved over-ambitious. Illustrating a complete reversal, a 2005 
report described the IBC’s fi nal draft text as ‘far from attempting to resolve all 
the existing bioethics issues’ (UNESCO 2005h: 7). Henk ten Have, Head of 
UNESCO’s Division of the Ethics of Science and Technology (the predecessor to 
the Division of Ethics and Global Change) from 2003 to 2010, explained, 
‘Research into stem cells and cloning does not for now affect the lives of most 
people. They remain a hope for the future, but right now, people are dying because 
of poor health conditions. We must concentrate on this problem’ (Tousni 2006). 
Rather than trying to address the large and ever-growing number of specifi c 
bioethics issues, he wrote in 2006, the declaration provides a ‘basis’ or ‘frame of 
reference’ for states developing legislation or policies on bioethics (ten Have 
2006: 341). The declaration was adopted ‘by acclamation’ by the General 
Conference, on 19 October 2005 at its thirty-third session (UNESCO 2005r).
All three UNESCO declarations aim to promote human dignity, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the context of bioethics and genetics, while at the 
same time embracing principles of responsibility, solidarity, equality and justice, 
as affi rmed in the preamble of each. They cover both medical and research ethics; 
article 5 of the UDHGHR refers to ‘research, treatment or diagnosis affecting an 
individual’s genome’, for example (UNESCO 1997). Each contains articles on 
informed consent, risks and benefi ts, confi dentiality, freedom of research, ethics 
committees and bioethics education and training. The IDHGD (2003) and the 
UDBHR (2005) also cover transnational practices and the monitoring and 
management of research. As well as these general provisions, the two genetics 
declarations include principles specifi c to their context; both, for example, 
condemn discrimination on the basis of genetic characteristics and genetic 
reductionism. The UDHGHR (articles 1 and 4) also disallows reproductive 
cloning and states that the human genome, the ‘heritage of humanity’, in its 
natural state should not enable fi nancial gain (UNESCO 1997).
The declarations also contain several principles that are particularly pertinent to 
developing countries. The UDHGHR (1997, article 17) promotes research on 
genetically infl uenced endemic diseases, while the UDBHR (2005, articles 6(3), 
8 and 12) endorses community engagement, the protection of individuals and 
groups of special vulnerability and due regard for cultural diversity and pluralism. 
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All three display a strong commitment to benefi t sharing, knowledge exchange 
and capacity building. Article 18 of the UDHGHR, for example, reads:
States should make every effort . . . to continue fostering the international 
dissemination of scientifi c knowledge concerning the human genome, human 
diversity and genetic research and, in that regard, to foster scientifi c and 
cultural co-operation, particularly between industrialized and developing 
countries.
(UNESCO 1997)
Article 18 of the IDHGD (2003) is very similar, the only difference being that it 
reads ‘human genetic data and human proteomic data’ rather than ‘human genome, 
human diversity and genetic research’ (UNESCO 2003b).
The UDBHR (2005) is different again, as follows (article 24 (2)):
Within the framework of international cooperation, States should promote 
cultural and scientifi c cooperation and enter into bilateral and multilateral 
agreements enabling developing countries to build up their capacity to 
participate in generating and sharing scientifi c knowledge, the related know-
how and the benefi ts thereof.
(UNESCO 2005s)
The UDBHR also directly addresses inequalities of health. Article 14, on social 
responsibility, pertains to social and economic rights as bioethical issues. Citing 
the promotion of health and social development as ‘a central purpose of 
government’, it states that progress in science and technology should advance 
access to healthcare, nutrition, water and improved environmental and living 
conditions and reductions in marginalization, illiteracy and poverty (ibid). These 
were considered important elements of the proposed declaration from an early 
stage. The IBC’s 2003 report on the possibility of a new bioethics instrument 
notes, ‘Our global society must face the responsibility to use science and 
technology to promote public health and to equalize access to healthcare and 
medicines’ (UNESCO 2003h: 4). (Berlinguer was rapporteur to the working 
group that compiled the report.)
Relation to other bioethics instruments
UNESCO’s status as an intergovernmental UN agency is a key factor in its 
justifi cation for its bioethics activities. Noëlle Lenoir, Chair of the IBC from 1993 
to 1998, claims that UNESCO played a ‘major role in laying the foundations of 
international bioethics’ through the UDHGHR (1997), in a paper titled ‘The fi rst 
legal and ethical framework at the global level’ (Lenoir 1998–9: 546). The 
UNESCO website describes the UDHGHR as having been ‘the only international 
instrument in the fi eld of bioethics’ at the time of its endorsement by the UN 
General Assembly in 1998 (UNESCO 2012b). Similarly, Koïchiro Matsuura, then 
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Director-General, declared in June 2005 that the UDBHR would ‘close a wide gap 
at the international level’ (UNESCO 2005m: Annex II, 1–2) and ten Have (2006: 
342) has described the governmental commitment enshrined in the bioethics 
declaration as its ‘innovative dimension’. All this implies that ethics guidelines 
produced by professional organizations, such as the World Medical Association 
(WMA) and the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS), are not truly ‘inter-national’, because they have not been agreed by 
nation-states (although CIOMS is in offi cial relations with the WHO). Yet, where 
the WMA’s Declaration of Helsinki is formally directed at physicians or 
researchers, the CIOMS guidelines, like the UNESCO declarations, are intended 
to be used in the designing of national policy on biomedical research ethics, 
particularly in developing countries.
Unusually, the UDBHR (2005) notes these non-UN documents in its preamble. 
The declaration is also considered unique in scope, as it is not confi ned to medical 
or research ethics (UNESCO 2005h: 6). Justice Kirby, who chaired the UDBHR 
drafting committee, purports, ‘It lifts the eyes of bioethicists from the patient’s 
bedside and the hospital ward to a new insistence on the relevance to the bioethics 
discipline for society, the community, humanity, all living beings and the 
biosphere’ (Kirby 2010: 794). ten Have (2006: 341) goes even further:
The Declaration on Bioethics thus opens perspectives for action that reach 
further than just medical ethics and reiterates the need to place bioethics 
within the context of refl ection open to the political and social world. Today, 
bioethics goes far beyond the code of ethics of the various professional 
practices concerned. It implicates refl ection on the evolution of society, 
indeed world stability, induced by scientifi c and technological developments. 
The Declaration on Bioethics paves the way for a new agenda of bioethics at 
the international level.
UNESCO and human cloning
After three declarations within a decade, at the end of 2005 UNESCO decided to 
take a ‘normative pause’ and instead concentrate on supporting the implementation 
of the existing declarations at regional and national levels (UNESCO 2005a: 4). It 
was not long, however, before it started to think about a fourth instrument. Despite 
ten Have’s words about the limited relevance of stem cell research and cloning to 
the majority of the world’s population, in 2008 the IBC set up a working group to 
examine whether there was any call for an international convention on human 
cloning.
What is cloning?
Human cloning inspires strong views, but also confusion about what exactly 
the term means and why the practice appears to be universally condemned. There 
are two types of cloning: ‘reproductive’ cloning and ‘therapeutic’ or ‘research’ 
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cloning. None of these terms are strictly accurate scientifi cally, but are widely used. 
They derive from when the only means of cloning were embryo splitting and 
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). SCNT is the process by which a single 
nucleus from a somatic (body) cell is transferred into an enucleated egg. The 
resulting embryo can be used for either reproductive or research purposes. 
Reproductive cloning sees the embryo being implanted into a female for gestation. 
Dolly the Sheep was the fi rst mammal to be cloned by this method in July 1996. 
Therapeutic cloning sees the embryo being harvested rather than gestated, to glean 
stem cells (embryonic stem cells or ESCs). These cells are pluripotent, meaning 
they have the capacity to develop into various types of specialized cells. They occur 
naturally only in the early stages of embryonic development. Stem cells harvested 
from a cloned embryo are likely to be particularly useful in therapeutic terms, 
because they will be compatible with the originator’s immune system (Wilmut 
et al. 1998: 21; Bowring 2004: 402–3; Isasi et al. 2004: 628; UNU-IAS 2007: 6).
Therapeutic cloning is seen to have great potential as a means of replacing 
damaged tissue and organs, but it remains controversial on several fronts. Some 
oppose the utilitarian creation of embryos purely for research, while others are 
concerned about the risks to egg donors. The strongest objection is to the destruction 
of embryos entailed in harvesting, on the grounds that they are morally equivalent 
to human persons. For those who believe human life begins at conception, even 
therapeutic cloning is reproductive (Isasi et al. 2004: 628; Lo et al. 2010: 17). 
In 2006 a new method was developed that avoids destroying embryos, by re-
engineering somatic cells to become pluripotent (induced pluripotent stem cells 
or iPSCs). This may circumvent the moral objections to therapeutic cloning by 
SCNT, but it opens up new possibilities for human reproductive cloning, through 
tetraploid complementation (a method used to clone mice) and artifi cial gamete 
production (Meyer 2008: 851; Lo et al. 2010: 16; UNESCO 2010g: 2).
Arguments for and against human reproductive cloning
Since the cloning of Dolly the Sheep made human reproductive cloning seem 
feasible within the near future, a plethora of authors – mainly bioethicists and 
lawyers rather than scientists – have argued for and against the development of 
this technology. Those in favour take a liberal position, in the name of reproductive 
freedom. They also see cloning as a promising means to combat infertility. Those 
against are concerned for the psychological health of the clone and society more 
broadly. Where there is near universal consensus is on the safety issue (Galton and 
Doyal 1998: 279; J. Robertson 1998: 1372 and 1410; de Melo-Martín 2002: 248; 
Cheshire et al. 2003: 1010; Gogarty 2003: 84; Harris-Short 2004: 333; Tauer 
2004: 209). Most scientists and philosophers agree that, as technology stands, it 
would be unethical to attempt human reproductive cloning. Fears for the physical 
health of both the clone and the mother are grounded in the poor record in animal 
cloning. Dolly was the only one of 277 attempts to survive to birth. Success 
rates in mammals remain very low and genetic abnormalities are common 
(Elsner 2006: 597). Even if these issues could be resolved, say some, there would 
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still be moral objections to cloning (Cheshire et al. 2003: 1010; Polkinghorne 
2004: 593).
Fears for the psychological health of a human clone are rooted in two related 
concepts. First, having a unique identity is seen as an inherently human quality, 
which a clone would be unable to enjoy. Second, they would be denied their right 
to ignorance (as articulated by Hans Jonas), or to an open future (Joel Feinberg), 
if they knew about the life of the person from whom they were cloned, or were 
expected by their ‘parents’ to conform to a particular life pattern (J. Robertson 
1998: 1411 and 1415–16; Burley and Harris 1999: 110; de Melo-Martín 2002: 
249–50; Gogarty 2003: 85; Harris-Short 2004: 344; Tauer 2004: 209; Tannert 
2006: 239; Mameli 2007: 87; Morales 2009: 43). These fears are seen by several 
scholars as speculative, with no basis in science. Nestor Morales (2009: 48) has 
reviewed analogous psychological studies (of twins, for example) and concluded 
that there is no evidence that individuals produced through reproductive cloning 
‘could display the characteristics of their donors to the extent of compromising 
uniqueness’. To believe otherwise, say the critics, is to engage in a crude genetic 
determinism that does not take suffi cient account of environmental factors.
A clone would not be an exact copy of their ‘original’ in all respects, but would 
simply have the same genetic code, as do ‘identical’ twins, who are considered to 
have unique personalities nevertheless. Since environment plays an important 
part in development, ‘time-separated twins’ would be less similar than monozygotic 
twins, whose psychological well-being is not of major concern (Harris 1997: 
353–4; Brock 1998: 152; J. Robertson 1998: 1415; de Melo-Martín 2002: 249–50; 
Pearson 2006: 658; Camporesi and Bortolotti 2008: e15; Morales 2009: 44–45; 
Ahlberg and Brighouse 2010: 541; Aloni 2011: 57). But the time delay is the 
signifi cant factor, say Evelyne Shuster (2003: 520) and David Jensen (2008: 620), 
not least because of the implications for notions of parenthood if one’s mother or 
father is also one’s genetic ‘twin’. For Christof Tannert (2006: 239), by contrast, 
the important point is that the similarity between monozygotic twins has occurred 
by chance rather than deliberate decision.
Inmaculada de Melo-Martín (2002: 251), like Justine Burley and Harris (1999: 
111), argues that policies should not be based on public misunderstandings about 
what cloning really entails. Finn Bowring (2004: 405) agrees that the problem lies 
in a false premise rather than the probable impact of cloning on identity per se, but 
believes this will lead to genetic determinism all the same:
The effects of eugenic technologies like human cloning are mediated by a 
cultural attachment to genetic determinism which both underpins and is 
consolidated by those same technologies. The problem is not that the autonomy 
and uniqueness of individuals will be lost, and hence they will be undeserving 
of the respect and dignity normally accorded to human beings. It is, rather, that 
the respect, love and recognition ideally expressed by adults towards the child 
will be subverted by their expectation that they have ordered a predetermined 
product, and this expectation will in turn promote the misrecognition or 
repression of the child’s attempts to assert its autonomy and uniqueness.
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John Robertson (2000–01: 41) sees these concerns as based on a misreading of 
parental motivations, at least in the case of an infertile couple who simply desire 
a genetically similar child, rather than to dictate the every move of their offspring. 
Any danger of psychological harms could thus be minimized through information 
and counselling. Joyce Havstad (2010: 74 and 76) agrees with Bowring that 
misconceptions of reality or fact have real consequences, which cannot be ignored, 
but also suggests information and monitoring as a means to mitigate these. A 
further counter-argument to Bowring is that there have always been parents who 
try to infl uence their children in an overbearing or less than perfect way, without 
this warranting interference in parenting styles (Harris 1997: 358; Camporesi and 
Bortolotti 2008: e15; Ahlberg and Brighouse 2010: 542).
Concerns about identity and ‘human-ness’ also extend to the societal level. 
Some believe reproductive cloning would violate human dignity (GAEIB 1997: 
351; Cheshire et al. 2003: 1011; Shuster 2003: 522–3; Harris-Short 2004: 352). A 
somewhat nebulous concept, human dignity encompasses ideas of intrinsic worth, 
self-determination and autonomy. Many equate it with Immanuel Kant’s 
categorical imperative that people should always be treated as ends not means; 
that is, they should not be commercialized or instrumentalized (S. Robertson 
1998: 282; Tannert 2006: 239). Shuster (2003: 524) has suggested that cloning 
could lead to a new form of slavery, in the form of ‘genetic bondage’.
The very mechanics of cloning are also seen as a threat to humanity. 
Reproductive cloning would be different to other forms of assisted reproductive 
technologies because it would mimic asexual rather than sexual reproduction and 
thus be ‘unnatural’. If part of being human is that one is the unique and unplanned 
result of the combination of two separate chromosomes, then reproductive cloning 
would mean nothing less than a redefi nition of what it means to be human 
(J. Robertson 1998: 1410; S. Robertson 1998: 282; Cheshire et al. 2003: 1011; 
Häyry 2003: 456–7; Shuster 2003: 521; Aloni 2011: 56). This distinction between 
the natural and the unnatural has been criticized as arbitrary. As David McCarthy 
(1999: 99) points out, marriage between racial groups has been deemed unnatural 
by some jurisdictions in the past. John Polkinghorne (2004: 597) similarly reminds 
us that much of routine medicine is unnatural.
Another societal level threat that cloning is perceived to carry is reduced human 
genetic diversity (Gogarty 2003: 84; Aloni 2011: 5). Jaime Ahlberg and Harry 
Brighouse (2010: 541) refute this possibility, as it is predicated on the highly 
unlikely scenario of vast numbers of clones with the same genetic code being 
created. In the eyes of several bioethicists, the idea of an army of clones is 
unfeasible, futile and the stuff of science fi ction. The reality will be far more 
mundane, with cloning being the last resort for such a small number of (honourably 
intentioned) people that the impact on genetic diversity will be negligible (Harris 
1997: 356–7; Harris-Short 2004: 359; Elsner 2006: 596; Camporesi and Bortolotti 
2008: e15). Furthermore, they argue, we cannot ban behaviours or techniques 
because they might be open to abuse. If we did this consistently, the implications 
for human society would be enormous (Harris 1997: 356; McCarthy 1999: 99; 
Camporesi and Bortolotti 2008: e15).
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Reproductive freedom, or procreative autonomy, is one of the key arguments in 
favour of allowing human reproductive cloning. If safety issues can be resolved, 
this principle would allow people to use cloning technology as and when they 
wish – to replace a dead loved one, for example (Harris 1997: 358; J. Robertson 
1998: 1381 and 1391; de Melo-Martín 2002: 253–4; Häyry 2003: 450; Harris-
Short 2004: 333; Tauer 2004: 209; Aloni 2011: 68). Authors differ on how broadly 
the right to reproductive freedom should be interpreted. Dan Brock (1998: 143) 
and Havstad (2010: 73) frame it as a negative right to non-interference in one’s 
reproductive choices, not a positive right to reproductive assistance. Sonia Harris-
Short (2004: 334) fi nds a similar reading of states’ obligations in international 
human rights law (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
for example). She thus concludes that there is no reproductive right to cloning: 
‘under international law, no one has an absolute right to procreate in any way they 
choose’ (Harris-Short 2004: 359). In a US context, John Robertson (1998: 1441) 
argues for a constitutional right to fertility treatment, to include cloning if and 
when this becomes feasible. Cheshire et al. (2003: 1011), by contrast, also writing 
from a US perspective, contend that reproductive liberty is not an inalienable 
right, nor is it a purely private matter. In the case of cloning, they argue, individual 
autonomy does not outweigh the public interest.
Closely linked with the reproductive freedom argument is the hope that 
reproductive cloning could help infertile couples and others who are unable to 
conceive ‘naturally’ (lesbian or gay couples, for example), or who are carriers of 
conditions such as Huntington’s disease, to have genetically related children 
(Harris 1997: 357; J. Robertson 1998: 1378 and 1445; de Melo-Martín 2002: 253; 
Häyry 2003: 449; Harris-Short 2004: 333; Tauer 2004: 209; Pearson 2006: 658; 
Havstad 2010: 72; Aloni 2011: 22). Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz (2005: 232) and 
Robert Sparrow (2006: 308) cite the potential to combat infertility as the strongest 
argument there is for reproductive cloning. If cloning is the only means by which 
an individual or couple could have a genetically related child, the argument that 
they should be able to use this technology to exercise their reproductive freedom 
is much stronger than a general appeal to autonomy and does not carry the usual 
concerns of parental narcissism or clonal armies taking over the world. Several 
authors support the use of cloning as an infertility treatment if scientifi c concerns 
about the safety of the procedure can be addressed (J. Robertson 2000–01: 35; 
Strong 2008: 130). Going ahead even with a higher than normal chance a child 
could be born with birth defects or abnormalities might not be unethical, unless 
the child’s life would not be worth living (J. Robertson 2000–01: 40; Elsner 2006: 
597 and 600; Lane 2006: 135). The ‘life worth living’ argument has also been 
applied against concerns about psychological harms to the clone (Burley and 
Harris 1999: 113; Havstad 2010: 74).
Some ethicists counter the argument for cloning as a fertility treatment on the 
grounds that, like the arguments about identity and uniqueness, it is based on a 
genetic fallacy (Sparrow 2006: 308). Levy and Lotz (2005: 232) believe that the 
importance attached to genetic relatedness is a societal construct. If environmental 
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factors are at least as important as genetic ones in determining a person’s identity, 
as those in favour of cloning argue, how can cloning to enable parents to have 
genetically similar children be justifi ed? J. Robertson (1998: 1373), who supports 
reproductive cloning (if safe), recognizes this tension:
The desire to clone arises precisely because genes are viewed as highly 
important, if not crucial, in making people who they are. Assigning signifi -
cance to genes, however, risks becoming a crude form of genetic essentialism 
or determinism. At the same time that one grants genes their due, one also 
must guard against expecting too much from them.
Implications for regulation and research
With very few exceptions, philosophers and scientists are agreed that human 
reproductive cloning should not currently be allowed: ‘Unlike many other areas of 
reproductive technology and indeed biotechnology, the practice has been near 
unanimously condemned by the scientifi c, medical, ethical, and general commu-
nities’ (Gogarty 2003: 84). As Roger Brownsword and Matti Häyry point out, 
however, this consensus is a ‘happenstance convergence’ (Brownsword 2004–5: 
538), or a ‘happy constellation’ (Häyry 2003: 459) that masks the confl icting 
principles bubbling under the surface. There is a fundamental difference in outlook 
between those who oppose reproductive cloning on safety or pragmatic grounds 
and those who see it as inherently wrong. John Robertson falls into the fi rst 
category. In an oft-cited paper of 1998, in which he systematically reviewed the 
arguments for and against cloning, he concluded that a complete ban on human 
reproductive cloning could not be justifi ed. He wrote, ‘When carefully analyzed, 
the alleged harms of cloning tend to be highly speculative, moralistic, or subjective 
judgments about the meaning of family and how reproduction should occur’ 
(J. Robertson 1998: 1441). Yet the view that cloning should be allowed once safety 
concerns have been resolved is itself speculative, as it is premised on a hypothetical 
level of suffi cient evidence that attempting human cloning would carry an ethically 
acceptable degree of risk (Galton and Doyal 1998: 279).
de Melo-Martín (2002: 246–7) claims that arguments both for and against 
reproductive cloning fail to stand up to scrutiny, because they ignore context. The 
reality, she says, is that we live in a world where overpopulation, poverty and ill-
health are rife:
When one reads analyses of this technology, one has the impression that we 
live in a society where our most serious and pressing problems are the pleas 
of infertile people, or the requests of those who want to replace their dead 
loved ones; a world where genetic disease is the main cause of preventable 
deaths, where individuality is threatened, where one of the worst things that 
can happen to children is that their parents have too many expectations 
because of their genetic make up, and where resources are all but limited.
(de Melo-Martín 2002: 264)
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Sparrow (2006: 318) similarly argues that moral arguments against cloning are 
not strong enough to trump reproductive autonomy, but asks whether pursuing 
cloning research would be an ethical use of scarce resources. Others baulk at the 
expense, given the lack of scientifi c or medical justifi cation for the risks involved 
(GAEIB 1997: 351; Gogarty 2003: 85). McCarthy (1999: 98) contends that the 
‘it’s expensive’ argument usually masks moral objections, but for Rosalind 
McDougall (2008: 259), like Sparrow, the expense is in itself a moral issue. She 
claims that investing in reproductive cloning would be an affront not to the dignity 
of the clone, but to the dignity of all those who are deprived of their basic rights 
and liberties through ill-health. Myfanwy Williams (2009: 331) directly counters 
this claim, citing the fact that we cannot know what the fruits of research will be. 
The question of how to balance meeting basic needs with the possibilities 
technological advancement brings goes far beyond the cloning debate, to the very 
heart of the scientifi c endeavour.
How human cloning is currently regulated
Given the albeit strained consensus that human reproductive cloning would be 
unethical under current conditions, it might be expected that this would be 
refl ected in international and national laws. This is only partially the case. Many 
countries, but by no means all, have enacted legislation to ban reproductive and/
or therapeutic cloning. Often this legislation refers to SCNT rather than cloning 
more generally and thus does not cover the newer technologies (Lo et al. 2010: 
16). At regional and international level, in the wake of Dolly, several measures 
were brought out. UNESCO’s 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights (UDHGHR) is unequivocal: ‘Practices which are contrary to 
human dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings, shall not be 
permitted’ (UNESCO 1997: article 11). The WHO passed resolutions in 1997 and 
1998 stating that human reproductive cloning is contrary to human dignity and 
urging member states to prohibit it (WHO 1998: 1). The Council of Europe’s 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on the 
Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, adopted in 1998, similarly prohibits 
reproductive cloning in all circumstances (articles 1 and 2), as does the European 
Union’s 2000 (amended 2007) Charter of Fundamental Human Rights (article 3). 
None of these constitute an absolute ban, however: the UDHGHR, as a declaration, 
is by defi nition non-binding, the Council of Europe’s Protocol has been ratifi ed by 
only 21 of its 47 member states (Council of Europe 2012) and the European Union 
(EU) Charter applies to its members only when enacting EU law (Europa 2010). 
This hole in the international canon prompted the UN General Assembly to look 
towards a binding convention in 2001. The end result was the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Cloning of 2005.
The circumstances surrounding the adoption of the UN Declaration on Human 
Cloning have been thoroughly documented by several authors (Isasi and Annas 
2003 and 2006; Arsanjani 2006; Cameron and Henderson 2008). In 2001, in 
response to claims by some scientists that they would soon attempt human 
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reproductive cloning, France and Germany proposed a convention to ban the 
reproductive cloning of human beings to the UN General Assembly. They decided 
on the UN rather than UNESCO, which had already proscribed the practice in its 
1997 UDHGHR, because of its wider membership (crucially, the US was not at 
the time a member of UNESCO) and its status as the premier global legislative 
forum. Moreover, as cloning is cross-cutting, touching on science, ethics, health 
and human rights, they felt it could not be dealt with fully by any one of the UN’s 
specialized agencies (Isasi and Annas 2003: 405; Arsanjani 2006: 164–5; 
UNU-IAS 2007: 16; Cameron and Henderson 2008: 153). It was expected 
that drafting and adopting a convention would be a relatively straightforward 
endeavour, as there was consensus among member states that human reproductive 
cloning was undesirable (Arsanjani 2006: 166; Cameron and Henderson 2008: 
157). What followed was four years of dispute and discord, as rival factions 
fought their corners. The divergence was not over reproductive cloning, but 
therapeutic cloning (or, more specifi cally, whether there is really a signifi cant 
difference between these two procedures, as both involve human embryos).
Some states felt that if only reproductive cloning were to be outlawed, this 
would implicitly endorse therapeutic cloning (that is, the creation and destruction 
of embryos), which would be unacceptable for those who believe human life 
begins at conception. Pragmatically, they worried that allowing therapeutic 
cloning could create a ‘slippery slope’ towards reproductive cloning and that it 
would be diffi cult to prevent rogue researchers implanting embryos that had 
originally been created for research purposes. There were also concerns about the 
impact on women, particularly in developing countries, who might be enticed to 
undergo risky procedures in order to produce large numbers of eggs for money. 
The US and Costa Rica led this faction, which grew to almost 70 states, including 
Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia and several other developing countries (Isasi and Annas 
2003: 408–10; Isasi and Annas 2006: 61; Arsanjani 2006: 167–72; Cameron and 
Henderson 2008: 160–3).
Commentators differ on how interested or involved developing countries were 
in the debate. According to Nigel Cameron and Anna Henderson (2008: 171), 
these countries were ‘particularly vocal’ regarding the exploitation of women. 
Led by Tanzania and Nigeria, they also successfully lobbied for the inclusion of 
an article that resembles in spirit Article 14 of the UDBHR (2005) on social 
responsibility, encouraging states to consider ‘the pressing global issues such as 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, which affect in particular the developing 
countries’ when allocating research funding (United Nations 2005a; Isasi and 
Annas 2006: 65). Rosario Isasi and George Annas (2006: 62) put this down to the 
political manoeuvring of the US and Costa Rica, which used this issue to broker 
the support of developing countries for a comprehensive ban. For Mahnoush 
Arsanjani (2006: 178), the inclusion of this article, which makes no mention of 
cloning, demonstrates the ‘remoteness’ of the issue for many developing countries.
On the other side, feelings ran equally strong. Those states in favour of 
therapeutic cloning would not countenance a holistic ban. This smaller group, led 
by the UK and Belgium, argued for an immediate international prohibition of 
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reproductive cloning, to prevent unscrupulous scientists fi nding sanctuary in 
states without appropriate jurisdiction, to be followed by further measures on 
therapeutic cloning as and when these could be agreed. This option, in turn, was 
unacceptable to those in favour of a complete embargo. Realising proceedings 
were at deadlock, in November 2003 the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
proposed discussions should be postponed for two years, in the hope that consensus 
might be possible at a later date. (There had already been a year long pause in 
negotiations in 2002–3 (Isasi and Annas 2003: 410–12; Arsanjani 2006: 172).) 
The General Assembly agreed to a delay of one year. As stances remained fi rm 
after the hiatus, in November 2004 it decided to opt for a declaration rather than a 
convention, in the vain hope that states would be able to agree on a non-binding 
instrument (Isasi and Annas 2003: 413; Isasi and Annas 2006: 62).
The UN Declaration on Human Cloning was adopted by the General Assembly 
on 8 March 2005, but by no means unanimously. Only 84 voted in favour, with 
34 against and 37 abstentions. (Later, seven states informed the UN Secretariat 
they had intended to vote in favour, one that they would have voted against and 
two that they would have abstained.) The reason why so many states felt they 
could not support the declaration was its ambiguous wording (Arsanjani 2006: 
165–6 and 176). The declaration calls on states to ‘prohibit all forms of human 
cloning inasmuch as they are incompatible with human dignity and the protection 
of human life’ (United Nations 2005a). The UK confi rmed that it had voted against 
the declaration because it ‘can be interpreted as a call for a total ban on all forms 
of human cloning. We cannot accept such an ambiguous declaration, which may 
sow confusion about the acceptability of that important fi eld of research’ (United 
Nations 2005b: 4–5). Nikola Biller-Andorno (2005: 63), in a Journal of Medical 
Ethics editorial, reports that an insider said the declaration was ‘ambiguous 
enough to please everybody’, but this strategy clearly backfi red, given the 
ambivalent voting.
That the declaration is ambiguous is disputed by some authors. This depends 
on whether one reads the phrase ‘inasmuch as’ to mean ‘to the extent that’ or 
‘because’ (note that the French and Spanish translations of the declaration use the 
former sense). Arsanjani (formerly Director of the Codifi cation Division of the 
UN’s Offi ce of Legal Affairs) believes the phrase was used deliberately to enable 
selective interpretation (Arsanjani 2006: 178), but Cameron (who advised the US 
delegation in 2002) and Henderson disagree. They maintain that the legislative 
intent of the General Assembly was clear and thus the only legitimate 
interpretation is to see the declaration as a comprehensive ban on all forms of 
cloning (Cameron and Henderson 2008: 195). Similarly, the UN Chronicle 
(United Nations 2005c: 28) states that, at the fi nal vote, the General Assembly 
had ‘urged Member States to prohibit all forms of human cloning, including 
cloning of human embryos for stem cell research’. A more subjective reading 
would mean that the declaration allows states to engage in reproductive cloning 
if they do not see this as violating human dignity (Cameron and Henderson 2008: 
195). In sum, the end result was highly unsatisfactory – a weakly worded 
document that enjoys only ambivalent support from states. It is seen as too weak 
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to either prevent renegade research or support legitimate scientifi c investigation 
(Isasi and Annas 2006: 63). 
UNESCO enters the fray
UNESCO’s decision to investigate the possibility of a convention on human 
cloning came on the back of a 2007 report by the United Nations University’s 
Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU-IAS), entitled Is Human Reproductive 
Cloning Inevitable: Future Options for UN Governance. One option identifi ed by 
the report was that the IBC take up the issue of cloning regulation. Another was, 
‘Dissemination, discussion and debate on cloning issues at the international level, 
such that all countries including the developing and least developed countries can 
participate and put forward their concerns regarding this new technology’ (UNU-
IAS 2007: 26). Koïchiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO, requested that 
the IBC examine the report. The IBC duly formed a Working Group on Human 
Cloning and International Governance for 2008–9. The Group’s task was to 
‘explore whether the scientifi c, ethical, social, political and legal developments on 
human cloning in recent years justify a new initiative at international level’, rather 
than to analyse ethical or scientifi c aspects of human cloning per se (UNESCO 
2008d: 1).
In its September 2008 interim report, the Working Group recommended a 
legally binding convention to ban reproductive cloning (UNESCO 2008h). It 
redrafted the report in the light of discussions at the IBC and joint IBC–IGBC 
sessions in October 2008 and, in the fi nal version (2009), recommended intensifi ed 
international dialogue on the issue, rather than a convention (UNESCO 2009e: 
7–8). The Working Group continued its work in 2010–11, but the IBC was unable 
to agree to its draft ‘fi nal statement’, which again recommended a ban. The topic 
has now been all but abandoned, as it will simply be monitored by one or two IBC 
members under the IBC’s Work Programme for 2012–13 (UNESCO 2011f: 4; 
UNESCO 2012m). Chapters 4 and 5 explore what led to this outcome and its 
implications.
Human genetic and biomedical research clearly has the potential to contribute 
towards addressing the pressing global problem of inequalities of health between 
North and South. If this potential is to be realized ethically, adequate protection of 
individual research subjects must be ensured. On a grander scale, suffi cient 
resources will be needed to fund research directed towards the health needs of 
developing countries and the provision of any interventions consequently devel-
oped. Aside from external factors, UNESCO’s effi cacy in meeting these chal-
lenges will depend partly on its systems of decision-making and implementation. 
The next chapter asks what insights international relations theory might offer into 
how successful UNESCO’s endeavours are in this regard.
3 Global governance
A conceptual framework for 
analysing bioethics at UNESCO
The fi eld of international relations, in simple terms, explores why, how and to 
what degree states and other actors engage with each other at international level. 
International relations theory falls into several schools, realism and liberalism 
being the two longest standing. The realist paradigm, which purports that nation-
states are the key actors in the international arena, was dominant until the end of 
the Cold War. It is chiefl y concerned with the quest for power (Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff 1996: 58). Realists view the international system as one of anarchy, 
where moral considerations have no place. (A variant on this theme, the concept 
of an anarchical international society, was introduced by Hedley Bull in 1966: 
‘Whereas men within each state are subject to a common government, sovereign 
states in their mutual relations are not. This anarchy it is possible to regard as the 
central fact of international life and the starting point of theorizing about it’ [Bull 
2000: 77].) Confl icts between states are seen as inevitable, as each will seek to 
defend its national interest (defi ned in terms of ‘survival, security, power, and 
relative capabilities’ [Holsti 1995: 37]), primarily through military power (Kegley 
1995: 4–5). States must exercise self-suffi ciency, as dependence on another actor 
would leave them open to exploitation. Thus international organizations and 
international law are thought to be of limited use (ibid; Genest 1994: 71). 
Neorealism (or structural realism), as championed most famously by Kenneth 
Waltz, differs from classical realism in that it sees the international system as 
more than the sum of its parts, its very structure driving states towards certain 
actions and restricting them from others (Waltz 1995: 74).
The main opposition to realist theory within international relations has come 
from liberalism. Generally, liberals argue that realists place too much emphasis on 
confl ict and too little on cooperation (Grieco 1995: 151). Security is often defi ned 
more broadly than under realism, to include elements such as health and education 
(Holsti 1995: 43). In a post-Cold War and globalizing world, liberalism has gained 
ground as an alternative explanation of world affairs, as scholars have paid 
increasing attention to infl uences beyond or below the state. Like realism, it has a 
‘neo-’ successor, which synthesizes these two traditionally antithetical approaches 
(Hasenclever et al. 1996: 196). Neoliberal institutionalists assume that self-
interested states are the principal international actors and that power differentials 
are important. While acknowledging the existence of anarchy, however, they hold 
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that international institutions can ‘transcend the basic structural characteristics of 
the anarchic international system’ (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1996: 62).
Constructivism, another school of international relations, has grown greatly in 
prominence in recent years. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, two of its 
core proponents, see constructivism as ‘a different kind of theory’ to realism and 
liberalism, as it makes no claims about the nature of agents (that is, individuals or 
institutions) or the content of structures. Rather, as a social theory, it investig-
ates social life and social change. They summarize this approach as follows: 
‘Constructivists focus on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argu-
ment in politics, stressing in particular the role of collectively held or “intersub-
jective” ideas and understandings on social life’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 
391–3). Thus constructivism sees rules and practices as being created and sus-
tained by mutual agreement. State sovereignty, as an institution, provides an 
example. Refl ecting common understandings about the characteristics of states, it 
allows these actors to recognize one another (Ellis 2002: 273–4).
This chapter explores on three specifi c approaches to governance within inter-
national relations theory: regime theory, government networks and cosmopolitan 
democracy. Regime theory draws on all three core schools of thought and 
networked governance and cosmopolitan democracy encompass elements of both 
neoliberalism and constructivism. Although differing in the signifi cance they 
attach to concepts of power, sovereignty and the state, each has collaboration and 
cooperation at an international level as a central theme. Thus they all fall within a 
concept that has in recent years become central to the study of international 
relations: global governance.
Global governance
The term ‘global governance’ derives from the Commission on Global 
Governance, which met in 1995 to report on the future of the UN (Commission on 
Global Governance 1995). It refers to governance within and as an output of the 
international system, aimed at addressing those issues that have the potential to 
affect everyone, irrespective of national borders. As Robert Goodin (2003: 80) 
puts it, ‘Cross-boundary spillovers – political and moral, as well as economic and 
environmental – are now absolutely endemic.’ Alongside states, transnational 
actors such as UN agencies, large corporations and civil society organizations are 
important actors in how (and how well) these spillovers are managed (Keohane 
2003: 130–2; Ruggie 2003: 117). ‘Global governance’ has both descriptive and 
normative connotations in this regard. Robert Keohane (2003: 132) describes it as 
rule-making and the exercise of power on a global scale, by entities not necessarily 
authorized to act by general consensus (with ensuing implications for legitimacy). 
James Rosenau (1992: 4) used the same premise, but from a different angle: 
because governance systems lack the traditional legitimacy conferred by demo-
cratic election, for example, they can only be effective if the great majority of 
those they cover agree to them. In this sense, then, governance has an inherent 
normative purpose; it is derived from shared goals rather than formal authority.
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Regime theory
Pierre de Senarclens, a regime scholar, has commented that the notion of govern-
ance in international relations theory emerged ‘in the aftermath of the debate 
about “regimes”’ (de Senarclens 1998: 92). Regime theory (or, more accurately, 
theories of regimes [Vogler 1995: 25]) has much to offer in terms of describing 
how international bodies work and how they might do so more effectively. 
International regimes encompass varying levels of institutional development. 
They arise from efforts to develop collaborative arrangements, formally or infor-
mally, around fairly well-defi ned issues, such as world trade or environmental 
concerns (de Senarclens 1993: 456; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1996: 436). 
Stephen Krasner and colleagues, in the seminal book International Regimes, 
defi ned them as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations’ (Krasner 1983: 2). Although deemed vague and woolly by 
critics, this defi nition remains the most widely used (Strange 1983: 342; 
Kratochwil 1984: 685; Young 1989: 195; Simmons and Martin 2002: 193).
Traditionally state-centric, regime theory is particularly pertinent to intergovern-
mental organizations (IGOs) such as UNESCO (Young 1997: 6). States may 
choose to join such arrangements if they feel a given problem could be addressed 
more effi ciently through an institution. Different theorists put forward power, 
interests or knowledge as defi ning variables in regimes, echoing the realist, 
neoliberal and constructivist schools of thought (Hasenclever et al. 1996: 178). 
Realist regime theory sees regimes as formed around and infl uenced by the power 
and interests of a dominant state, or group of states. Since states are seen as being 
primarily concerned with power plays and the vulnerability that interdependence 
brings, international cooperation is believed to occur infrequently (Zacher, with 
Sutton 1996: 2–3). Neoliberal regime theory, the mainstream approach to regimes, 
does not disregard power differentials, but portrays states as ‘rational egoists’ who 
pursue absolute rather than relative gains. States will therefore cooperate to realize 
common interests (ibid: 2; Hasenclever et al. 1996: 183–4). Cognitive (or 
constructivist) regime theory recognizes that cooperation is affected not only by 
power and interests but also by values, beliefs and knowledge. As regimes are 
based on shared principles and understandings, they are intersubjective; the issue 
areas around which they converge are not pre-ordained. Thus cognitive approaches 
help to explain the evolution and content of regimes (Kratochwil and Ruggie 
1986: 764; Haggard and Simmons 1987: 509–10).
The neoliberal and cognitivist approaches do not have to be mutually exclusive. 
In After Hegemony, Keohane (1984: 63) wrote:
But regimes can also affect state interests, for the notion of self-interest is 
itself elastic and largely subjective. Perceptions of self-interest depend on 
actors’ expectations of the likely consequences that will follow from particular 
actions and on their fundamental values. Regimes can certainly affect 
expectations and may affect values as well.
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Similarly, Oran Young (1999: 4) states, ‘it is perfectly possible to adopt the view 
that actors and institutions are mutually constitutive’. In terms of UNESCO, all 
three approaches are relevant. We can ask, how much did differences in power 
between states infl uence the outcome of negotiations on the declarations and 
cloning? How did states and other actors go about securing their interests? 
And how did key principles in bioethics shape the formation of the declarations 
and vice versa?
Networked governance
Intergovernmental regimes have often been perceived to be slow-moving and 
ineffective. This has led some international relations theorists to examine 
alternative deliberative structures to see whether they might be more successful in 
implementing positive change. Wolfgang Reinicke and colleagues, for example, 
have analysed what they call Global Public Policy Networks (GPPNs). Reinicke 
(1999–2000: 44) charts the emergence of networks such as the Global Environment 
Facility and the Roll Back Malaria initiative from the 1990s onwards, defi ning 
them as ‘loose alliances of government agencies, international organizations, 
corporations, and elements of civil society such as nongovernmental organizations, 
professional associations, or religious groups that join together to achieve what 
none can accomplish on its own’. Those who proposed the Global Genomics 
Initiative (GGI) (see p. 14) drew on the work of various network theorists. 
One of their earlier plans was based on Jean-François Rischard’s Global Issues 
Networks, a highly specifi ed form of GPPN, which Rischard has suggested as a 
means to address the 20 foremost problems faced by the world within 20 years 
(Rischard 2002: 66 and 224–5). Under this equitable model the GGI was to 
comprise representatives from governments, industry, academia, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and civil society (Acharya et al. 2004a: 5). In a later 
proposal they shifted their focus slightly, citing the infl uential work of Anne-Marie 
Slaughter on government networks. The GGI was still to include NGOs, businesses 
and other sectors, but it would be ‘underpinned by governments’ in order to garner 
legitimacy and accountability (Dowdeswell et al. 2006: 138 and 140).
The importance of the part played by government actors in global networks lies 
at the heart of Slaughter’s 2004 book, A New World Order, in which she analyses 
how government offi cials network at a global level, to exchange information and 
coordinate activities. These government networks are, Slaughter writes, ‘a key 
feature of world order in the twenty-fi rst century, but they are underappreciated, 
undersupported, and underused to address the central problems of global 
governance’ (Slaughter 2004: 1). Slaughter’s premise is that the state, contrary to 
the model assumed by many international relations theorists and multilateral 
negotiators alike, is not a unitary actor. Rather, it is disaggregated, primarily along 
legislative, regulatory and judicial lines; members of distinct domestic government 
institutions are increasingly involved in activities beyond national borders, 
interacting with their counterparts in other countries and at supranational level 
(ibid: 5–6, 12–13 and 31).
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Slaughter (2004: 14) defi nes a government network broadly, as ‘a pattern of 
regular and purposive relations among like government units working across the 
borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the “domestic” 
from the “international” sphere’. At present, government networks ‘contribute’ to 
world order by stimulating policy convergence among states, encouraging adherence 
to international treaties and promoting international cooperation (ibid: 24). In future, 
Slaughter suggests, this remit could be expanded. She envisages a form of networked 
governance that would include non-state actors such as international organizations, 
corporations and civil society organizations, but with government actors at the core. 
Slaughter claims that viewing the world as one of disaggregated states enables 
the imagining of ‘a genuinely new set of possibilities for a future world order’, the 
‘building blocks’ of which would not be states but parts of states (ibid: 6). She 
describes what shape this conceptual framework might take thus:
A disaggregated world order would be a world latticed by countless 
government networks. These would include horizontal networks and vertical 
networks; networks for collecting and sharing information of all kinds, for 
policy coordination, for enforcement cooperation, for technical assistance 
and training, perhaps ultimately for rule making. They would be bilateral, 
plurilateral, regional, or global. Taken together, they would provide the 
skeleton or infrastructure for global governance.
(ibid: 15–16)
Cosmopolitan democracy
More ambitious still is ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, a model for global governance 
most prominently advocated by political theorists David Held and Daniele 
Archibugi. Archibugi (2004: 438) pithily captures the purpose of cosmopolitan 
democracy as follows: ‘to globalize democracy while, at the same time, democratiz-
ing globalization’. The aim is to respond to global concerns in an integrated manner. 
Archibugi detects a strong call for global regulation of issues such as immigration, 
human rights, the environment, fi nancial fl ows and development aid, but observes 
that at present each of these areas is serviced to a greater or lesser extent by its own 
regime. Cosmopolitan democracy offers a framework to connect what are currently 
disparate governance efforts (ibid: 451). The idea hinges on the premise that the 
world is made up of ‘overlapping networks of power’ and ‘overlapping communi-
ties of fate’ that do not fi t neatly within state boundaries, causing strain in the current 
global system. The fates of distant communities are interwoven, to the extent that 
local level economic, social or environmental issues and events can have global 
ramifi cations and vice versa (Held 2003: 161–2 and 167). The ensuing risk that 
national level democracy will be ‘hollowed out’, as Archibugi (2002: 28) puts it, 
begs the question why democracy must be contained within domestic borders.
Held (2003: 169) articulates the three fundamental principles of cosmopolitanism 
as follows: individuals, as opposed to states or other entities, are ‘the ultimate 
units of moral concern’; everyone’s equal worth must be acknowledged; and rules 
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and principles must be impartial and thus universally shared. Cosmopolitan 
democracy would particularly address those issues that are diffi cult to regulate 
effectively at state level alone. Importantly, a global government per se is not 
envisaged. Rather, democracy would be promoted at several mutually supportive 
levels – inside nations, among states and transnationally – and involve both state 
and non-state actors (Archibugi 1998: 209; Archibugi 2002: 28–29 and 34). Held 
(2004b: 115) outlines the need for a multilayered approach thus:
Today, if people are to be free and equal in the determination of the conditions 
that shape their lives, there must be an array of fora, from the city to global 
associations, in which they can hold decision-makers to account. If many 
contemporary forms of power are to become accountable and if many of 
the complex issues that affect us all – locally, nationally, regionally and 
globally – are to be democratically regulated, people will have to have access 
to, and membership in, diverse political communities.
These different approaches to global governance – regime theory, networked 
governance and cosmopolitan democracy – have points of convergence and 
divergence on two key themes that are pertinent to the governance of the UNESCO 
Bioethics Programme: deliberation and implementation. Taken together, these 
themes provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of the Programme in later 
chapters.
The deliberative process: representation, legitimacy 
and accountability
Whether UNESCO is considered as a legitimate arbiter of bioethics will depend 
partly on whether stakeholders and experts see it as a representative and 
accountable body. Allan Buchanan and Keohane (2006: 407) write:
It is important not only that global governance institutions be legitimate, but 
that they are perceived to be legitimate. The perception of legitimacy matters, 
because, in a democratic era, multilateral institutions will only thrive if they 
are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics.
Held (2004b: xiii and 141) describes IGOs (of which UNESCO is one) as facing 
a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ on two counts: relations between strong and weak states 
are unequal and ‘chains of delegation’ from the international to the national are 
too long. On the fi rst issue, Held (ibid: xiii) states, ‘Increasingly, these institutions 
appear to speak for the powerful, or to be cast aside by these very same forces if 
they fail to fall into line with their will.’
Drawing on the work of Pamela Chasek and Lavanya Rajamani, Held (2004b: 
95–6) points to the power imbalances between states during international 
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negotiations by way of example. These can be both qualitative and quantitative; 
some countries can afford to make available large delegations of experts to back 
up their offi cial representative, while others may only be able to send one person, 
who may not be a specialist in the fi eld. Slaughter (2004: 221) makes a similar 
observation with regard to less formalized relations between states, highlighting 
concerns with inequalities in power between rich and poor countries as govern-
ment offi cials become increasingly involved in global governance: ‘shifting 
authority to technocrats means privileging the views of those nations that have 
technocrats – inevitably the most developed nations’. She also notes that networks 
are sometimes criticized on the grounds that their informality can allow more 
powerful states to dominate, because the constraints found in traditional IGOs are 
absent (ibid: 28–9).
Chasek and Rajamani outline specifi c diffi culties faced by developing countries 
during international negotiations. Further to the problems concerning the size and 
expertise of delegations highlighted by Held, they describe how some delegates 
will arrive at meetings with ‘hollow mandates’, having not received clear 
instructions as to what their countries’ negotiating positions should be. Moreover, 
if they attend only later sessions, they will not only have missed out on agenda 
setting, but will also lack ‘institutional memory’ and the corresponding leverage 
to infl uence proceedings. This can be compounded for those countries without 
easy access to background documentation through high-speed internet connections 
(Chasek and Rajamani 2003: 246–9 and 258–9).
The two analysts propose several practical means by which developing coun-
tries could be better represented at international meetings and thus have stronger 
mandates and bargaining positions. Echoing Robert Putnam’s notion (1998) that 
international negotiations are ‘two-level games’, involving the domestic as well 
as the international sphere, they suggest that national policy debates, strategic 
consultations and greater coordination between relevant ministries would ‘make 
for more effective delegations’. Second, regional preparatory meetings would aid 
networking among developing countries. Broad coalitions can be powerful, but 
given the diversity of national concerns and priorities, Chasek and Rajamani rec-
ommend that these should be complemented by smaller groups focusing on 
special issues. Finally, fast and reliable internet access would help improve both 
coordination among countries and availability of information. All these measures 
might be realized through a participation fund (Chasek and Rajamani 2003: 246, 
255 and 258–9).
The second crisis of legitimacy that Held identifi es, the ‘chains of delegation’, 
he attributes to weak and obscure mechanisms of accountability, particularly with 
regard to international negotiations (Held 2004b: 141–2). Raffaele Marchetti 
(2006: 291) makes a similar observation, describing the system of ‘double repre-
sentation’ in international organizations, whereby individuals are represented by 
national parliaments, which in turn elect an international representative, as 
producing ‘an almost insurmountable barrier to engaging in public international 
life’. Nayef Samhat and Jaye Ellis argue, separately, for greater public engagement 
in the international system, to deal with the accountability issue. They propose 
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that regimes (formal and informal) be considered as public spheres, characterized 
as frameworks within which interests and identities are constituted and actors 
engage in discussion and deliberation.
Samhat (2005: 180 and 186) believes the ‘democratic potential’ of international 
regimes is growing as they involve a broadening range of actors, thus forming 
‘transboundary political communities’ around specifi c issues. For Ellis (2002: 
274), discourse within regimes enables ‘the articulation of international rules and 
norms grounded in consensus and therefore enjoying legitimacy’. Both writers 
see the inclusion of civil society as the key element of regimes as public spheres. 
Ellis (ibid: 288) recommends that negotiations be made more open and thus ‘more 
permeable to infl uence from civil society’. This is already happening, according 
to Samhat. Documentation of international meetings is becoming increasingly 
public and civil society actors are now participating ‘across the gamut of regime 
and norm-building processes’, from agenda setting to compliance monitoring. He 
sees these actors as representative agents and thus the means by which a 
rudimentary form of global democracy or global citizenship is practised, as a 
precursor to cosmopolitan democracy (Samhat 2005: 182–3 and 186).
Slaughter, by contrast, while not explicitly taking the line that civil society 
organizations and businesses are given too much space in international fora relative 
to states, gives voice to those who do (Slaughter 2004: 9–10, 224–5, 240 and 262). 
She argues that government networks, as they exist currently, have an advantage 
over the more equitable global networks advocated by former UN Secretary-
General Kofi  Annan, Reinicke, Rischard and others, in that, being composed of 
democratically appointed or elected offi cials, it is clear who is exercising power on 
whose behalf. The broader policy networks of Slaughter’s vision of networked 
governance would thus enjoy legitimacy through having these accountable 
government networks, responsible for fi nal decisions, at their core. Long chains of 
delegation would be avoided because those negotiating agreements would also be 
responsible for their implementation (ibid: 28–9, 224, 231 and 263).
Slaughter proposes ‘global deliberative equality’ as the foundational norm of 
global governance. By this she means that all those individuals and groups affected 
by common problems should be able to participate in collective deliberation about 
how to solve them, under a ‘presumption of inclusion’. Participation would be 
indirect, through government representatives. Slaughter acknowledges that 
government offi cials are often seen as unelected technocrats acting on behalf of 
vested interests, but suggests ways in which such perceptions could be mitigated; 
namely, government networks could host common websites, engage systematically 
with counterpart networks of corporations and civil society organizations and 
promote enhanced accountability at domestic levels (Slaughter 2004: 28–9, 220–1, 
235, 245–6 and 266). She envisages a system in which government offi cials would 
be explicitly recognized as having both domestic and international duties: 
National offi cials are responsible to national constituencies for their domestic 
and . . . their transgovernmental activities. At the same time . . . government 
networks constitute a global governance system, which must somehow be 
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accountable to the global community as a whole, comprising both states and 
individuals whose collective interests stem from a common humanity.
(ibid: 218)
Held (2004b: 173–4) and Archibugi (1998: 204–5 and 211–12), like Samhat, 
advocate that individuals should be entitled to take part in policy formation at the 
global level as fully-fl edged cosmopolitan citizens, rather than through government 
representatives. Which individuals and groups might come together to hold to 
account relevant parties over a certain issue would be dictated less by geographical 
proximity than by whether they fell within, to use one of Held’s recurring phrases, 
‘overlapping communities of fate’. In a similar vein to Slaughter’s norm of ‘global 
deliberative equality’, Held (2004b: 97) holds that ‘those who are signifi cantly 
affected by a global good or bad should have a say in its provision or regulation’. 
Likewise, Archibugi (2004: 443–4) argues that ‘cross-border issues’ should be 
dealt with under a democratic principle that ‘everyone affected is able to take part 
in the decision-making’. Where this does not happen, there is an accountability 
gap (Held 2004a: 383; Held 2004b: 99–100).
Under cosmopolitan democracy, new forms of accountability would comple-
ment those afforded by democratic elections. A full-blown cosmopolitan polity 
would involve an ‘overarching network of democratic public fora’, whereby 
people would be members of several different communities, according to the 
issues affecting them and would be able to engage politically in those issues in a 
variety of ways (Held 2004b: 109). These would include forms of both direct 
(local) and representative (global) democracy, but also novel democratic arenas 
such as stakeholder consultations and collective decision-making through 
impartial deliberative examination of opinion and informed participation (if 
indeed impartiality of opinion and information can ever be guaranteed) (Held 
2003: 175–6). Such fora, construed within or without the UNESCO system, could 
perhaps help to improve global decision-making on bioethics.
The implementation process: realizing and 
enforcing norms
UNESCO has a stated purpose to promulgate universal norms on bioethics. How 
these are implemented and enforced will depend on both their nature and content. 
In a world of sovereign states, any international system relies ultimately on self-
regulation by members, urged on by the perceived threat of reciprocal action and 
national concerns with status and reputation (Vogler 1995: 41). As Ellis (2002: 
292) puts it, ‘States are both subjects and instruments of international law, being 
both the addressees of international norms and the agents responsible for their 
domestic implementation and enforcement.’
Young (1999: 47 and 103) describes the conception and revision of regimes as 
‘messy processes’. Norms are often drafted ambiguously rather than to ‘coherent 
institutional designs’, representing compromise positions reached through hard 
bargaining and consensus-based decision-making. Negotiations aimed at binding 
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accords, in particular, sometimes suffer a ‘lowest common denominator’ effect. 
Non-binding instruments, which allow for fl uctuating levels of compliance and 
are thus less threatening to reluctant states, may therefore be preferred (Stokke 
1997: 50). These generally have the added advantages over binding agreements of 
being quicker to negotiate, more fl exible in application and more open to future 
adjustments (Victor et al. 1998: 8 and 18). The corresponding disadvantages lie in 
their modest enforcement power, which is seen to render them weaker than 
binding agreements. This ‘conventional wisdom’ is challenged by David Victor 
et al. in their study of international environmental regimes, published in 2000. 
They found that binding instruments that set low standards, even if fully complied 
with, may have negligible impact on a given problem. By contrast, non-binding 
agreements enshrining high standards, even if only partly met, may effect 
signifi cant behavioural change (Raustiala and Victor 1998: 685 and 705; Victor 
et al. 1998: 7).
While regimes usually coalesce around fairly well-defi ned issues, ambiguity 
concerning ownership of and responsibility for problems can result in overlapping 
or contradictory norms, functions and mandates among different international 
bodies. Lack of coherence can also lead to issues falling between agencies, or 
uncertainty as to whether action should be taken at global or national levels 
(Reinicke 1997: 136–7; Hurrell 2002: 143; Held 2004b: 94 and 97). Bioethics 
provides an example. As the previous chapter illustrated, several international 
organizations, UN-based and otherwise, have produced guidelines or standards 
for ethical biomedical research. Sjef Gevers (2001: 297) is critical of this 
proliferation:
Before elaborating and publishing their ‘own’ standards, international 
organizations should really ask themselves what the ‘added value’ is of their 
contribution in terms of further convergence and better protection. A mere 
proliferation of standards is of no use to anybody, but may only lead to 
confusion or even “shopping” between different international documents.
From a different perspective, Young notes that, as much as organizations having 
similar mandates raises the possibility of overlap and congestion, it also enables 
positive connections and mutual reinforcement (Young 1999: 122). A too strictly 
delineated remit may also deny linkages with those working on related issues 
(Haggard and Simmons 1987: 497).
Rischard (2002: 42–4, 157, 170 and 181) deplores what he sees as rigidity in 
traditional IGOs and concludes that they need to become fl atter, leaner and faster. 
What he does not take into account is that some of the advantages of international 
cooperation take time to be realized. Regimes confer a degree of stability in 
international relations by allowing reciprocal expectations and mutual information 
networks to develop. Liberal regime theorists hold that states will enter into 
multilateral agreements on the understanding that it will be to their long-term 
advantage (Smouts 1993: 445 and 447). The longer parties remain in a regime, the 
more interconnected they become and the harder it is to withdraw. Peer pressure 
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may induce conformity over time. ‘So even though it might formally seem as if 
treaty regimes have no real power over member states,’ writes Robert Goodin 
(2003: 82), ‘the informal reality is that they typically provide an awful lot of 
leverage.’
One way to encourage adoption of regimes at national level may be through 
systems of implementation review (SIRs). According to Victor et al. (1998: 18), 
SIRs enhance transparency and accountability and lessen the chance of non-binding 
commitments being ignored. Young (1999: 119) similarly remarks, ‘Well-
constructed SIRs are important in almost every case as methods of retaining the 
attention of policymakers and avoiding the onset of “out of sight, out of mind” 
syndrome.’ SIRs do have their limitations; Victor et al. found poor data reporting to 
be a chronic problem, in terms of both quantity and quality. More positively, they 
showed that active and effective implementation review often evolves informally, 
after an agreement has entered into force. They also observed that states were 
becoming more open even to external review, in the interests of international 
cooperation (Raustiala and Victor 1998: 677–8, 680 and 695; Victor et al. 1998: 18).
Where norms are not being upheld by member states, IGOs have two approaches 
to encouraging implementation: enforcement and management. Which is deemed 
appropriate will depend on whether non-compliance is attributed to self-interested 
choice or incapacity (Raustiala and Victor 1998: 681). John Vogler (1995: 70) 
writes, ‘They [governments] may simply lack the technical personnel and data 
gathering facilities to fulfi l their obligations under a regime.’ Young (1999: 81, 
95–6 and 100) judges IGOs to be ‘notoriously weak’ in applying enforcement 
measures such as sanctions and thus considers initiatives like UNESCO’s 
capacity-building activities, aimed at strengthening those desiring to comply, 
a better option in many cases. Victor et al. found that a combined approach can 
prove effective; the threatened withdrawal of managerial assistance, for example, 
might be a powerful enforcement tool. The likely success of either or both methods 
will depend partly on a system’s capacity to apply them (Raustiala and Victor 
1998: 683–4). Young (1999: 119) notes that organizations administering regimes 
often struggle for suffi cient material resources, especially for programmes aimed 
at developing countries.
Whether a regime is adopted at national level and, if so, how successfully, may 
be as dependent on internal dynamics and pressures as on IGO enforcement or 
management mechanisms. Where international arrangements disrupt or are 
incompatible with local procedures, their effi cacy may be impaired (Young 1999: 
122–3). This is particularly pertinent to bioethics, given the debate over universal 
versus pluralist, culturally determined values. Slaughter endorses pluralism, under 
the constitutional norms of ‘legitimate difference’ and ‘checks and balances’. 
Legitimate difference would restrain government networks from attempting to 
cover over differences in fundamental values. Instead, they would draw up 
compilations of best practices, for regulators to adapt to local circumstances. 
Similarly, horizontal and vertical checks and balances would enshrine ‘an 
affi rmative norm of friction and constructive ambiguity’ (Slaughter 2004: 31–2, 
249–50 and 254–5).
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These pluralistic norms would contrast directly with the third principle of 
cosmopolitanism, which states that rules and principles must be universally and 
impartially shared; those that cannot be must be rejected. Held (2003: 169–71) 
gives broad examples of what such rules might comprise, in terms of avoiding 
harm and meeting urgent needs. He acknowledges that how these should be 
interpreted could not be specifi ed ‘once and for all’, but would depend on temporally 
determined cultures and traditions. Samhat (2005: 187–8) takes a balanced 
approach, seeing regimes as a means to resolve tension between universalism (or 
‘solidarism’, as he puts it, defi ned as consensus on the moral standards states must 
uphold) and pluralism within the international system, on an issue by issue basis. 
Progress is generally incremental in this regard, as norms and principles stemming 
from initially different perspectives are scrutinized and revised. Encapsulated in 
these different perspectives is a question that UNESCO, with its aim of fostering 
respect for cultural diversity alongside respect for universal human rights, must 
answer: how far can universal principles be adapted to suit particular contexts 
before they lose all potency? At what point, in fact, do they become plural?
Which government agency takes on responsibility for implementing a regime 
may also be a key factor in the translation of internationally agreed principles to 
the national context. Slaughter (2004: 247) believes that networks would work 
most effectively if they were targeted: ‘government networks should be explicitly 
designed to engage, enmesh, and assist specifi c government institutions’. What 
she appears not to recognize is that some issues are cross-cutting. Bioethics, for 
example, could involve ministries of health, science and technology, industry and 
education, to name a few. Echoing Slaughter’s disaggregated state, Young 
(1999: 94) observes, ‘Regimes ordinarily become the property of specifi c public 
agencies within governments rather than of the government as a whole.’ Thus it 
is essential for IGOs to identify and liaise with the most appropriate national 
bodies (ibid: 48). Samhat and Ellis concur. Although they believe international 
regimes have the potential to expand democracy beyond the state as global public 
spheres, they appreciate that strong states are needed to administer whatever rules 
and norms are agreed upon (Ellis 2002: 280; Samhat 2005: 179–80 and 189). 
Young (1999: 94–5 and 105) sees unoffi cial groups as of ‘even greater importance’ 
in this regard. Where regimes trigger active communities willing to give time and 
energy to their fulfi lment, they cannot be shunted aside or simply fade from the 
collective conscience through apathy. It might be expected that involving relevant 
constituencies in negotiations would harness their subsequent support, but this 
does not necessarily follow. Victor et al. found that including practitioners in 
decision-making led to better-crafted agreements, but had little impact in terms of 
encouraging participation in their realization (Raustiala and Victor 1998: 665). 
Sceptical of current systems for inducing adherence to international norms and 
principles, Slaughter and Held suggest alternatives. These range from variations 
on the enforcement and management approaches to new understandings of 
sovereignty. Slaughter’s plans for augmenting governance through government 
networks, both horizontal and vertical, would mirror current regime arrangements 
in that the norms developed would have little potency unless implemented at 
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domestic level. Horizontal networks would employ ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004: x) 
on a continuum running from information to socialization to persuasion to 
discussion and debate, to foster national level adherence (Slaughter 2004: 27, 213 
and 263). Vertical networks would see international organizations directly 
marshalling the legislative, regulatory or judicial power of their domestic 
counterparts in order to achieve maximum effi cacy. ‘Absent a world government,’ 
writes Slaughter, ‘it is impossible to grant supranational offi cials genuine coercive 
power’ (ibid: 13–14 and 20).
To promote implementation, costs and prestige would be attached to failing or 
meeting respectively a network’s norms and standards. To this end, Slaughter 
introduces a new conception of sovereignty: disaggregated sovereignty. At present, 
she avers, there is a ‘conceptual blind spot’ in international law and politics, 
whereby separate government institutions are not formally recognized indepen-
dently of the unitary state. To address the myopia, Slaughter suggests, these institu-
tions should individually bear the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty. Each 
would have a discrete mandate to meet international legal obligations (which could 
lead to duplication and confusion should institutions with overlapping responsi-
bilities separately apply these instruments at national level). Sovereignty would 
be newly understood in terms of capacity to take part in transgovernmental 
networks (Slaughter 2004: 25, 33–4 and 266–9). This new notion of sovereignty 
has not gone uncriticized. Berkowitz (2005: 75) writes, ‘One should not underesti-
mate the radicalism of Slaughter’s proposal, encapsulated in her casual exercise in 
redefi nition – as if one could disguise the rejection of a fundamental principle by 
keeping the name while changing the meaning.’ Anderson (2005: 1299–1300) like-
wise comments that Slaughter’s argument ‘operates by pure defi nitional fi at’, such 
that she has ‘redefi ned sovereignty to mean engaging in activities characteristic of 
giving up traditional sovereignty’. He believes she has confused sovereign power 
with the international benefi ts it can be used to secure.
Like those of the management school of regime theory, Slaughter sees com-
pliance with international norms as being as much about capacity as willingness. 
She particularly cites developing countries as lacking this capacity and suggests 
that government networks could provide technical assistance in helping them to 
build it (Slaughter 2004: 4, 26 and 261). She also recognizes that network effects 
take time to develop. She believes discussion and argument are the key to creative, 
legitimate and high-quality solutions to complex problems and that if the positive 
nature of confl ict could be harnessed in this way the result would be long-term, 
trusting relationships (ibid: 27 and 214). Again, her ideas have not escaped 
criticism. Perju (2005: 475 and 480) describes Slaughter’s plans for high-quality 
dialogue as ‘romanticized’. In reality, he says, power relations do not get ‘fi ltered 
out’. He also objects to the dialogue- and discussion-heavy approach on the 
grounds that it can represent a subtle means for strong states to dominate weak 
ones, observing, ‘the current global conversation is far less global than we should 
expect it to be’.
Like Slaughter’s government networks, cosmopolitan democracy would entail 
a new understanding of sovereignty. Where traditionally states have been protected 
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from external accountability by the national sovereignty principle, Held (2003: 
168) and Archibugi (2004: 452) argue that allowing them to act with impunity 
simply because they sit within certain borders is incompatible with democracy; 
states should not be considered ‘ontologically privileged’ (Held 2004a: 391). The 
two theorists frame their proposed alternatives differently. Held (2004b: 119 and 
131) sees a ‘liberal international sovereignty’ already emerging in the international 
arena. Under cosmopolitan democracy, this would entrench powers and con-
straints, rights and duties that might sometimes confl ict with national laws. States 
would thus forfeit their right to sovereignty if they violated standards of 
international order, understood in terms of human rights and democracy. Archibugi 
(2004: 452) endorses a similar ethos, but argues that the canon of sovereignty 
should be done away with altogether and supplanted by that of ‘global 
constitutionalism’, which would see confl ict resolved by jurisdictional bodies 
acting under a constitutional mandate.
Held (2003: 179–80) stresses that cosmopolitan democracy would not necessitate 
a diminution of state power and capacity per se, but it is diffi cult to envisage how 
it would be possible to have effective supranational levels of governance without 
state sovereignty being adversely affected. At present, states can assert that 
international norms to which they would rather not adhere lack democratic 
legitimization, a claim that would be invalid under cosmopolitan democracy (ibid). 
In its present form, the UN struggles to persuade states to uphold international law, 
both in spite and because of their ultimate sovereignty. To convince states to give 
up this sovereignty would be a task more diffi cult by an order of magnitude. Like 
Slaughter’s, Held’s views on sovereignty have been castigated for being 
unrealistically benign (Chandler 2003: 339 and 343; Desai 2005: 68–9; Slaughter 
and Hale 2005: 128; Wolf 2005: 41). Lupel (2005: 122) writes, ‘States, as the 
major actors in the international arena, have a strong interest in maintaining their 
de jure sovereignty; sovereign status remains the foundation of state identity and 
agency in the international arena. This is never to be given up lightly.’
Held (2004b: 107) and Archibugi (2004: 465–6) recognize that cosmopolitan 
democracy is not immediately implementable as a fait accompli. It would likely 
be achieved through many ‘little steps forward’, writes Archibugi, rather than a 
one-off, momentous shift, with campaigns pursuing limited objectives eventually 
leading to the desired world order. Whether such little steps can be taken in the 
area of bioethics and genetics are a prime consideration. The combination of non-
binding agreements and state sovereignty does not augur well for the 
implementation of the norms and principles of the UNESCO declarations. At 
issue is whether effi cacy can more realistically be achieved by changing the nature 
of sovereignty or by fi nding ways to govern in spite of it.
Application to the UNESCO Bioethics Programme
The previous sections have presented a broad theoretical framework for thinking 
about global governance. In Chapters 4 to 7 the analysis turns to the governance 
of bioethics and genetics and, more precisely, the actual and potential effi cacy of 
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the UNESCO Bioethics Programme, particularly in developing countries. The 
analysis will be anchored in the questions laid out here, which ask how far the 
Programme correlates with explanatory approaches to global governance and 
normative suggestions for its improvement, in terms of deliberation and 
implementation.
The UNESCO declarations, as a set of principles and norms on bioethics and 
genetics decided upon according to certain rules and procedures, can be considered 
an international regime under Krasner’s classic defi nition. Hence we can ask, to 
what extent do they refl ect or shape the powers, interests and values of states and 
other stakeholders? Like many international agreements, the declarations are 
housed in an IGO. Held has identifi ed two crises of legitimacy currently faced by 
these organizations: unequal power between developed and developing countries 
and long chains of delegation from international to national levels. Chapter 4 will 
explore whether his assessment can be applied to the UNESCO Bioethics 
Programme in the context of the bioethics and genetics declarations and the 
deliberations on human cloning. Did negotiation sessions bear out Chasek and 
Rajamani’s fi ndings about disparities in delegation size, expertise and 
preparedness? How far were any power differentials mitigated by procedural 
norms on the right to speak? Has UNESCO fulfi lled the democratic potential of 
IGOs by including civil society actors, as Samhat might expect?
Chapter 5 will examine the content and implementation of the UNESCO 
declarations. Did their non-binding nature render them relatively quick to 
negotiate and amenable to future adaptation? Are they characterized by the 
ambiguity and compromise common to many regimes? Are they weaker than 
binding instruments, as per conventional regime interpretations, or do they enable 
states to strive for higher standards, like the environmental agreements Victor 
et al. examined? On the management side, how effective is the Bioethics 
Programme in encouraging states to adopt and adhere to the declarations? Are its 
capacity-building activities hampered by constrained fi nances, in line with 
Young’s observations? With regard to enforcement, how effective are the 
declarations’ reporting mechanisms?
Chapters 6 and 7 turn to the national level. Has the Bioethics Programme been 
able to engage with the appropriate ministries and departments? Have government-
appointed offi cials adequately represented their constituents at UNESCO meetings, 
thus garnering the legitimacy Slaughter believes them to carry? Or have geneticists, 
ethicists and relevant interest groups in Kenya and South Africa had little 
opportunity to contribute to the negotiating positions taken by their countries at 
international level? Have the declarations made an impact on states’ laws, 
regulations or policies, particularly Kenya’s and South Africa’s? In what ways 
have their principles been tailored to local contexts and in which areas is 
implementation lacking? How far does consultation take place between government, 
experts and the general public on domestic policy on bioethics and genetics?
Where the empirical data highlight that the governance of bioethics and genetics 
might be improved, the concluding chapter will discuss whether this could be 
achieved by changing elements of the regime that is the decision-making 
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procedures and declarations of the UNESCO Bioethics Programme. Might 
measures similar to those recommended by Chasek and Rajamani for increasing 
the participation of developing countries in international negotiations be applied 
to UNESCO? Would any of the suggestions for increasing the involvement of 
experts and civil society put forward by Samhat, Ellis, Slaughter or Held and 
Archibugi be practicable? Not only an organization’s membership but also the 
nature and number of its rules and procedures will affect the type and content of 
any norms it elaborates. To mitigate against interest-based bargaining, Held 
promotes an ethos of impartiality, while Slaughter, Samhat and Ellis emphasize 
the value of discussion and deliberation. Would such measures lead to improved 
deliberation and stronger agreements within UNESCO?
The question of how best to secure the implementation of the UNESCO 
declarations revolves around the issue of state sovereignty. If this is to remain 
sacrosanct, how might any states that have not yet adopted the declarations be 
persuaded or encouraged to do so? Could a Slaughter-like network foster inter-
state peer pressure, the declarations’ norms becoming gradually socialized through 
ongoing discussions among offi cials? At another level of abstraction, what would 
happen if states were to relinquish a part or the whole of their sovereignty? This 
would see UNESCO as the hub of a vertical network in a disaggregated world 
order, or as an institution empowered to enforce human rights under cosmopolitan 
democracy. Is either scenario in any way likely, given the powers, interests and 




UNESCO is a traditional IGO in that it is comprised of member states. It is 
these states which make fi nal decisions on the organization’s activities, includ-
ing the elaboration and adoption of international declarations. In this sense, 
then, UNESCO’s declarations on bioethics and human genetics form a state-
centric regime. Non-state actors were involved in their drafting, however, 
notably UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee. This chapter explains 
the infrastructure of the Bioethics Programme, before exploring relations 
between member states of UNESCO in the drafting of the three declarations and 
the debate on the governance of human cloning, as well as the roles played 
by other actors, such as UNESCO’s sister UN agencies and NGOs. Lenoir, 
fi rst President of the IBC, wrote in 1996 that ‘to involve the developing 
countries in the debate [on bioethics] is itself an ethical imperative’ (Lenoir 
1996). The extent to which this imperative has been met is a major focus of 
the analysis. 
The infrastructure of the UNESCO Bioethics Programme
The main bodies within the UNESCO Bioethics Programme are the International 
Bioethics Committee (IBC) and the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee 
(IGBC). These are supported by a secretariat based in Paris. The IBC was the 
prime actor in the elaboration of the text of all three declarations. Although 
one of the committee’s defi ning characteristics is that it is made up of indepen-
dent experts, its authority is seen to derive from the fact that it sits within 
an intergovernmental body. Hence during the drawing up of the UDHGHR 
(1997) it was considered to be ‘the only international body working in the fi eld 
of bioethics’ (UNESCO 1999a: 1). The IBC has various functions, includ-
ing promotion of refl ection and education around ethical issues, cooperation 
with IGOs, NGOs and bioethics committees and follow-up on the three 
declarations (UNESCO 1998c: 1; UNESCO 2003b; UNESCO 2005s). Some of 
these tasks are carried out by smaller working groups, which focus on particular 
topics.
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The whole committee meets once a year. Members are selected by the Director-
General according to recommendations by member states, but as independent 
advisors:
The Director-General appoints the IBC’s 36 members to serve in their personal 
capacities for four year terms. The selection is made taking into account cultural 
diversity, balanced geographical representation and nominations from States of 
qualifi ed specialists in the life sciences and in the social and human sciences, 
including law, human rights, philosophy, education and communication.
(UNESCO 2004h)
Achieving this cultural, geographical and disciplinary diversity can be a challenge. 
Whether a nominee is appointed will depend partly on whether they meet the 
necessary profi le to secure a balanced membership. In the early years there was a 
high proportion of legislators, but there has since been a shift towards health. For 
the two-year period during which the UDBHR (2005) was elaborated, the 
committee had several medical experts but would have welcomed more bioethicists 
(interviews with F_01 and F2_03). At the seventeenth IBC session in Paris in 
October 2010, the IBC Chair was glad to note the increased membership from 
Africa (UNESCO 2011i: 1).
The IGBC’s mandate, as agreed by the Executive Board in 1998, is to ‘examine 
the advice and recommendations of the IBC, including those concerned with the 
follow-up of the Universal Declaration’ (that is, the 1997 UDHGHR). According to 
the IBC’s statutes, the IGBC is to inform the IBC and the Director-General of its 
opinions, including options for following up on the work of the IBC, which the 
Director-General may then submit to member states, the Executive Board and the 
General Conference (UNESCO 1998c: 3). More informally, at the committee’s 
second session in 2001, then Chair Najib Ouariti suggested that ‘the IGBC must act 
as an essential relay between the IBC and all the Member States on the one hand 
and between the IBC and civil societies on the other’ (UNESCO 2001c: 1). The 
IGBC converges every two years, with meetings open to the public unless it decides 
otherwise. States hold seats for four years, half the membership being elected at 
each biennial General Conference (for example, 18 members served terms from 
2005–2009 and 18 from 2007–2011) (UNESCO 1998c: 3; UNESCO 2011h: 2).
With 36 seats, under a fi fth of states are directly represented on the IGBC (Kenya 
was a member during the elaboration of the 2003 and 2005 declarations but South 
Africa was not, for example). This is mitigated by seats being allocated according 
to UNESCO’s regional groupings, in accordance with 155 EX/Decision 9.2 (1998) 
of the Executive Board, where the seats are allocated in the same way. Which states 
from each group get the seats is subject to a certain amount of ‘political wheeling 
and dealing’ (interview with F_01 [quoted]; informal conversation, IGBC meeting, 
September 2011). The composition of the committee is as follows:
• Group I: Western European and North American states, 7 seats (from 27 
members);
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• Group II: Eastern European states, 4 seats (25 members);
• Group III: Latin American and Caribbean states, 6 seats (33 members);
• Group IV: Asian and Pacifi c states, 7 seats (44 members);
• Group Va and Vb: (a) African and (b) Arab states, 8 and 4 seats respectively 
(64 members) (UNESCO 1998a: 67; UNESCO 2006b; UNESCO 2012d: 64–6).
Drafting and negotiating the declarations
The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights (1997)
The elaboration of the UDHGHR (1997) has been documented in detail elsewhere 
and need not be revisited here. A previous volume in this book series, The Inter-
national Legal Governance of the Human Genome (2009), by Chamundeeswari 
Kuppuswamy, carefully analyses the IBC’s reports of its meetings during the 
negotiating period, while UNESCO’s own book, Birth of the Universal Decla-
ration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1999a), includes the proceed-
ings of the Legal Commission (the group of IBC members charged with drafting 
the outline text), its make-up in terms of membership and the various drafts of the 
declaration. A broad range of state and non-state actors participated in the elabora-
tion process. At its second meeting, the Legal Commission decided that ‘one of the 
major objectives of the IBC is to set back the debate on ethics into a planetary 
context, by giving the opportunity to representatives of countries from the global 
South to voice their concerns, often neglected in such discussions’ (UNESCO 
1999a: 37). Roberto Andorno (2003: 106) notes that 81 member states sent repre-
sentatives to the 1997 intergovernmental meeting of experts that fi nalized the draft 
of the declaration adopted by the General Conference later that year. Non-state 
actors were given the opportunity to share their opinions in a ‘vast and informal’ 
consultation in 1995–6, in line with then Director-General Federico Mayor’s wish 
that the declaration be used as ‘an instrument of intercultural dialogue’ (Lenoir 
1996). The outline text was sent to around 300 institutions and individuals, includ-
ing other UN agencies, national bodies, NGOs, ethics committees, universities and 
prominent intellectuals. Responses were discussed in detail by the Legal 
Commission and the IBC and formed the basis of the preliminary draft of March 
1996 (ibid; UNESCO 1999a: 57–8, 61 and 67).
The International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003)
Although the idea of a separate declaration on human genetic data was mooted in 
2001, two years after the establishment of the IGBC, the committee appears to 
have played no role in the drafting of the declaration (UNESCO 2003j: 19). 
Nevertheless, member states of UNESCO were able to contribute to the elaboration 
process on various occasions. The fi rst opportunity came in January 2003, with 
the launch of an international consultation. An outline of the draft declaration and 
a questionnaire were sent to international, regional and national organizations and 
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more than 100 bioethics experts, as well as states. Very few replies were received 
at fi rst, so the deadline for submission was extended. 42 member states eventually 
responded, 10 from Group I (out of 27 members), eight from Group II (24), six 
from Group III (33), six from Group IV (42) and 12 from Group V (64). Pro-
portionally, then, there were more replies from developed countries than develop-
ing ones. Replies were also received from the Offi ce of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 12 NGOs (including the Council for Internatio-
nal Organizations of Medical Sciences, the Human Genome Organisation and the 
Joint Programme Commission on Science and Ethics, which then had 32 member 
organizations), 22 ethics bodies, six data protection agencies and 21 ‘eminent 
personalities’ or former IBC members (UNESCO 2003e: 1 and 12–15).
The consultation was followed by a Public Hearings Day in Monaco in February 
2003, at which Pierre Sané, Assistant Director-General for the UNESCO’s Social 
and Human Sciences sector, stressed ‘the importance that should be attached to the 
involvement of civil society in the bioethical debate and the transparency of the 
IBC’s work’. Speakers representing interest groups, developing country research-
ers and international bodies such as the World Medical Association (WMA), as 
well as insurance and pharmaceutical companies, duly made statements. These 
were discussed by a broad audience, comprising the drafting group and some 30 
observers attending in a personal capacity or on behalf of member states or other 
IGOs, including the World Health Organization (WHO). The drafting group then 
took these discussions into consideration at its subsequent meeting (UNESCO 
2003g: 1 and Annex II, 3–5). In light of both the Public Hearings Day and the 
returned questionnaires, it refi ned the draft declaration in preparation for the inter-
governmental meeting of experts (IGE meeting) in June 2003, with greater empha-
sis placed on issues pertinent to developing countries, such as benefi t sharing and 
international cooperation (UNESCO 2003e: 1–2 and 11).
The IGE meeting was poorly attended. Only 57 member states sent delegates, 
of whom 34 took part in the meeting’s general debate. The reason for this low 
attendance is not clear; perhaps some states did not consider the draft declaration 
of particular relevance to their national needs or interests. Group I was more 
strongly represented than the other four, despite its being one of the smaller 
regional groupings (UNESCO 2003c: 1). Furthermore, consonant with Chasek 
and Rajamani’s fi ndings, the larger delegations were chiefl y from Group I states. 
While most countries sent one or two representatives, the US (at the time not even 
a member of UNESCO) sent six, Germany fi ve, France six and, as an exception to 
the rule, Tunisia fi ve (UNESCO 2003d). The meeting supported the revised 
provisions on benefi t sharing and international cooperation, particularly those 
concerning donor communities and scientifi c researchers in developing countries. 
Some delegates wanted to see these provisions strengthened further, but others 
objected, foreseeing clashes with the patent system and national standards for 
sample donation and research. As is often the case in regime negotiations, 
a compromise was reached: the draft text was retained, with the addition of 
a clause stressing the need to build the capacity of developing countries to 
collect and process human genetic data (UNESCO 2003c: 6–7).
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The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005)
As for the IDHGD (2003), the fi rst contributions by states to the drafting of the 
bioethics declaration were made through a written consultation. A questionnaire 
on what the declaration’s aims, structure and content should be was sent to all 
member states, associate member states and permanent observer missions in 
January 2004 (UNESCO 2005j: 1). Of the 67 questionnaires returned, 21 were 
from Group I, 10 from Group II, six from Group III, eight from Group IV, 21 from 
Group V and one from a permanent observer (UNESCO 2005q). The greater 
number of responses to this questionnaire in comparison to that for the IDHGD 
is thus mainly attributable to states in Groups I and V. Cheryl Macpherson 
(2007: 588), in an article provocatively titled ‘Global bioethics: did the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights miss the boat?’, laments that neither 
the questionnaire nor the results have been made available online, as they might 
‘contribute signifi cantly to the bioethics literature regarding global and universal 
bioethics’. Such an impact is unlikely, however, as the questionnaire was very 
basic, with only yes/no questions (Snead 2009: 207–8).
Participation by member states at meetings on the UDBHR was ostensibly fair 
and equal. The IBC and IGBC held a week of separate and joint meetings in 
January 2005. (The IGBC met to discuss the draft declaration on 24 and 25 
January 2005. On 26 and 27 January it continued this discussion at a joint meeting 
with the IBC. On 28 January the IBC held a further meeting, attended by several 
IGBC representatives, to revise the draft in light of the week’s discussions.) The 
chairs of these meetings went to great pains to ensure that members had equal 
opportunities to contribute, as enjoined by the IGBC rules of procedure: ‘The 
Chairperson shall call upon participants in the order in which they signify their 
wish to speak’ (personal observations, IBC and IGBC meetings, January 2005; 
UNESCO 2011h: 2). This practice was also stipulated for the IGE meetings held 
in April and June 2005 (UNESCO 2005d: 3; UNESCO 2005n: 3). An attendee 
confi rmed these were conducted in said fashion: ‘From my own observations 
everybody had a right to say whatever he or she wanted to say. After all, they were 
representing their states’ (interview with K_01). Nevertheless, some participants 
played a greater part in these sessions than others. At the January 2005 IBC and 
IGBC meetings, representatives from Germany, the US, the Russian Federation, 
Brazil and Egypt each made fi fteen or more comments, whereas those of Malawi, 
Mozambique and Togo made none at all (personal observations). Furthermore, 
some attendees at the IGE negotiations commented in interviews that the coffee 
breaks were when things were really decided, which also seemed to be the case at 
the January meetings (ibid; interviews with UK_01 and UK_02).
A Kenyan participant at the IGE meetings felt that those countries that had a 
long history in bioethics had an advantage over those just starting in the fi eld 
(interview with K_01). This mirrors the concerns of Chasek, Rajamani and Held 
about differences between countries in levels of expertise at international 
negotiations. Some also felt ill-prepared. One African delegate to the January 
2005 joint IBC and IGBC sessions described how it had been diffi cult for them to 
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access the relevant documents before the meetings because their offi ce did not 
have an internet connection (informal conversation). In terms of numbers, the lists 
of delegates reveal that, as for the IDHGD (2003) negotiations, some countries 
were able to send bigger entourages than others to both the January IBC and 
IGBC sessions and the two IGE meetings. A conference on biodiversity was being 
held in the same week as the former, with at least one African delegate obliged to 
cover both at once; representatives of other African countries were not present for 
signifi cant periods of the meetings (interview with F_02; personal observations, 
IBC and IGBC meetings, January 2005; UNESCO 2005f). Of the 75 and 90 states 
that attended the April and June IGE meetings, 59 and 68 respectively sent only 
one or two delegates. By contrast, Canada, France and the US sent six, seven and 
eight delegates respectively to the April meeting and fi ve, eight and nine to the 
June meeting (UNESCO 2005e and 2005o). The chief South African representative 
at the June meeting commented, ‘I was left as the sole representative from South 
Africa (unlike other countries that were much more organized and had a panel of 
experts representing them).’ They went on to say, ‘The bigger boys came with a 
whole network of people that spoke and contributed to each thing. . . I felt uniquely 
alienated. . . without that intensive support’ (interview with SA_23).
Some countries sent no representative at all. Of UNESCO’s 190 member states 
at the time, exactly half attended the April or June meetings. As at the IGE meeting 
for the IDHGD (2003), there were proportionately more countries from Group I 
than from the other four groups, as Table 4.1 shows. Some developing countries 
may have considered bioethics to be a First World issue and therefore of little 
importance to them. One West African delegate at the January 2005 IBC and 
IGBC meetings commented anecdotally that bioethics was not of general concern 
in their country, as people had more immediate problems to deal with. Several 
representatives from developed countries would have had the double bonus of 
greater funding for travel combined with a shorter distance to cover, compared 
with their developing country counterparts.
A member of the Kenya National Commission for UNESCO, who had attended 
a number of meetings in Paris on different issues, noted that, in general, ‘The 
participation from the developing countries is quite low.’ This can be problematic, 
they said, because if countries do not participate in negotiations their interests 
Table 4.1 Number of member states attending the April and June 2005 IGE meetings, by 
regional group
Group Region April June
Group I Western Europe and North America 20 (74%) 22 (81%)
Group II Eastern Europe  8 (32%) 13 (52%)
Group III Latin America and Caribbean 17 (52%) 20 (61%)
Group IV Asia and Pacifi c  9 (20%) 12 (27%)
Group V Africa/Arab states 21 (33%) 23 (36%)
Sources: UNESCO (2005e and 2005o).
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cannot be addressed (interview with K_16). The Kenyan UNESCO Chair in 
Bioethics, who attended the April and June IGE meetings, made a similar 
observation, citing lack of resources as the reason why several African countries 
could not send representatives. (For both the IGBC and IGE meetings, states had 
to cover their attendance costs.) They thought it would be harder for these states 
to visualize how to implement the declaration, having not been involved in its 
elaboration (interview with K_01). Although not the poorest country, South 
Africa’s fi rst real input into the negotiation process was at the June IGE meeting, 
by which time, in line with Chasek and Rajamani’s observations, it seemed to one 
of its delegates too late to bring anything new to the table, ‘when we hadn’t had a 
voice a priori’ (interview with SA_23). As only cosmetic changes were made at 
the 2005 General Conference, when the Declaration was adopted, those states that 
did not attend the IGE meetings can have had little input into the UDBHR beyond 
the fi nal vote. 
Developing countries may have been disproportionately few in number at 
negotiations, but the UDBHR represents a signifi cant effort to address their needs 
and concerns. As with the UDHGHR (1997), this had been the intention from the 
outset. The IBC, in its initial report on the possibility of a bioethics declaration, 
suggested the priorities of such an instrument should be meeting vital needs and 
increasing access to drugs (UNESCO 2003h: 4). Then the drafting group, at its 
fi rst meeting, decided that the UDBHR should ‘above all respond to the concerns 
of developing countries’ (UNESCO 2004f: 3). By forming common regional 
fronts on some issues, these countries were able to voice their concerns relatively 
loudly, echoing Chasek and Rajamani’s observations on the power of coalitions. 
This represented a compromise on states’ individual views on certain points, in 
order to strengthen their negotiating positions overall. Describing the diffi culties 
in balancing the national interest with broader concerns, the Kenya National 
Commission for UNESCO representative said, ‘It’s a challenge, because you as a 
country may be having certain inclinations, but we are also bound by what they 
call the “African Unity”’ (interview with K_16). The South African delegate to the 
June IGE meeting also noted that people from the same region would speak with 
a common voice. They remarked that, on issues such as women and vulnerable 
communities, the Latin American countries, together with India, were the most 
vocal: ‘So it seemed as if the world dynamics are still based on the developed and 
the developing worlds and it’s the fact of life’ (interview with SA_23).
The issue for which the regional groupings were most visible was social 
responsibility and health. This was initially introduced by the Latin American 
states and later also backed by the Asian and African Groups (interview with 
F_01). Carter Snead (2009: 213–4) writes, ‘Most obviously, there was a very 
strong “development agenda” supported by the Group of 77 (G-77), the largest 
coalition of developing countries in the UN, who agreed to vote together for 
purposes of this negotiation.’ A second written consultation, this time targeting 
IGOs, NGOs, national bioethics committees and independent experts as well as 
member states, had been launched in October 2004, to which only 31 member 
states and permanent observers responded (UNESCO 2005q). It was during this 
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consultation and a series of regional meetings towards the end of 2004 that the 
issue of social responsibility gained real prominence. Brazil and Paraguay argued 
strongly for a greater emphasis on a ‘social agenda’. The former wrote, ‘The draft 
text . . . is too narrow in scope in relation to the development of aspects connected 
to economic, social and cultural rights, which represent the “social agenda” of the 
draft declaration’ (UNESCO 2005j: 2). Paraguay’s response was in a similar vein:
The Declaration has left out or has yet to include themes closely tied to 
bioethics, such as access to health care and drugs and the right to a life of 
dignity and a healthy environment. . . . A declaration cannot be universal if it 
leaves out these and other problems which affect perhaps the majority of the 
world’s population, who are faced with poverty, hunger, illness, social 
exclusion and, in many cases, violence.
(ibid: 7)
In the light of such comments, the IBC drafting group added an article on social 
responsibility to the draft text, the concept having previously featured in the 
preamble only (2005j: 3).
The formulation of the article came in for much discussion at the January 2005 
IBC and IGBC meetings, where it was described by Justice Kirby, Chair of the 
IBC’s drafting group, as softer than the ‘right to health’, but innovative (personal 
observation). Several Latin American delegates emphasized the importance of 
the article and argued that it should go further. Other participants thought that 
developmental goals were outside the remit of the declaration. The dichotomous 
opinions did not represent a straightforward split between North and South; Chile 
expressed the view that issues such as poverty and illiteracy were not bioethical 
issues, while Finland supported the inclusion of access to nutrition and water, 
seeing these as important in preventing ill-health (personal observations).
At the fi nal IGE session in June 2005, developing countries are reported to have 
declared the article on social responsibility to be of ‘paramount importance’ 
(UNESCO 2005m: 6). It was approved by consensus by the meeting, a somewhat 
unexpected outcome given the previous opposition of some member states. 
Germany and the US, for example, had continually opposed the inclusion of 
articles dealing with social and economic development, not because they 
considered these issues unimportant, but rather as beyond the scope of bioethics 
and being dealt with in other fora (interviews with F_01 and F_02; UNESCO 
2005k: 3–4 and 38). Moreover, the fi nal article is more strongly worded than its 
original formulation, pronouncing ‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health’ a human right (UNESCO 2005s: article 14).
Snead sheds some light on this turn of events in his fi rst-hand account of the 
negotiations, which had mirrored the split over cloning at the UN a few months 
before. The US found itself in a bind. With developing countries (most notably 
Costa Rica), it wished the UNESCO declaration to include a reference to respect 
for human life, which had been excised from earlier drafts. Its allies on the devel-
opment issue opposed the reinstatement of this reference, for fear that it would 
Deliberating bioethics  53
proscribe research on embryos. As a compromise, the US suggested a change of 
wording to the article on social responsibility, borrowing language from the 
WHO’s constitution. The delegation explained that it had come to realize that the 
proposed declaration was not ‘an academic or scholarly treatise on bioethics’, but 
rather ‘a more comprehensive document that was meant to express and acknowl-
edge matters of human concern that arose at the nexus of science, medicine, and 
technology’. The suggestion proved acceptable to all (as did the re-insertion of the 
principle of respect for human life, in the interests of consensus) (Snead 2009: 
210–18). This aspect of the declaration may help to dispel the belief, highlighted 
in Chapter 2, that ‘universal’ bioethics is in fact simply Western bioethics (inter-
view with F_01; comment by Justice Kirby, IGBC meeting, January 2005 [per-
sonal observation]). Faunce and Nasu (2009: 316–17) have compared the social 
responsibility article, together with those on benefi t sharing and transnational 
research (14, 15 and 21 respectively), with cosmopolitan norms.
While the Latin American countries were successful in keeping social 
responsibility on the agenda during the drafting of the UDBHR, this was not the 
case for every issue. Members of the Executive Board from Group III (Latin 
American and Caribbean states) had wanted the declaration to cover reproductive 
human cloning, sex selection, pharmacogenetics, germ-line interventions and 
beginning and end of life, but these were deemed too controversial (UNESCO 
2004c: 4; UNESCO 2004e: 2). Developing countries as a whole were very 
concerned with intellectual property rights, but agreement on this subject was also 
considered impossible (interview with UK_01). (One participant at the IGE 
meetings commented that it was left out because it would ‘bring a lot of politics’, 
although the explanation given in the report of the June meeting was that it falls 
within the competence of other IGOs [interview with K_01; UNESCO 2005m: 
3]). Overall, however, the declaration is seen to cover several themes particularly 
pertinent to developing countries. Indeed, those from Kenya involved in the 
drafting process declared themselves mostly satisfi ed with the fi nal outcome 
(interviews with K_01 and K_16).
UNESCO considered the involvement of actors other than member states to be 
crucial to the drafting of the declaration. Its website read, ‘only the participation 
of all the actors concerned could ensure that all the different perceptions of ethical 
and legal issues were taken into account’ (UNESCO 2004o). As well as the 
invitation to make written comments on the third outline of the text in October 
2004, there were comprehensive verbal consultations. Before even the fi rst 
meeting of the drafting group, the IBC held an extraordinary session in order to 
gauge the opinions of ‘the actors concerned’ on the scope and structure of the 
proposed declaration (namely other IGOs, organizations such as the WMA and 
the Human Genome Organisation and national bioethics committees) (UNESCO 
2004d: 1–6). At its eleventh session in August 2004, representatives of different 
‘religious and spiritual perspectives’ gave presentations. This meeting also hosted 
a public discussion and was attended by more than 250 participants from 
80 countries (UNESCO 2005b: 1). In 2005, national and regional expert con-
sultations were held in several states, including Argentina, Mexico and Indonesia, 
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as part of an ‘Ethics Around the World’ project (UNESCO 2005h: 4; UNESCO 
2005q). It was hoped that meetings would also be held in the African and Arab 
region, but this did not prove possible within the time available. Pharmaceutical 
companies were invited to make contributions at various sessions, but were ‘quite 
quiet’ (interview with F_01).
In terms of formal negotiations, other IGOs and non-state actors took part to a 
limited degree. Only 11 NGOs attended the two IGE meetings (UNESCO 2005e: 
15; UNESCO 2005o: 17–18). The Provisional Rules of Procedure, published in 
February 2005, stated, ‘All plenary sessions shall be held in public, unless the 
Meeting decides otherwise’ (UNESCO 2005d: 3). The meetings were classifi ed as 
category II, however, meaning that all observers had to be approved by the 
Executive Board. The Board approved the list of invitations in September 2004, 
fully fi ve months before the rules of procedure were made public (personal e-mail, 
16 March 2005). The only UN agencies other than UNESCO to attend the 
meetings were the World Trade Organization and the WHO, although IGOs had 
other opportunities to feed into the declaration, through the UN Inter-Agency 
Committee on Bioethics (UNESCO 2005e: 14; UNESCO 2005o: 16). At the 
Inter-Agency Committee’s third meeting in June 2004, participants ‘reiterated 
their full support for the drawing up of a declaration providing a universal ethical 
framework in the fi eld of science and technology’, but wished to clarify the scope 
of the declaration (UNESCO 2004g: 2). Their concerns on this front were carried 
through to the fourth meeting, in December 2004, when some committee members 
commented that the declaration ‘should not go beyond the fi eld of competence of 
UNESCO’ (UNESCO 2005p: 1).
The low attendance of non-state actors at formal negotiations notwithstanding, 
the Director-General highlighted at the fi rst IGE meeting in April 2005 the 
‘transparent and participatory nature of the elaboration process’ (UNESCO 
2005c: 1). Similarly, at the 2005 UNESCO General Conference, member states 
expressed satisfaction that the drafting process had been an open one, involving a 
wide range of actors (UNESCO 2005a: 2). The Director-General attributed this 
transparency partly to the availability of relevant documents on the UNESCO 
website, which he said made the drafting process open to ‘the greatest possible 
number’ (UNESCO 2005h: 1 and 7). At the January 2005 IBC meeting, the 
Chair of the drafting group, Justice Kirby, had declared that all documentation 
concerning the draft declaration would be put on the website, under a principle of 
transparency (personal observation). For ten Have (2005: 747), then Head of the 
Division of the Ethics of Science and Technology, this meant that people from 
‘the four corners of the world’ were able to participate in the elaboration process, 
thereby ‘nourishing intercultural dialogue’.
Those who had not been involved did not share these insider views on 
transparency. Even among those with ready internet access in Kenya and South 
Africa, several potential stakeholders had simply not thought, or had not had time, 
to look at the UNESCO website in connection with bioethics and genetics 
(interviews with SA_03 and SA_27 and informal conversations with geneticists 
in Kenya). One South African ethicist (SA_25) commented:
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You don’t just want a faceless committee designing this. Maybe some of 
them do have experience, but why not make it an open process? What would 
be the problem with that? Why have they not involved individuals with 
expertise and wide recognition or standing in the international bioethics 
community?
Another (SA_19) said that the initial draft of a document such as the declaration 
should be drawn up by experienced committees, but then made open for public 
scrutiny ‘in such a way that people know about it and it’s readily accessible’. 
These sentiments are refl ected in the bioethics literature. John Williams, then 
Director of Ethics at the WMA, in a September 2005 special issue of Developing 
World Bioethics devoted to the draft UDBHR, was critical of the fact that the 
version of the declaration approved by the June IGE meeting had not been through 
the same broad consultation procedures as earlier drafts (Williams 2005: 211). 
Macpherson (2007: 588) accuses UNESCO of having limited its consultations to 
its affi liates, thereby sidelining ‘mainstream bioethicists’ and the broader public. 
She found the documentation on the website hard to fi nd and would have liked 
details on the deliberations behind the drafts, as well as the texts themselves. 
Snead (2009: 209) similarly laments that ‘the substance of the deliberations was a 
jealously guarded secret’.
Whereas ten Have (2005: 746) has stated that ‘the transparency and the active 
participation of all the actors concerned . . . has already largely contributed to the 
visibility and general acceptance of the text’, Macpherson (2007: 589–90) feels 
that the declaration’s credibility and impact have been damaged by UNESCO’s 
failure to seek out or respond to peer review. Aside from the website’s limitations, 
her main evidence for this failure is UNESCO’s apparent ignorance of the 
September 2005 special issue of Developing World Bioethics. She also bemoans 
the lack of engagement with marginalized groups (ibid: 589). This echoes almost 
exactly the concerns of some of the Kenyan and South African interviewees in 
2005-6 (K_07, SA_17 and SA_25). One (SA_17) commented:
The declarations have made decisions for the international public, but which 
international public? I mean, for me, the research participants in South Africa 
are the rural research participants on the ground. How much have they had a 
say in terms of the declaration? Have we had our tribal leaders being involved 
in these discussions?
Howard Wolinsky (2006: 355) describes the negotiations as ‘a dance between 
government and bioethics groups’. Although the texts of all three declarations were 
drawn up by the IBC, the body of independent experts, decisions on content of 
fi nal drafts and whether they should be adopted ultimately lay with member states. 
(Similarly, it was states that determined whether the declarations should be drafted 
in the fi rst place. When the IBC presented its report on the possibility of elaborating 
an instrument on bioethics to the IGBC, the latter was reminded that this was 
merely a ‘feasibility study’ and that it was for states to decide, at the General 
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Conference, whether the elaboration should go ahead [UNESCO 2003i: 8].) This 
was not without its problems. For the UDBHR (2005), some countries sent civil 
servants or embassy representatives (that is, members of the Permanent Delegations 
to UNESCO based in Paris) to the IGE meetings that fi nalized the draft, rather than 
bioethicists. Describing the relationship between experts and states as ‘always a 
tension’, a member of the Bioethics Programme said this meant that what had been 
put together logically and rationally by a body of non-state experts was then 
overridden in a political process by inexpert state representatives (interview with 
F_01). Attendees at the April and June IGE meetings corroborated this tension, 
with one observing that, although there were several non-state actors present, they 
had fewer opportunities to speak than the state representatives, even though they 
perhaps knew more about the subject matter (interviews with UK_01 and UK_02).
Another illustration of the tension is provided by the debate at the January 2005 
joint IBC and IGBC meetings over whether the UDBHR (2005) and implementation 
guidelines for the IDHGD (2003) were to include reporting mechanisms, under 
which states would have to periodically inform UNESCO about measures taken 
to realize the declarations. A member of the IBC remarked informally that the 
committee would try to include more concrete obligations than in the past, but that 
this was a ‘shot in the dark’, as these would probably get watered down by states. 
Describing the room as having a metaphorical Red Sea down its middle that the 
meeting would have to try to bridge, Justice Kirby (Chair of the UDBHR drafting 
group) told those assembled that there would be some issues, such as the reporting 
mechanism, on which the two committees would take different views. The IBC 
members were independents, while the IGBC representatives were not, he said; 
each should fulfi l their function, but it would be the states that would make the 
fi nal decisions on such matters, through the political processes of UNESCO. The 
states duly decided at the June IGE meeting that it would be inappropriate to 
include any such mechanism in the UDBHR (UNESCO 2005m: 7–8).
Members of the two committees have diametrically opposed views on which 
was the more qualifi ed to fi nalize the UDBHR. Justice Kirby (2010: 796) bewails 
the changes the IGBC made to the IBC’s fi nal draft: ‘In part, some obfuscation 
must be laid at the door of the IGBC, and of the governmental representatives and 
so-called governmental “experts” who played with the IBC text, after it had been 
concluded.’ He cites their changes to the text on informed consent as an example, 
which moved from broad principle to highly specifi c contexts, against the grain of 
trends in bioethics. By contrast, Snead (2009: 220), an IBC member from 2008–11 
but the lead US representative at the joint IBC–IGBC meeting in January 2005 
and the May and June IGE meetings, writes, ‘It is worth noting that many of the 
fl aws in the process of elaboration resulting from the work of the IBC drafting 
committee were (painstakingly) corrected by the subsequent negotiation and 
drafting sessions of the Government Experts.’ ten Have (2006: 336) recognizes 
that having two bioethics committees is a challenge as well as a strength:
Policy development and political decision making regarding bioethics need 
to be informed by expert scientifi c advice, and bioethical expertise, if it 
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wishes to be translated into policies and legislation, needs to be associated 
with politics. The unique link between IBC and IGBC also brings to light 
some of the diffi culties with the connection between ethics and policymaking.
The human cloning debate
UNESCO’s pattern of consultation on the governance of human cloning has been 
different from that on the three declarations. The debate has not been over the 
content of a legal instrument, the necessity of which is already recognized, but on 
whether there is even a call for such an instrument. There have been several 
opportunities for discussion since the debate launched in 2008, mainly at the 
regular meetings of the IBC and IGBC in September/October each year. The fi rst 
opportunity came when the IBC’s Working Group on Human Cloning and 
International Governance, consisting of members from Estonia, Israel, China and 
Egypt, met for three days from 30 June to 1 July 2008. One day was devoted to 
public hearings, to which experts and member states were invited, allowing 
‘transparency and clarity as per the work of the Committee’ (UNESCO 2008d: 1). 
Twenty-six states plus the Holy See attended the hearings, the majority from 
developing countries, including eight Latin American and Caribbean states (Group 
III) and six African states (Group Va). All representatives were members of their 
country’s Permanent Delegation to UNESCO in Paris (or Brussels in Malawi’s 
case) (UNESCO 2008d, Annex II: 3–6). There were no outside observers, although 
one of the experts asked to give a presentation was from the WHO.
More states engaged in the IBC and joint IBC–IGBC sessions in October 2008, 
which discussed the Working Group’s interim report (published in September) 
and heard further presentations by experts and stakeholders. Alongside the 35 (of 
36) IGBC member states that attended, 38 non-IGBC states had representatives at 
the meetings (as observers), about half of which were developing countries. There 
were also several representatives of intergovernmental and non-state actors, such 
as the WHO, the European Commission and the International Council of Women 
(UNESCO 2008c; UNESCO 2008f). The IBC meeting included further public 
hearings on cloning, with presentations from members of the national bioethics 
committees of Indonesia, Madagascar and Brazil and the International Society for 
Stem Cell Research (UNESCO 2009d: 4). Claiming once again UNESCO’s 
unique position in the fi eld of bioethics, the report of the IBC meeting reads, 
‘Only through the multidimensional, multidisciplinary and multicultural refl ection 
facilitated by IBC can sustainable solutions be devised for the complex ethical 
issues concerning cloning of human beings’ (ibid: 1).
In its interim report of 2008, the Working Group had found that a new, binding 
instrument to ban human reproductive cloning was indeed justifi ed, given develop-
ments in the fi eld such as induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs), increasing 
commercial interest in the technology, growing public awareness, updated 
national regulations and ongoing concerns for the health of women and foetuses 
(UNESCO 2008h: 3–4). Participants at the October IBC meeting differed on 
whether there was likely to be a strong enough consensus on the need for a ban to 
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avoid a repeat of what had happened at the UN in 2005 and on whether recent 
scientifi c advances (especially iPSCs) were signifi cant enough to warrant a new 
instrument (UNESCO 2009d: 5–6). Those at the joint IBC–IGBC meeting, which 
followed immediately, were similarly concerned to avoid a repeat of the UN 
debacle, but some emphasized how useful a binding international agreement 
would be to those developing countries which had not yet adopted national 
legislation on cloning and asked the committees not to shy away from ways to 
realize effective international governance (UNESCO 2010i: 12–13).
The Working Group erred on the side of caution in its fi nal report of June 2009, 
concluding that a fresh international normative instrument would be premature, 
despite the potential benefi t to those developing countries still lacking specifi c 
cloning regulations. Instead, it argued that increased and focused global dialogue, 
to include developing countries particularly, was ‘crucially needed’ (UNESCO 
2009e: 7–8). This was endorsed by the IGBC at its sixth session a month later, 
where several participants noted that, because many developing countries lack 
‘a well developed national bioethics infrastructure’, they benefi t from international 
level discussions such as those at IBC and IGBC meetings. Nevertheless, some 
IGBC members asked that a disclaimer be added to the IBC report, to the effect 
that it expressed the views of the IBC rather than the offi cial position of member 
states or UNESCO as an organization (UNESCO 2009f: 4).
On the advice of the IGBC, the IBC mandated an expanded Working Group to 
continue its work on cloning in 2010–11, focusing on three issues: (a) terminology, 
(b) dissemination and (c) options for regulation (UNESCO 2010g: 1). (The 
IGBC sixth session report states that the committee invited the IBC to ‘further 
explore and elaborate different modalities and tools of soft regulation and 
governance’ [UNESCO 2009f: 4]. In the offi cial conclusions of the meeting this 
became a suggestion that the IBC review ‘other possible options for its regula-
tion’ [UNESCO 2009b: 2]. The IBC moved back towards hard law, asking the 
Working Group to examine ‘different options for legal regulation of human 
reproductive cloning (including the possibility of a moratorium)’, after 
discussions at its sixteenth session in November 2009 [UNESCO 2010g: 1; 
UNESCO 2010j: 10].)
The Working Group presented a draft report at the IBC and joint IBC–IGBC 
meetings in October 2010. The Chair of the Working Group, Toivo Maimets, 
emphasized that it was indeed a draft and asked for a lot of input from the two 
committees. It was at a ‘living document stage right now’, he said (personal 
observation). The report put forward new terms and defi nitions for reproductive 
and therapeutic cloning, which it was hoped would be taken up by the scientifi c 
community. This was partly because existing defi nitions tended to refer to cloning 
by somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) only and thus did not account for current 
and future developments in the fi eld, such as iPSCs. Echoing those who have 
argued that reproductive cloning will not produce identical human beings (only 
people with the same nuclear DNA), the Working Group found defi nitions based 
on this premise to be ‘scientifi cally incorrect’. It suggested keeping the term, given 
its widespread use in national and international law and guidelines, but 
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reformulating the defi nition based on intention, to ‘using the linear DNA nucleotide 
sequence of an existing human being to create an embryo, which is implanted into 
womb with the purpose to produce human baby’ [sic]. Somewhat inconsistently, it 
found the terms ‘therapeutic cloning’ and ‘research cloning’ misleading and 
therefore to be avoided, precisely because they are based on intention. As an 
alternative, the Working Group recommended terminology describing the process 
of obtaining pluripotent stem cells: ‘derivation of pluripotent cells’. It stated, ‘This 
terminology has an advantage of being descriptive, technically accurate, simple, 
easily understandable, and capable of incorporating any future scientifi c and 
technological developments’ (UNESCO 2010g: 3–4).
Unfortunately, the IBC did not agree. It commended the Working Group for its 
work, but felt that terminology should encompass technology, procedures and 
intention (UNESCO 2011i: 6). One member suggested that the ethical issues 
cannot be dealt with holistically, but should be elaborated for each new technique 
developed. Others felt that if a certain process were allowed, it would be hard to 
regulate intentions for its use (one making the comparison with a nation’s stated 
intent for nuclear power), while another said that to defi ne one type of cloning 
according to process and another according to purpose was ‘apples and pears’ 
(personal observations, IBC meeting, October 2010). At the joint IBC–IGBC 
meeting there was general agreement that a clearer distinction between 
reproductive cloning and therapeutic cloning is needed, as current defi nitions are 
ambiguous and unsatisfactory, bringing confusion to decision-making. Germany 
and Syria drew a connection between terminology and regulation, thus linking 
two of the Working Group’s areas of study. They argued that clear defi nitions are 
needed before international legislation can be developed (personal observations, 
IBC–IGBC meeting, October 2010).
The Working Group’s 2010 draft report also pressed again for a binding 
instrument on human reproductive cloning (a convention or moratorium), citing 
suffi cient consensus among governments to enable this. UNESCO would provide 
the best international platform to enact such an instrument, the report claimed, 
because of its standing in the fi eld. This would sit alongside activities to encourage 
global discussion and debate (UNESCO 2010g: 6–7), but the IGBC showed no 
appetite for the former. Reporting on the joint IBC–IGBC session, the UNESCO 
website (2010d) states:
IBC members were unequivocal in expressing concern that the recent 
scientifi c developments have raised a need for a binding international legal 
instrument. However, feedback by Member States of IGBC was indicative 
that the political hurdles that have prevented the realization of such instrument 
[sic] in the past are still in place. 
The offi cial report of the IBC meeting that took place earlier in the week (and 
which several IGBC members attended as observers) states that IBC members 
considered it ‘imperative’ to draw up a new legal instrument to ban human 
reproductive cloning as a matter of urgency, due to the speed of scientifi c 
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developments in the fi eld juxtaposed with the time it would take to draft such an 
instrument. They also noted the need to thoroughly investigate the feasibility of 
such an enterprise (UNESCO 2011i: 6). At both meetings, several IBC members 
argued strongly for a convention specifi cally on human reproductive cloning, to 
be adopted as soon as possible, but members were not unanimous. Donald Evans, 
then IBC Chair, said at the beginning of the IBC discussion that it was time to ‘get 
the boxing gloves out’ and urged participants not to just be polite and say ‘what 
we’re supposed to say’. His opinion was that a convention or moratorium would 
require a very careful defi nition of the term ‘reproductive cloning’, specifying that 
the ban concerned the bringing to birth of a cloned embryo. In terms of the furore 
over other applications, he said, the ethical dilemmas cannot simply be defi ned 
away. He and Stefano Semplici, his successor as IBC Chair, were pessimistic 
about the chances of getting political agreement on a ban (personal observations, 
IBC and joint IBC–IGBC meetings, October 2010).
At the joint meeting, the US delegation (the fi rst to comment) expressed 
puzzlement that the possibility of a convention was ‘back on the table’, thinking 
that this idea had been laid to rest in the 2009 report. They reiterated that such an 
initiative would be premature and advocated continued dialogue instead, coupled 
with support for states in developing regulations and policies. Germany and Brazil 
agreed, endorsing the status quo. Germany argued that existing regulations should 
be preserved and reinforced, not watered down, while Brazil described the current 
situation internationally as ‘very comfortable’, as it bans reproductive cloning but 
allows therapeutic cloning; UNESCO should instead focus on awareness-raising 
about the risks of cloning. This triumvirate prompted one of the IBC members to 
question why they considered a ban premature in 2010, but not in 2001 when the 
idea was fi rst mooted at the UN (personal observations, IBC–IGBC meeting, 
October 2010).
Côte d’Ivoire disagreed that a convention would be premature, but was 
concerned about the possibility of a moratorium, as this would only postpone 
progress; a normative instrument giving shape to cloning and allowing it to 
develop would be welcome. Madagascar’s representative made a similar plea. 
They questioned the Working Group’s conclusion that there was international 
consensus that human reproductive cloning should not happen and insisted that 
the science should be allowed to develop. Scientifi c discovery is not about 
‘playing God’, they said, but about understanding him better so that we can love 
him more. God knows this and knows when to put limits on human activity; 
scientists also know where to stop. Lebanon agreed that barriers cannot be put on 
scientifi c and human progress, as this is how mankind evolves, but considered this 
a reason for UNESCO to be vigilant, rather than employ a ‘wait and see approach’ 
to whether ethical values are respected in how research is applied (personal 
observations, IBC–IGBC meeting, October 2010).
Other states took a more pragmatic approach to the debate. Nigeria recognized 
that cloning already takes place with animals and plants and might have some use 
in medical applications, such as the replacement of diseased tissues and organs. 
The delegation described its position as in line with the Council of Europe and the 
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WHO, in that the country does not subscribe to human reproductive cloning. It 
had decided that the issue was to be placed ‘on the front banner’, through a 
consultation involving all stakeholders, to encompass the totality of views of 
Nigerians. Kenya took the middle ground. It recognized that previous attempts at 
international governance have failed, but highlighted UNESCO’s role as a 
standard setter; as several developing countries still lack regulations on cloning, 
UNESCO should disseminate information that will help states to develop 
legislation where appropriate. Switzerland also made links to dissemination, the 
third strand of the Working Group’s mandate for 2010–11. It proposed an 
international conference as a good way of defi ning the kinds of actions that need 
to be taken. This would also afford the opportunity for a deeper international 
dialogue to rebuild the international governance framework. Switzerland itself 
would not fi nd a convention problematic, subject to a discussion of what form it 
would take. The delegation also underlined the risks associated with conventions, 
in that they are only binding on those states that ratify them (personal observations, 
IBC–IGBC meeting, October 2010).
The Working Group was to fi nalize its report for the eighteenth IBC session in 
May 2012, but instead presented a draft ‘fi nal statement’ repeating the recom-
mendations of the 2010 preliminary report and adding that ‘technical manipulations 
of human embryo, either for research or therapeutic purposes’ [sic] (that is, what is 
commonly understood as therapeutic or research cloning) should continue to be 
regulated at national rather than international level, according to social, historical 
and religious contexts (UNESCO 2011d: 3). The IBC chose not to adopt the 
statement because of the ‘divergent positions’ of its members on both the ethics 
and governance of human cloning (UNESCO 2011f: 4). By this point several IBC 
members appeared to be tiring of the topic. They felt that, as political consensus on 
a ban remained elusive, the committee could not go any further in its deliberations. 
One said that if they left the debate open, they could still be debating the same 
points in ten years’ time (personal observations, IBC meeting, May–June 2011).
Some in the IBC would have liked to adopt the fi nal statement as the culmination 
of its work in this area, including Maimets, the Chair of the Working Group. He 
was not overly optimistic that an international ban or moratorium could be 
achieved after the UN fi asco in 2005, but pointed out that it was for governments 
rather than the IBC to decide whether to take this forward. What the committee 
could say, as a body of independent experts, was that it does not support human 
reproductive cloning. Others opposed this. For the fi rst time, ethics entered the 
debate (which the Working Group had been asked to steer clear of in its original 
mandate). Some members questioned the hitherto uncritical acceptance that 
reproductive cloning was undesirable and hence that the only barriers to a ban 
were political. Citing reproductive freedom, they felt that the philosophical 
arguments against cloning based on genetic determinism and the impact on the 
cloned child were not strong enough to justify a ban. These issues were not 
addressed in the draft statement, but one member argued that, as an ethical rather 
than political body, the IBC should be prepared to give at least a brief explanation 
of the ethical rationale for a ban (personal observations). This ethical turn was 
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alluded to by Semplici, the incoming IBC Chair, in his progress report to the 
IGBC at its seventh session in September 2011. He commented that the IBC had 
been unable to endorse the draft fi nal statement because this would require a 
strong ethical argument against the use of SCNT for the purposes of producing a 
child, which the IBC considered a very challenging undertaking, without any 
promise of agreement (personal observation).
As the IBC always operates by consensus but could not agree on whether or not 
to adopt the draft statement, it was dropped by default. Evans, as outgoing Chair, 
explained to the IGBC in September 2011 that there had been some pressure at the 
IBC’s meeting earlier in the year to go to a vote, but that he had resisted this. He 
also stated that he believed there would never be consensus on a ban, because the 
issue was a philosophical rather than scientifi c one, concerning the legal status of 
the early embryo. The IBC had not ‘come up with the wisdom of Solomon’ on this 
point (personal observation, IGBC meeting, September 2011). The IGBC largely 
agreed. The Danish representative thought it better to have a thorough report 
(from 2009) and leave it at that than to try in vain to reach a consensus. The US 
and Austrian delegates echoed these comments, saying that a tremendous amount 
of work had been done already and further headway might prove diffi cult. 
Lebanon felt that UNESCO should slow down rather than give up the issue 
completely as, despite its complexity, the academic community may be able to 
reach conclusions based on consensus in the longer term. Japan also felt that 
UNESCO should ‘keep in touch’ with cloning (personal observations, IGBC 
meeting, September 2011). The offi cial conclusions of the meeting note the 
importance of the topic, but also the lack of consensus among both states and IBC 
members. Thus the IGBC merely ‘encourages UNESCO, with the assistance of 
IBC as appropriate, to continue to follow the developments in this fi eld in order to 
anticipate emerging ethical challenges’ (UNESCO 2011c: 2–3). Consequently, the 
2012–13 IBC Work Programme relegates cloning to monitoring by one or two 
IBC members, who are to report any signifi cant developments in the fi eld to the 
committee and thereby the Director-General (UNESCO 2012m).
Perspectives on cloning from sub-Saharan Africa
The Permanent Delegations (PDs) and National Commissions (NCs) which 
answered questionnaires in 2012 echoed several of the opinions on cloning voiced 
in the IBC and IGBC meetings. Most commissions supported the idea of a 
convention to ban human reproductive cloning. One West African NC wrote that, 
because African countries see science as key to development, without such 
conventions ‘ethical ills would continue to be on the rise’. A Southern African NC 
believed a convention would help countries to adopt regulations on human 
cloning, even  though it is not yet an issue in their region, due to lack of human 
cloning technology. Another Southern African NC thought that a convention 
would be useful as, in developing countries, it is only scientists who are interested 
in such issues, which makes it diffi cult to monitor and enact laws to prevent or 
regulate such practices. A third confi rmed that conventions are useful in setting 
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normative parameters that can be domesticated at national level, as did its PD, 
which favoured a convention over dialogue. Only one country, from West Africa, 
did not support a convention. Both its NC and its PD felt that international 
dialogue should come fi rst, which should be ‘based on full understanding of all 
issues involved, including the usefulness of such a convention to the developing 
countries’. Other respondents supported dialogue alongside a convention, as ‘both 
are equally important as they are interdependent’ and dialogue ‘keeps states on 
their toes’, enabling education and sensitization, sharing of perspectives and 
experiences, consensus building and (echoing the Lebanese delegate) eventual 
agreement on international standards. An East African PD added, ‘In this 
interconnected world, no issue may be dealt with in isolation. Countries have to 
fully cooperate for tangible results.’
Opinions also differed on the ethics and usefulness of cloning. Like at the IGBC 
meetings, respondents were not unanimous in rejecting reproductive cloning. 
Illustrating the remoteness of the issue for some developing countries, as noted by 
Arsanjani, two NCs, from East Africa and Southern Africa, did not know the issue 
was being debated at UNESCO and did not feel qualifi ed to give an informed 
opinion. A West African NC respondent gave their personal view that cloning is 
not ethically right and so should not be promoted in the guise of development. 
A second Southern African NC, focusing on reproductive cloning, did not think 
cloning technologies would make an important contribution to development, 
because ‘for African countries we already have high birth rates which increases 
the probability of getting all the relevant skills which may be required’. A West 
African PD made a similar point, but with a more negative spin: ‘Not as it pertains 
to duplication of human beings in an already overpopulated world in a highly 
degraded environment.’ Its counterpart NC simply said, ‘Developing countries 
are yet to buy into cloning.’ Likewise, a third Southern African NC commented, 
‘The positive results are not yet clear to developing countries.’ Its PD gave a 
different view, believing that cloning technologies could make an important 
contribution to development, if accessible and affordable. It warned, ‘In the 
contemporary world, many technologies exist that could address many 
development needs in many countries but their contribution is minimal due to 
high costs and restricted access.’ The fourth Southern African NC also saw 
promise in cloning technologies, if applied appropriately: ‘they must be regulated 
and used in a manner that respects human rights, peace and security’. 
Within UNESCO’s Bioethics Programme, relations between North and South and 
between state and non-state actors are ostensibly equal – or at least balanced – at 
international level. The organization has put in place rules and procedures to 
ensure that all states, along with experts and stakeholders in bioethics and genetics, 
have the opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, representation from developing 
countries has been disproportionately low at intergovernmental meetings and the 
ultimate power held by states has created something of a two tier system of 
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decision-making between them and non-state experts. This was particularly 
apparent during the negotiations on the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights in 2004–5, but has also been a feature of the discussions on human 
cloning. The need to heed all voices and yet achieve consensus has had a 
substantive impact on the content and nature of UNESCO’s bioethics instruments 
(existing and potential), as explored in the next chapter.
5 Implementing bioethics
UNESCO’s efforts to realize and 
enforce the declarations
The three declarations – the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights (1997), the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 
(2003) and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005) – 
are by nature non-binding. They are, nevertheless, the product of an intergovern-
mental body and thus qualitatively different (some would claim) to the bioethics 
guidelines and codes of conduct devised by professional organizations. This has 
implications for what UNESCO can demand of its member states and, conversely, 
what member states can expect of UNESCO. Focusing especially on dissemination 
and capacity-building activities, this chapter examines the content and strength of 
the UNESCO norms and the organization’s efforts to ensure they are realized. It 
also assesses the degree to which these efforts overlap with those of the WHO and 
the potential long-term repercussions of UNESCO’s failure to agree on a binding 
convention on human cloning.
The nature and content of the declarations
UNESCO gave very similar reasons for the choice of a declaratory rather than 
conventional (binding) format for all three declarations: fi rst, declarations are 
generally adopted more quickly than conventions; second, states would be more 
likely to agree to non-binding norms; and third, greater fl exibility might be 
benefi cial in the rapidly changing fi elds of bioethics and genetics. For the 
UDHGHR (1997), the IBC decided:
An instrument not requiring ratifi cation, accession or acceptance, is likely to 
be adopted more quickly than a formal agreement, whereas the binding nature 
of a convention could well discourage certain States from committing 
themselves in so complex and changeable an area.
(UNESCO 1999a: 79)
For the IDHGD (2003), it was thought that a declaratory instrument would not 
only facilitate consensus during the negotiation period, but also ‘allow for 
adaptations in a domain where the variety of situations covered, and the complexity 
of the subject, is constantly evolving with new scientifi c discoveries’ (UNESCO 
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2003k). For the UDBHR (2005), the IBC again argued that a declaration would 
have the greatest impact, because it ‘would be better adapted to a constantly 
changing environment and would enable a broader consensus among Member 
States to be achieved rapidly’ (UNESCO 2003i: 7–8). The views of a Kenyan 
offi cial at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs chimed with this reasoning. They 
corroborated that states are more likely to agree to declarations than conventions. 
As Kenya would not be legally bound by a declaration, they said, it would not be 
too worried if not all its requirements were met during negotiations (interview 
with K_30).
Declaratory instruments were also considered appropriate because states would 
be able to interpret them as they saw fi t within their national contexts. UNESCO’s 
aim has been to elaborate universal norms that take account of the different 
traditions of its member states. Accordingly, the UDHGHR (1997) is intended to 
‘transcend different cultural, political and religious sensitivities’ (UNESCO 
1999a: 28). Lenoir (1998–9: 546) has claimed that the UDHGHR is ‘on another 
plane’ to European directives on genetics, as it ‘does not seek to govern specifi c 
practices; rather, it spells out universally-accepted ethical principles’. (During the 
drafting of the declaration, by contrast, Alastair Iles [1996: 43] had predicted that 
the declaration would be ‘constrained in its vision and transformative potential’ 
because of the need to accommodate ‘vast cultural and political diversity’.) For 
the IDHGD (2003), ‘the declaratory form of the instrument was chosen for its 
appropriateness in the elaboration of principles that States can interpret taking 
into account their legal systems and different cultural, economic and social 
circumstances’ (UNESCO 2003c: 3). The General Conference commissioned a 
similarly balanced approach to the drafting of the UDBHR (2005), judging that 
universal standards were needed in bioethics, but that these should be set ‘in the 
spirit of cultural pluralism inherent in bioethics’ (UNESCO 2004p: 47).
In order that these mandates be fulfi lled, the declarations contain only general 
principles, to which all states were able to agree without conceding their cultural 
and political particularities. Andorno (2007: 150), a member of the IBC during the 
drafting of the UDBHR, writes of the declaration, ‘Regardless of the weaknesses 
inherent to this kind of instrument, the very fact that virtually all states reached an 
agreement in this sensitive area is in itself a major achievement.’ This resonates 
more with Young’s observations about the messy process of regime negotiation 
than with Victor et al.’s on non-binding agreements encapsulating less com-
promised standards than binding ones. Articles in the declarations are more or less 
specifi c, depending on the issue concerned. Some appear reasonably detailed. All 
three declarations, for example, lay out guidelines for authorization for research 
with persons without the capacity to consent and the IDHGD (2003) and UDBHR 
(2005) offer concrete suggestions on what benefi t sharing might actually entail, 
such as provision of new diagnostics and drugs or capacity building in data collec-
tion and research. Even so, these are minimal in comparison with the equivalent 
sections of the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects (2002) of the Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS), which run to several paragraphs.
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A signifi cant feature of the UDHGHR (1997) is that it says of the human 
genome, ‘In a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity’ (article 1). Although 
UNESCO considered this conceptually innovative, the stronger formulation 
‘common heritage of humanity’ was used in earlier drafts, a recognized term in 
international law (as applied to the sea and outer space, for example) and the 
one adopted by the Human Genome Organisation. Lenoir (1996), as president of 
the IBC, described the application of this legal term to the human species as ‘the 
main originality’ of the draft declaration. Member states made the change, 
concerned that the idea of ‘common heritage’ could be misconstrued to justify 
the appropriation of human genetic sequences for commercial purposes (Andorno 
2003: 107). Relatedly, they added article 4 on commercialization just before the 
declaration was adopted: ‘The human genome in its natural state shall not give 
rise to fi nancial gains’ (UNESCO 1997; Knoppers 1999: 24). This was in 
response to developing countries wishing to protect their genetic resources 
(Lenoir 1998–9: 553). While the article would appear to guard against gene 
patenting, the phrase ‘in its natural state’ renders it ambiguous in Andorno’s 
eyes: ‘Given that the ethical and legal problem is raised precisely by the patenting 
of human DNA sequences in something other than its natural form, . . . the 
Declaration gives the impression of having eluded the real problem’ (Andorno 
2003: 111). Kluge (2003: 124) makes a similar criticism, arguing that the article 
could be interpreted to justify gene patenting on the grounds that this concerns 
only parts of the human genome, which if separated from ‘their contextual DNA’ 
would not be in their natural state.
Several commentators have criticized the declarations for being vague and 
indeterminate (Taylor 1999: 510; Abbing 2004: 93; D. Benatar 2005: 221; Harmon 
2005: 33; Landman and Schüklenk 2005: iv; Williams 2005: 213). IBC members, 
by contrast, have framed the declarations’ generality more positively, as a 
necessary step in reaching an international consensus, from which states can draw 
in making more fi rm regulations (Andorno 2002: 960; Butler 2004: 369). Loretta 
Kopelman (2009: 262–70) takes the middle ground. The UDBHR (2005) fails in 
philosophical terms, she says, because it does not justify, rank, clarify or specify 
its principles, but its very vagueness may help to stimulate high quality public 
discourse among people of different backgrounds, of the kind Slaughter endorses. 
William Sweet and Joseph Masciulli (2011: 13) similarly defend UNESCO’s use 
of the term ‘human dignity’, without defi nition, in all three declarations. They 
believe this is key to the ‘global moral response’ needed to advances in biotech-
nology, as it conveys the sense that human beings can never be used merely as 
means and are fundamentally equal. Andorno (2009: 228) also credits the UDBHR 
with making a ‘signifi cant contribution’ to our understanding of the concept of 
dignity, as follows:
The promotion of respect for human dignity constitutes not only the main 
purpose of the document (Article 2.c) but also the fi rst principle that should 
govern biomedical issues (Article 3), the rationale for the prohibition of 
discrimination and stigmatization of individuals or groups of individuals 
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(Article 11), the framework within which cultural diversity is to be respected 
(Article 12), and the interpretative principle for a correct understanding of all 
the Declaration’s provisions (Article 28).
(ibid: 234)
UNESCO puts great store by the fact that the declarations have been a
dopted by consensus, believing this to confer on them normative legiti-
macy. Lenoir (1998–9: 558) wrote of the UDHGHR (1997) soon after its 
adoption:
The active involvement of the states in the process of preparing the Human 
Genome Declaration is undoubtedly the best guarantee of its future effective-
ness. The discussions were heated at times, and, naturally, the balance offered 
by the text remains fragile. Paradoxically, this fragility and controversy make 
the Human Genome Declaration’s unanimous acceptance even more 
signifi cant.
ten Have (2006: 341–2) has made a similar claim of the UDBHR (2005): ‘The 
unanimous adoption by the member states is not merely symbolic but gives the 
declaration moral authority and creates a moral commitment.’ This was echoed by 
the Bioethics Programme leader at the IBC’s meeting of 31 May to 2 June 2011, 
who said that it had been a big achievement to get agreement among diverse 
countries and that it was particularly signifi cant that a declaration on such a 
sensitive issue as bioethics had been adopted by acclamation, as this was not 
common practice (personal observation).
Yet the emphasis on decision-making by consensus can also be seen as a 
weakness. A number of issues arose during the drafting of the UDBHR (2005) 
that proved diffi cult or impossible to resolve. Group I (Western European and 
North American) and Group IV (Asian) states were at odds over whether the 
declaration should extend to the biosphere or be limited to humans and a 
defi nition of the term ‘bioethics’ had to be dropped because consensus on wording 
and scope could not be reached (UNESCO 2005m: 2–3). Of most relevance to 
research ethics was the furore over an article on risk assessment. States were 
unable to agree whether or not it should incorporate the precautionary principle 
(that is, that practices that have not been proved to be safe should be avoided). 
The eventual resolution at the June 2005 IGE session epitomizes many regime 
negotiations. The offi cial records of the meeting state, ‘The meeting decided to 
retain the article by amending it in such a way as to formulate a general principle 
without going into detail’ (UNESCO 2005m: 7). Hence the article’s rather 
nebulous wording:
Appropriate assessment and adequate management of risk related to medicine, 
life sciences and associated technologies should be promoted
(UNESCO 2005s: article 20)
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as compared with draft formulations, for example:
When scientifi c evidence of serious or irreversible damage to public health or 
human welfare or the environment is not suffi cient, provisional, adequate and 
proportionate measures shall be taken in a timely manner. Such measures 
shall be based on the best scientifi c knowledge available and on procedures 
that are specially designed for evaluating the ethical issues at stake. These 
measures should be carried out in accordance with the principles set out in 
this Declaration and with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms.
(UNESCO 2004b: 8)
Despite the non-binding nature of the declaration, then, the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ effect could not be avoided in this case. This was affi rmed by a 
member of the Bioethics Programme secretariat, who said:
We had an article on risk management, which was in fact arguing the precau-
tionary principle without mentioning it. And then some of the delegations, they 
took the whole text out and they changed it for a very general text, which has 
been accepted. So now the text there is an open door, it’s just a generality.
(interview with F_01)
How controversial issues in bioethics might be included in the text also proved 
irresolvable (Macpherson 2007: 589; Snead 2009: 210). Thus no mention is made 
of gene therapy or stem cell research, for instance. Instead, general and procedural 
principles are intended to provide a basis for ‘the search for common positions’ on 
issues for which no such position could be found in specifi c terms (UNESCO 
2004k: 1 [quoted]; Snead 2009: 221). The IBC tried to make provision for these 
issues to fi gure in future revisions to the declaration, with the following clauses:
31 (c) Five years after its adoption and thereafter on a periodical basis, 
UNESCO shall take appropriate measures to examine the Declaration in the 
light of scientifi c and technological development and, if necessary, to ensure 
its revision, in accordance with UNESCO’s statutory procedures
and
31 (d) With respect to the principles set forth herein, this Declaration could be 
further developed through international instruments adopted by the General 
Conference of UNESCO, in accordance with UNESCO’s statutory procedures.
(UNESCO 2004b: 10)
The governmental representatives removed the clauses at their June 2005 IGE 
meeting, however, considering them inappropriate (UNESCO 2005i: 7–8). Thus 
it appears that the declaration will be less fl exible in a ‘constantly changing 
environment’ than the IBC initially hoped (UNESCO 2003i: 7–8).
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The normative power of the declarations
Although the declarations, by defi nition, cannot be binding on member states, 
what states might seemingly be obligated to do was still of concern during 
negotiations. There was substantial debate during the drafting of both the IDHGD 
(2003) and the UDBHR (2005) over whether states ‘shall’ or  ‘should’ implement 
their principles. At the IDHGD IGE meeting, the experts representing their 
governments ‘agreed that insofar as possible the word “shall” would be replaced 
by “should” or by “may” in the text of the preliminary draft’. Only in relation to 
the IBC and IGBC was ‘shall’ retained (UNESCO 2003c: 4). For the UDBHR, 
some states felt that ‘shall’ could be used as an indication of moral commitment, 
without compromising the non-binding nature of the text, while others, including 
the US, Canada and Germany, were adamant that only the conditional form was 
appropriate within a declaration, except in regard to actions prescribed for 
UNESCO (interview with UK_01; UNESCO 2005c: 3; UNESCO 2005j; Snead 
2009: 210). A more specifi c example concerns the free fl ow and sharing of 
scientifi c and technological knowledge. An article in the draft UDBHR asserting 
that states should ‘make every effort to guarantee’ these was softened so that they 
should merely ‘encourage’ them, after several member states of the IGBC (namely 
Canada, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Latvia and the US) objected to the stronger 
formulation at the IBC–IGBC meetings in January 2005 (UNESCO 2004b: 9; 
personal observations).
UNESCO places a high value on the commitment of states to the implementation 
of the declarations that each of the texts articulates. Jan Helge Solbakk (2007), 
chief of the Bioethics Programme from 2007 to 2008, remarked in a presentation 
on the UDBHR that this commitment made the declaration ‘harder than soft law’, 
in that it differed from a document like the Declaration of Helsinki of the World 
Medical Association (WMA), which can have only moral weight. Macklin (2005: 
244) agrees, seeing the UDBHR’s ‘greatest strength’ in its ‘stature as an 
international declaration issued by a United Nations Organization’. Andorno 
(2009: 225–6) similarly places emphasis on the declarations’ intergovernmental 
origins. He refutes the idea that their non-binding nature reduces them to ‘purely 
ethical or rhetorical recommendations deprived of any legal effect’. Echoing 
Goodin (p. 39), he sees the declarations as ‘potentially binding’, as states gradually 
take them on board. ten Have (2005: 746) goes further, claiming that the value and 
strength of the UDBHR ‘are in no way diminished’ by its non-binding nature. ‘For 
the fi rst time in the history of bioethics,’ he writes, ‘all States in the international 
community are solemnly committed to respect and to implement the basic 
principles of bioethics, set forth within a single text.’
The three declarations vary slightly in what is expected of member states in 
terms of compliance. While several articles of the UDHGHR (1997) allude to 
national law in relation to research ethics, confi dentiality and reparation for 
damage, the section on promotion of its principles requires states to do this 
‘through education and relevant means’ and ‘all appropriate measures’ (whatever 
those might be), rather than through codifi cation per se (UNESCO 1997: articles 
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20 and 22). In her paper published soon after the adoption of the declaration, 
Lenoir (1998–9: 546 and 548) stated that its primary purpose is to enable states to 
enact legislation. Yet she went on,
Their [states] commitment is, above all, political and moral. It is also 
motivated by the advantage that states and the scientifi c community saw in 
introducing stability into a fi eld which is strongly affected by the vagaries of 
the public response to new discoveries. States saw a need to establish points 
of reference which could serve as guidelines for researchers, practitioners, 
and policy-makers.
(Lenoir 1998–9: 553)
In the IDHGD (2003) and the UDBHR (2005) the legislative push is stronger: 
states are to ‘take all appropriate measures, whether of a legislative, administrative 
or other character’, to give effect to the declarations’ principles (UNESCO 2003b: 
article 23; UNESCO 2005s: article 22). This stipulation is reinforced in the 
UDBHR, one of its stated aims being to provide a universal framework to 
guide states in formulating legislation, policies or other instruments on bioethics 
(article 2(a)).
In several of its reports concerning the declarations, UNESCO refers to the 
practice within the UN of fi rst adopting a declaration and then following up with 
a binding instrument at a later date (as was the case with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the subsequent covenants on civil, political, social, economic 
and cultural rights). Lenoir (1998–9: 549–50) noted that the UDHGHR (1997) 
was intended as a precursor to a convention, although there was ‘no guarantee’ 
this evolution would happen. Federico Mayor, former Director-General of 
UNESCO, wrote in the preface to UNESCO’s 1999 book on the history of the 
UDHGHR, ‘Eventually, UNESCO should perhaps, on the basis of a searching 
evaluation of the measures taken and the prevailing situation, take the initiative 
once again so as to entrench the principles enshrined in the Declaration more 
fi rmly in law’ (UNESCO 1999a: III). Mayor’s use of the word ‘eventually’ is 
telling. A member of the Bioethics Programme, when interviewed in 2005, thought 
it might be possible to combine the 1997 and 2003 genetics declarations to form 
a convention in the future, to include a prohibition on cloning, but said that this 
would depend on the global political climate; for conventions, they observed, ‘the 
politics is much heavier’ (interview with F_01). Another member of the 
Programme, interviewed in 2011, did not believe this development would unfold, 
as it would entail several diffi culties and disagreements (interview with F2_03).
Implementation and enforcement
In his book on environmental politics, The Global Commons, Vogler (1995: 152) 
states, ‘The question of effectiveness should be at the heart of any discussion of 
regimes.’ Andreas Hasenclever et al. (1996: 178) explain how this effectiveness is 
measured: ‘First, a regime is effective to the extent that its members abide by its 
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norms and rules. Second, a regime is effective to the extent that it achieves the 
objectives or purposes for which it was intended.’ The real key to whether 
UNESCO’s declarations can be successful as instruments of governance lies in 
the extent to which they are taken up by states and other actors; having formalized 
norms is only a fi rst step. Koïchiro Matsuura made this point in his speech 
as Director-General of UNESCO at the fi rst meeting of the IBC after the 
General Conference had approved the UDBHR in 2005. He said, ‘Its adoption is 
just the beginning. To give full life to the Declaration and render it effective, the 
most important part of the work remains to be done’ (UNESCO 2005a: 3). This 
section examines UNESCO’s attempts to ensure its member states take up 
the bioethics and genetics declarations. ‘Harder than soft law’ they may be, but 
UNESCO’s implementation activities tend to take a management approach, aimed 
at encouragement and facilitation.
UNESCO’s capacity-building activities
Dissemination
One of UNESCO’s foremost activities in promoting the declarations is dissemi-
nation, in order that they reach as wide an audience as possible. Within two years 
of its adoption, the UDHGHR (1997) had been distributed to IGOs and other 
international institutions, UNESCO National Commissions, Permanent Delega-
tions and fi eld offi ces, ethics committees, universities, NGOs, the media and 
various specialists, through brochures (120,000 copies), posters, journals and 
conferences (UNESCO 1998b: 29 and 53–4; UNESCO 1999b: 2–3). By October 
2001, half a million copies of the declaration had been published, in 20 languages, 
more than 80 articles on the declaration had been written worldwide and over 40 
television and radio interviews had been given. The International Society of 
Bioethics awarded its 2002 Prize to UNESCO, for its work on the UDHGHR and 
in bioethics in general (UNESCO 2001a: 6–7). The second declaration, the 
IDHGD (2003), is perhaps less well-known. Almost two years after its adoption, 
many countries were ‘not even aware that there is such a declaration’, said a 
member of the Bioethics Programme in September 2005. Portugal, Israel and 
Turkey were exceptions, where IBC members had liaised with their National 
Commissions to provide local translations (interview with F_01).
Since 2005 the Bioethics Programme has focused particularly on dissemination 
of the UDBHR. By 2007 the declaration had been translated into 24 languages 
(none African) on top of UNESCO’s six offi cial ones (Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish), in cooperation with National Commissions 
(UNESCO 2007e). At the joint IBC–IGBC meeting in October 2010, Evans 
stressed that dissemination was UNESCO’s most important activity. As the 
declarations and other publications are costly to produce (in terms of airfares, for 
example), it is imperative that they do not just gather dust, but rather take root in 
the lives of people around the world. The declarations must actually make a 
difference to how states view their citizens with regard to science and technology, 
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he said. They should also have an impact on institutions, as they are not addressed 
exclusively to states. But, at a world conference of universities he had recently 
attended, only one of 1,000 delegates had heard of the UDBHR (personal 
observations).
At the same meeting, IBC and IGBC members suggested several ways to raise 
the profi le of the declarations. Some said that members of both committees had a 
responsibility in this regard and should try to ensure that local and regional 
UNESCO offi ces publicize the declarations to schools, universities, the general 
public and, in the case of IGBC members, governments. Two IBC members 
pointed out that, as independent experts, they have no offi cial mandate to work 
under UNESCO’s umbrella, leaving a question mark over their role that hinders 
such efforts. Echoing Held’s observations about chains of delegation, the need for 
better communications between (a) the Bioethics Programme secretariat and 
National Commissions, (b) the secretariat and national bioethics committees 
(NBCs) and (c) National Commissions and ethics bodies within their countries 
was also highlighted. This would give national level institutions a bigger role in 
distributing the declarations and, crucially, adapting information to the local 
context. As one Latin American IBC member explained, documents may be on 
the internet, but access is not always easy or part of a society’s culture (personal 
observations, IBC–IGBC meeting, October 2010).
In answer to the comments about NBCs, the Bioethics Programme chief 
responded that some are still very young and thus need to be built up further 
before they can fully engage with the public, although awareness-raising events 
always form part of their training (see below). An African IBC member sounded 
another note of caution in this regard. NBCs can function as hubs for exchanges 
of experiences and capacity building, they said, but goodwill is insuffi cient: 
networking requires resources. Sometimes NBCs are ignored by authorities or 
exist on paper but have no premises, so UNESCO also needs to work more with 
decision-makers (personal observations, IBC–IGBC meeting, October 2010).
The Bioethics Programme secretariat, despite having a small staff, makes a 
plethora of information on its activities freely available on the UNESCO website. 
But when it comes to actively distributing materials to member states, there can 
be problems. Members of the Programme interviewed in 2005 (F_01) and 2011 
(F2_03) explained that they cannot be sure whether information is always getting 
to the most appropriate government departments, because UNESCO deals 
primarily with ministries of education (where National Commissions often sit), 
even though these might not be the most natural ports of call with regard to 
bioethics and genetics. This can also be the reason behind communication 
problems between National Commissions and existing NBCs, several of which 
have been developed through ministries of science and technology or health 
(interview with F2_03). This issue was discussed informally by attendees at the 
IBC’s eighteenth session in May–June 2011. It would be natural for a health 
ministry to hold an event on bioethics, they said, but if organized through a 
National Commission the offi cial host would most likely be the ministry of 
education. Persuading an education ministry of the importance of bioethics might 
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not be easy, but it would be diplomatically awkward for a ministry of health to 
take the lead.
Several committee members also raised the issue of language at the 2010 joint 
IBC–IGBC meeting, saying that more translations of UNESCO documents are 
needed if they are to reach the widest audience possible. One IBC member from 
an Arab state used the ironic example of a 2008 report on bioethics in Arab 
countries being available in French and English but not Arabic. The Kenyan 
IGBC representative appealed for the UDBHR (2005) to be translated into 
Kiswahili, which is widely spoken in sub-Saharan Africa and one of the offi cial 
languages of the African Union. Members also felt that more could be done to 
engage the public through the mass media (although another Arab state IBC 
member warned that messages have to put together carefully, since some people 
in developing countries are not entirely trustful of international organizations, 
seeing them as a new form of colonialism). The IGBC Chair wanted to see 
bioethics on YouTube and Facebook, to reach young people. The following year, 
at the IGBC’s September meeting, he asked how UNESCO could particularly 
target the main stakeholders. The head of the Bioethics Programme replied that in 
2012–13 they would be focusing on the media, parliamentarians and judges, as 
well as civil society. The Programme is trying to reach out to both decision-makers 
and the general public in new ways, such as television and the internet, in 
collaboration with UNESCO’s information and communications and external 
relations sectors (personal observations, IBC–IGBC meeting, October 2010 and 
IGBC meeting, September 2011). 
As well as the declarations themselves, UNESCO disseminates reports by the 
IBC, which give guidance on particular articles. Lenoir (1998–9: 575) has 
described this role of the IBC, mandated in articles 24 of the UDHGHR (1997) 
and 25 of the UDBHR (2005), as unique, because it is an independent body. 
Héctor Gros Espiel made a similar point in his 1998 report to the IBC on the 
implementation of the 1997 declaration:
The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights is 
innovative in that it entrusts the IBC with a role in the monitoring of its 
implementation. It is, indeed, the fi rst document of a declarative nature that 
stipulates the existence of a system of follow-up and implementation.
(UNESCO 1998b: 28)
Since member states sometimes arrive at a formulation for an article that is ‘open 
to multiple interpretations’, one of the IBC’s duties is to work out how to go from 
‘the very general level of the principle to much more practical guidelines, how to 
do it in different countries and cultures’ (interview with F_01). The aim is to 
produce usable, practicable documents that will guide states, institutions and 
individuals in operationalizing the declarations, rather than academic treatises 
(comments by Donald Evans, IGBC meeting, September 2011 [personal 
observation]). To this end, a new series of reports was launched in 2008, on the 
principles of the UDBHR (2005). The report on informed consent provides 
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explanations of the relevant principles in the UDBHR and gives examples of how 
they might be applied in certain contexts (UNESCO 2008g), while the report on 
social responsibility and health outlines ‘possible concrete strategies and courses 
of action’ for translating the principles of article 14 into specifi c policies (UNESCO 
2010h: 5).
In the biennium 2008–9, the IBC began to explore issues around article 8 of the 
UDBHR, on human vulnerability and personal integrity. It continued this work in 
2010–11. The topic garnered considerable discussion and disagreement at 
meetings, demonstrating some of the diffi culties of operating by consensus. The 
fi nal report contains no defi nition:
Attempts to defi ne vulnerability in general risk drawing the concept too 
widely or too narrowly, thereby triggering disputes rather than resolving 
them. In most cases, however, it is relatively easy to recognise vulnerability 
when it arises: something fundamental is indeed at stake.
(UNESCO 2011g: 2)
This was because neither the assigned working group, nor the IBC more broadly, 
could agree on one (echoing the debate over the defi nition of ‘bioethics’ during 
the UDBHR negotiations). At the IBC and IBC–IGBC meetings in October 2010, 
some IBC members were concerned that it would look weak to write a report but 
not be able to say what it was about, but others applauded the working group’s 
decision not to get bogged down with a complex philosophical discussion, which 
might have alienated prospective readers. IGBC members were similarly split 
(personal observations). Nevertheless, the fi nal report was welcomed by states at 
the IGBC meeting in September 2011, with the representative of the Dominican 
Republic commenting that it would be an extremely useful tool in developing 
countries lacking services and legislation, where people have been exploited in 
clinical trials and stem cell research (personal observations).
The IBC also publishes reports on contemporary bioethical issues, such as gene 
therapy (1994), embryonic stem cells (2001) and pre-implantation diagnosis 
(2003). Alongside its work on cloning and vulnerability, in 2010–11 it decided to 
examine the ethical implications of traditional medicine. ‘Traditional medicine’ 
has proved as diffi cult to defi ne as vulnerability, in terms of the scope of the 
report, as what is ‘alternative’ or ‘complementary’ in one country may be 
‘mainstream’ in another. The use of the contrastive term ‘Western medicine’ was 
objected to at meetings by some IBC and IGBC members, as well as invited 
speakers, as being indicative of the arrogance of the developed world rather than 
an accurate description of the provenance and use of allopathic medicine (‘modern 
medicine’ was preferred). Despite these obstacles, the topic was considered 
important enough to warrant another year’s work. At the IGBC’s September 2011 
meeting, for example, the Ghanaian representative, backed up by Kenya’s, 
described it as a ‘hot metal’ issue, but pleaded that it should stay on the agenda, 
particularly as it ties in with UNESCO’s two global priorities, ‘Africa’ and ‘gender 
equality’ (personal observations). 
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The September 2011 IGBC session also debated other possible topics for the 
biennium 2012–13. Suggestions at the IBC meeting earlier in the year had 
included biobanking, regenerative medicine, neuroscience, benefi t sharing, 
genetic testing and organ transplantation. Of these, biobanking proved to be the 
most popular with IGBC members (personal observations). This has become an 
increasingly important issue for developing countries, with several NBCs 
requesting that it be addressed in their training (see below; interview with F2_03). 
As one African IBC member explained at the May–June 2011 meeting, scientists 
based in the global South are tired of being treated as little more than a ‘post offi ce 
box’ for biological samples (personal observation). There was a push from 
UNESCO’s Director-General, via Pilar Álvarez-Laso, the Assistant Director-
General for Social and Human Sciences, for the IBC to concentrate on articles in 
the UDBHR, namely those on non-discrimination and non-stigmatization (article 
11) and benefi t sharing (article 15) (personal observations, IBC meeting, May–
June 2011 and IGBC meeting, September 2011). The Work Programme for 
2012–13 duly uses article 11 as a catch-all:
The Committee will focus on the principle of non-discrimination and non-
stigmatization as set forth in article 11 of the Declaration, by using this 
principle as a “conceptual umbrella” under which the new risks and 
responsibilities arising from progress in different sensitive areas of medicine, 
life sciences and associated technology (including but not limited to biobanks; 
access to drug [sic]; organs, tissues and cells transplantation and traffi cking; 
neuroscience; HIV/AIDS, and nanotechnologies) could be transversally 
analyzed.
(UNESCO 2012m)
A third information source provided by UNESCO is the Global Ethics 
Observatory (GEObs), launched in December 2005 at the IBC’s twelfth session in 
Japan (UNESCO 2006c: 9). GEObs can be accessed via UNESCO’s website 
(www.unesco.org/shs/ethics/geobs) and is available in all of the organization’s 
offi cial languages. Hosting six web-based databases – comprising ethics experts, 
institutions (including NBCs), teaching programmes, legislation or guidelines, 
codes of conduct and ethics resources – GEObs covers the ethics of science and 
technology and the environment as well as bioethics. UNESCO sees GEObs as a 
‘crucial platform’ for supporting member states in their ethics activities, providing 
models for legislation or policy (UNESCO 2006c: 9; UNESCO: 2007c; Ang et al. 
2008: 740). It is also intended to have a broader reach (ten Have and Ang 2007: 
16; UNESCO 2010c: 15). People designing new ethics courses might use the 
education section to seek the advice of those with previous experience, for 
example. ‘It’s a kind of facilitator of contacts among different people’, said a 
Bioethics Programme representative a few months before its offi cial launch. In 
particular, they hoped that GEObs would enable people in developing countries to 
access resources such as reports and guidelines from other regions quickly, to 
which they did not previously have access (interview with F_01).
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Tee Wee Ang et al. (2008: 740) write of GEObs, ‘it could also inform the 
discourse and work of the scientifi c community, civil society and the private 
sector, with the potential for cross-fertilisation of ideas on bioethics regulations 
across countries and regions’. Thus it has the capacity to become a Slaughter-like 
information network, but to fulfi l this potential people must know about it and 
consider it worthwhile (hence, perhaps, ten Have’s several publications on the 
initiative in prominent ethics journals). The efforts are starting to bear fruit. An 
evaluation of UNESCO’s ethics activities in 2008–9 by its Internal Oversight 
Offi ce (IOS) surveyed 375 GEObs users, 75 per cent of whom were very satisfi ed 
or satisfi ed with the resource. The evaluation also noted that member states were 
more willing to supply information to UNESCO than to databases compiled by 
NGOs or universities, although there were still information gaps (UNESCO 
2010c: 5–6). The head of the Bioethics Programme reported at the IGBC meeting 
in September 2011 that GEObs is used increasingly in Asia and Latin America 
and has now been linked with the European project ETHICSWEB, to boost 
visibility (personal observation).
Usage increased steadily year on year up to 2012, which saw a slight drop (see 
Table 5.1). The amount of data in GEObs has also multiplied impressively over 
the last fi ve years, despite constraints on human and fi nancial resources (the IOS 
evaluation found that ‘the amount of data that needs processing and inputting into 
the GEObs databases exceeds the resources that have been assigned to the task’ 
[UNESCO 2010c: 2]). The data are gathered and inputted by the Bioethics 
Programme secretariat, which ensures quality control. As Table 5.2 shows, the 
legislation and resources databases continue to grow signifi cantly, with the former 
gaining a lot of users (interview with F2_03). Specifi c sections of legal documents 
are cross-referenced with articles in UNESCO’s 2003 and 2005 declarations, for 
policy-makers to draw upon should they wish to codify the declarations within 
their own domestic law (Ang et al. 2008: 740).
Table 5.1 Use of GEObs, 2005 to 2012
Year Number of unique users









Source: UNESCO (2013). 
a from launch on 8 December.
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Capacity-building programmes
Alongside information dissemination, UNESCO has more active programmes 
aimed at facilitating uptake of the three declarations. Under the auspices of the 
Bioethics Programme, it supports the establishment of NBCs where they do not 
already exist. When the UDBHR was adopted in 2005, only about a quarter of 
member states had a NBC (Wolinsky 2006: 355). UNESCO (2010b: 1) states, 
‘Providing technical assistance in the process of establishment of National 
Bioethics Committees (NBCs), as well as the subsequent capacity-building for 
ensuring their viability and sustainability, are essential elements of UNESCO’s 
capacity-building action in the fi eld of bioethics.’ These committees can 
provide a clear point of contact for the Bioethics Programme secretariat and are 
seen as intermediary steps towards the long-term goal of state level legislation 
(ibid; interview with F_01). Without such bodies of experts to advise policy-
makers, say ten Have et al. (2011: 380), it is unlikely that states will make 
efforts to effect the declarations. According to a report from 2001, UNESCO 
was then helping seven countries to set up national committees, including South 
Africa (although this was not mentioned by a single participant during 
fi eldwork). The other countries were Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Jamaica, Morocco, 
Nepal and Senegal (UNESCO 2001a: 6). More recently, this work has continued 
under an initiative entitled Assisting Bioethics Committees (ABC). It has 
focused mainly on Africa, where there has until recently been a lack of ethics 
infrastructure (sub-Saharan Africa is the only region not mentioned in a 2005 
report to the German National Ethics Council on NBCs, for example) (Fuchs 
2005: 7).
In 2008–9, ABC activities were held in 14 African countries (out of 30 in total), 
costing USD 170,000 (53 per cent of the total ABC budget) (UNESCO 2010c: 
25). As well as this direct support, the Bioethics Programme distributes guidebooks 
on how to set up, run and educate bioethics committees, with further volumes on 
public policies and public debate forthcoming. Like GEObs, the guidebooks are 
available in all six offi cial languages of UNESCO (UNESCO 2011m). The IOS 
2008–9 evaluation surveyed the chairs of nine newly established NBCs. Of the 
Table 5.2 Number of entries in GEObs, 2007 to 2012
2007 December 2009 June 2012
Database 1: Experts 851 1,405 1,515
Database 2: Institutions 200   437   527
Database 3: Teaching programmes 162   232 2,355




  738 
(34 countries)
Database 5: Codes of conduct 141   151   151
Database 6: Ethics resources N/A   211   416
Sources: UNESCO (2007e; 2010c: 14; 2011m); GEObs (accessed 29 June 2012).
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fi ve who responded, four had used the guide Establishing Bioethics Committees, 
three had used Bioethics Committees at Work and two had used Educating 
Bioethics Committees and had found them useful. The evaluation spins these 
numbers positively, although it might have been expected that all the committees 
would have used all the guides, given that they had been established under the 
ABC programme (UNESCO 2010c: 5 and 18–19).
The ABC initiative derives from article 19 of the UDBHR (2005), which 
commits states to instituting ethics committees at different levels. As medical and 
research ethics committees are already in place or are being set up by states 
themselves or other organizations, UNESCO decided to focus on helping states to 
establish NBCs (Bioethics Programme progress report, IBC meeting, May–June 
2011). Under UNESCO’s defi nition, NBCs’ mandates go beyond ethical review, 
to include policy promotion and dialogue. Echoing IBC members at the 2010 
meetings, ten Have et al. (2011: 380) outline this expanded role thus: ‘As a forum 
for intercultural exchange, a national (bio)ethics committee can provide a platform 
to engage citizens and society as a whole in dialogue about (bio)ethical issues on 
a regular basis.’ The ABC programme has a particular methodology for building 
the capacity of NBCs in this and other respects, devised by a committee of experts 
in 2006 (ibid: 383). Yet there is also considerable fl exibility, to ensure that training 
is tailored to the needs of the country (UNESCO 2010b: 2; Bioethics Programme 
progress report, IBC meeting, May–June 2011).
The process is usually instigated by a member state, which will request 
assistance from UNESCO. The fi rst step is a ‘diagnosis’ of what ethics capacity 
exists in the country already. Next comes an exploratory mission, to ascertain 
what the ‘optimum modalities’ of the NBC will be and the practicalities of setting 
it up (UNESCO 2010b: 3). The programme conducted 14 such missions in 
2007–9, all in Africa and Latin America (ten Have et al. 2011: 383–4). The launch 
of the committee is usually combined with an awareness-raising event and a 
formal signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with UNESCO, 
concerning the three-year period of technical support to follow (UNESCO 
2010b: 3). Ideally, a government minister (of health, education or science) should 
conduct the inauguration, to signify its signifi cance (UNESCO no date b). Of the 
14 countries that hosted exploratory missions, nine had established NBCs and six 
had signed MoUs by November 2011, with the rest still considering their options. 
Some countries with already established NBCs, such as Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya, 
also signed MoUs, to avail themselves of the ABC training programme (ten Have 
et al. 2011: 384; UNESCO 2011b).
The technical support aims to ensure sustainability of the committees. A series 
of intensive two or three day sessions (one per year) largely follow the pattern of 
the guidebooks, training the nascent NBCs in, inter alia, working methods, 
building up documentation, establishing a secretariat, principles and practices, 
public engagement and legislation, as well as issues considered particularly 
relevant to the national context (UNESCO 2010f). Members of the Bioethics 
Programme secretariat lead the sessions, with support from teams of experts from 
countries with long-established NBCs (ten Have 2006: 346). This transferral of 
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experience and expertise is considered a very valuable aspect of the ABC 
programme by UNESCO (UNESCO 2010b: 2). Teams have thus far been English, 
French or Spanish speaking, but at the IGBC meeting in September 2011 the 
delegate from Portugal said that their country would be willing to participate in 
the programme to develop NBCs in lusophone African countries. As Cape Verde 
was, at the time, still considering establishing a committee after the exploratory 
mission of 2008, this was a timely offer (ten Have et al. 2011: 384; personal 
observation, IGBC meeting, September 2011). Beyond the scheduled trainings, 
the ABC methodology includes six-week internships for NBC secretariats and 
longer-term partnerships with experienced committees. These partnerships are a 
means to promote North–South and, at some stage, South–South collaboration. 
The Swiss and Belgian NBCs are working with their Togolese and Guinean 
counterparts respectively, for example (ten Have et al. 2011: 387; Bioethics 
Programme progress report, IGBC meeting, September 2011).
Although the technical support stage is aimed at sustainability, there are doubts 
about the viability of NBCs in resource-poor countries in the long term. ten Have 
et al. (2011: 387) note, ‘Experiences in the ABC project show that sustainability 
is a serious challenge.’ At the IBC–IGBC meeting in October 2010, an IBC 
member expressed their concerns about the make-up of committees, asking 
whether they are genuinely pluralist and independent (personal observation). The 
IOS 2008–9 evaluation also raised these issues, linking independence with 
fi nancial sustainability (UNESCO 2010c: 19–20). Political considerations may 
also have an impact. Whether a NBC gets up and running even is dependent on 
the will of the government. UNESCO can only explain why a committee is needed 
and offer expertise: ‘The actual decision is up to them’ (ten Have et al. 2011: 384). 
Internal power struggles can delay procedures. ten Have et al. (ibid) give the 
example of Mauritius, where there was a dispute about whether the process should 
be led by the university or the Academy of Sciences. This was eventually resolved 
at parliamentary level, through a bill to create a NBC.
Ongoing governmental backing is crucial. The IOS 2008–9 evaluation warned 
that, while the ABC programme was instrumental in establishing NBCs, the 
committees would only survive if they enjoyed the commitment of national 
stakeholders (UNESCO 2010c: 2). The limited resources of the programme itself 
are another challenge, as more states look to establish NBCs. One option being 
explored is online modules (to be delivered through e-learning, teleconferencing 
and webcasting, to the journalists, parliamentarians and judges who are to be the 
focus of efforts in the 2012–13 biennium). A study commissioned from The Open 
University in the UK found that this would enable a broader, more effi cient reach, 
but that the face-to-face nature of the existing methodology plays a key role in its 
success (Bioethics Programme progress reports, IBC meeting, May–June 2011 
and IGBC meeting, September 2011; UNESCO 2011b). Furthermore, as ten Have 
et al. (2011: 387) point out, the internet is not always easily accessible in 
developing countries. When interviewed in September 2011, a member of the 
Bioethics Programme secretariat (F2_03) wondered what the results of a future 
evaluation would reveal about the quality of the committees that have been set up, 
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as some may not be able to conduct their work due to funding constraints. Overall, 
however, they were positive about the ABC programme, seeing the partnerships 
with peer bodies as a means of supporting and strengthening the newer committees.
UNESCO’s second capacity-building activity is the Ethics Education Pro-
gramme (EEP), which helps states to fulfi l their obligations under the various 
articles in the three declarations on ethics education and training (UDHGHR, 
articles 20, 21 and 23; IDHGD, articles 6(a), 23(a) and 24; and UDBHR, articles 
18(2/3), 19(d), 22(1) and 23(1)). UNESCO launched the EEP in 2004, in the wake 
of a report by the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientifi c Knowledge and 
Technology (COMEST, a UNESCO body) from the previous year on the teaching 
of ethics. The report recommended that, inter alia, UNESCO develop ethics 
courses, support ethics teaching in developing countries, establish fellowships 
and chairs in ethics and appoint a board of ethics experts to focus specifi cally on 
ethics teaching (ten Have 2008: 57–8). UNESCO hopes the EEP (together with 
the education section of GEObs) will ensure that ‘future generations of scientists 
and professionals’ learn the principles in the declarations, whether or not states 
develop legislation (interview with F_01).
Whereas UNESCO’s reputation as primarily an educational institution may 
have hindered its efforts to liaise with ministries of health or science and 
technology in some countries, it has been a boon in relation to the EEP. ten Have 
(2008: 59) writes, ‘In many countries, even if there is the motivation to introduce 
ethics teaching, problems will be encountered in the implementation, because of 
a lack of adequate resources. . . . Unesco, with its experience in education, is in a 
position to remedy this situation.’ Similarly, Nouzha Guessous-Idrissi (2010: 98), 
a member of the IBC from 2000 to 2007 and of UNESCO’s Advisory Expert 
Committee for the Teaching of Ethics (see below), has commented that it is 
‘absolutely logical’ for UNESCO to encourage its member states to promote 
ethics education and training, as education is ‘the foundation on which it is built’. 
At the IBC–IGBC meeting in October 2010, two IBC members called for National 
Commissions to use their connections with education ministries to suggest 
curricula for primary and secondary schools on the UDBHR, to aid dissemination 
(personal observation).
There are four main aspects to the EEP, all of which closely align with the 
COMEST recommendations. Alongside the database of teaching programmes in 
GEObs, UNESCO has written a Core Curriculum in bioethics, appointed Chairs 
in Bioethics and developed a training course for ethics teachers. The curriculum 
is based on the UDBHR (2005). Thus it has a global reach, given that the UDBHR 
was agreed by international consensus. Nevertheless, it is designed to be suf-
fi ciently fl exible that it can be moulded to suit the requirements of different 
regions. Intended primarily for use in medical and science schools, it can also be 
deployed much more widely (Bioethics Programme progress reports, IBC–IGBC 
meeting, October 2010 and IBC meeting, May–June 2011). The curriculum was 
developed by the ad hoc Advisory Expert Committee for the Teaching of Ethics, 
appointed to assist the Bioethics Programme secretariat with the EEP. The 
committee consisted of four IBC members and representatives of the Third World 
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Academy of Sciences, the WMA and COMEST (UNESCO 2008b: i). (Ironically, 
the member from WMA was its former Director of Ethics, John Williams, who 
had been critical of the UDBHR during its drafting, as we saw in the previous 
chapter [Williams 2005].) After several committee meetings and a consultation 
with 24 further experts, mostly from developing countries, the curriculum was 
fi nalized and published in early 2008 (UNESCO no date c). Study materials and 
casebooks on Human Dignity and Human Rights and Benefi t and Harm followed 
in 2011 (UNESCO no date f).
Details on the instigation of the Core Curriculum in universities are somewhat 
hazy. There were plans to pilot it in Kenya, Israel and the Philippines in 2008, but 
no documentary record of the outcome appears to exist (UNESCO 2007e). At the 
IBC–IGBC meeting in October 2010, the chief of the Bioethics Programme 
reported that several universities were willing to act as potential test sites. MoUs 
had been signed with fi ve institutions in Asia and the Pacifi c, four in Europe and 
North America and one in Latin America and the Caribbean, with several others 
from these regions showing an interest, as well as three in Africa and two in the 
Arab world. Moreover, the curriculum had already been largely adopted by the 
Standing Committee of European Doctors, received the backing of the British 
Medical Association and the UK’s General Medical Council and contributed to 
the Master in Bioethics of Saudi Arabia’s National Guard Health Affairs. There 
would be a probable global deployment in 2011. In September the following year, 
however, in the update to the IGBC on the Bioethics Programme’s activities, the 
test sites were not mentioned, although it was reported that the study materials had 
been requested widely. The global deployment appears to have been delayed a 
year, as the Advisory Committee was to meet again in November 2011, to assess 
feedback from the pilot phase and prepare for a global rollout (no information on 
this meeting is available) (UNESCO 2010f; Bioethics Programme progress 
reports, IBC–IGBC meeting, October 2010 and IGBC meeting, September 2011). 
The course materials are freely available on the UNESCO website.
One handicap to the rollout of the Core Curriculum may be the lack of faculty 
qualifi ed to teach bioethics. This is something the EEP’s Ethics Teachers’ Training 
Course (ETTC) – developed in cooperation with the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics 
of Haifa, Israel – aims to address (ten Have 2008: 59). The ETTC is targeted at 
early career educators, introducing them to methods and resources for ethics 
teaching and giving feedback on their technique (UNESCO 2011m). It has proved 
particularly popular in the former Eastern Europe, where courses have been held 
in Romania (2006), Slovakia (2007), Belarus (2008), Serbia (2011), Croatia 
(2010, 2011 and 2012), Lithuania (2012) and Azerbaijan (2012). Courses were 
also held in Saudi Arabia and Kenya in 2007 and Namibia in 2012 (UNESCO 
no date d).
The 2008–9 IOS evaluation, which focused on the fi ve courses held up to and 
including 2008, raised serious doubts about the effi cacy and worth of the ETTC 
programme: ‘The teacher training courses involved a small number of individuals, 
some of whom are no longer teaching in ethics, which raises the question 
of whether UNESCO needs to continue with this type of training’ (UNESCO 
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2010c: 3). Feedback from the participants themselves proved positive. Of the 38 
(of 68 in total) who responded to the IOS survey, 86 per cent had found the training 
useful, 78 per cent used the skills they had acquired once a month or more, 65 per 
cent were members of regional ethics networks and 59 per cent had taken part in 
national debates on ethics. Of concern to the IOS was the rate of attrition, with 
only 79 per cent still teaching ethics, despite the short space of time since they had 
been on the course (ibid: 5, 22 and 24). 
The UNESCO Chairs in Bioethics also received mixed praise in the IOS 
evaluation. There are 12 chairs in all, in Israel, Slovakia, Argentina, Peru, Brazil, 
Mexico, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, the US, Spain, Portugal and Italy (UNESCO 
2011m). The evaluation found that the contribution of the chairs (then nine in 
number, with two appointed only in 2009) had been ‘uneven’, with those from 
Spain, Israel, Kenya and Brazil proving more active than the others (UNESCO 
2010c: 23). The Bioethics Programme is trying to address this by working with 
both the Chairs in Bioethics and those in related disciplines to bolster bioethics 
programmes at university level. There was a Symposium of UNESCO Chairs in 
Bioethics, Peace, Human Rights, Democracy and Tolerance in Italy in March 2011, 
for example (Bioethics Programme progress reports, IBC meeting, May–June 
2011 and IGBC meeting, September 2011). At the IGBC meeting in September 
2011, the Kenya representative supported these efforts and lobbied for the chairs 
to get more involved on the ground, to aid sustainability of programmes. They also 
hoped to see the sharing of best practice between the chairs (personal observation). 
The former Kenyan Chair in Bioethics would also like to see networking among 
chairs, to stimulate cross-fertilization of ideas (interview with K2_01).
In addition to its EEP activities, UNESCO is supporting the International 
Association for Ethics in Education (IAEE), created in 2011. Although an 
independent body, the IAEE was founded by ten Have (now at Duquesne University 
in Pittsburgh in the US, where the IAEE secretariat is based) and aims to provide a 
global platform for exchanging information and experiences in ethics teaching 
(broadly framed), so there are close connections with UNESCO in both personnel 
and mandate (UNESCO no date e; Duquesne University 2012). Thus far, the 
Association has held its inaugural conference, which was attended by more than 
200 delegates from 29 countries, including India, Kenya, the Dominican Republic, 
Tunisia and Romania. Further conferences are planned for 2014 in Turkey and 
2015 in Brazil. Until then, the IAEE will work on creating a website to enable 
ongoing knowledge exchange, through which users will be able to link to GEObs 
and the Core Curriculum (UNESCO 2012g). The IAEE mirrors in structure 
Reinicke’s Global Public Policy Networks (see p. 32). As the Association is still 
young, it is perhaps too early to tell how well it will sit alongside UNESCO’s 
activities, or whether its semi-independence will be a help or hindrance in its 
becoming respected and valued by the (bio)ethics community.
The fi nal activity of the Bioethics Programme is awareness-raising about ethics 
among the general public, with a view to ensuring that civil society engages with 
policy-makers and experts in ethical debate around science and technology. From 
2004 to 2007 this was done primarily through the Ethics Around the World 
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conferences, organized by the Division of the Ethics of Science and Technology 
in conjunction with UNESCO National Commissions and fi eld offi ces, as well as 
academic and research institutions. The conferences had the specifi c purpose of 
stimulating debate at national and regional levels and thus focused on topics of 
relevance to the host country. There were 15 in total, with at least one in every 
region. Conferences and seminars have since been organized on a more ad hoc 
basis and have targeted the ethics community more than civil society generally. 
Three have taken place at the initiative of the Chairs in Bioethics, in Kenya (2008), 
Israel (2009) and Brazil (2009) (ten Have 2006: 347; UNESCO 2007e). Another, 
the Joint Action for Capacity Building in Bioethics (JACOB) between the 
European Commission and UNESCO (funded by the EU’s Seventh Framework 
Programme), followed the IBC’s sixteenth session in Mexico in 2009 (UNESCO 
2010e: 9).
There is little independent evaluation of UNESCO’s capacity-building 
endeavours. The large majority of academic papers reviewing its activities have 
been written by people either currently or previously associated with the Bioethics 
Programme, as members of the IBC or the secretariat. The 2008–9 IOS evaluation 
was independent of the Programme, but still fell under the auspices of UNESCO. 
One of its recommendations was that the Programme should strengthen its 
monitoring frameworks. Another was that it should consolidate its efforts where 
it has most impact, to make the most of its limited human and fi nancial resources 
(UNESCO 2010c: 2–3). In line with Young’s estimation of IGO resources, the 
Bioethics Programme’s ambitions for encouraging implementation of the 
declarations may be curtailed by funding limitations. For the secretariat to engage 
in more follow-up activities, more money and staff would be needed (interview 
with F2_03).
During the biennial period 2004–5, out of UNESCO’s USD 610 million budget 
for its regular programme, the amount devoted to ‘ethics of science and technology, 
with emphasis on bioethics’ was a shade over USD 3.25 million (just over 0.5 per 
cent). As the ‘principal priority’ of the Social and Human Sciences Major 
Programme, this represented 26 per cent of the amount dedicated to activities 
(excluding cross-cutting projects), compared to 15.3 per cent in the previous 
biennium (UNESCO 2004a: 13–14 and 147). For 2006–7 funding for both the 
Major Programme and the ethics section was slightly reduced, although ethics 
remained the principal priority and its percentage share rose to 30 per cent 
(UNESCO 2006a: xiii–xiv and 123–4). The ethics budget more than doubled in 
2008–9, to just over USD 7.2 million, representing 2.6 per cent of UNESCO’s 
total budget for programme activities (UNESCO 2008a: xi and 270). 2010–11 
saw another slight increase, to just under USD 7.4 million, followed by a drop in 
2012–13 to just over USD 6.5 million (1 per cent of the total budget of USD 653 
million) (UNESCO 2010a: 270; UNESCO 2012a: 324 and 340). To put these 
fi gures into context, in a 2004 document seeking to attract funding partnerships 
for various projects, the foundation and running costs of GEObs over three years 
were projected at nearly USD 3.4 million (UNESCO 2004m: 53).
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Duplication of activities
Chapter 3 described how, in an ad hoc international system, the mandates and 
programmes of IGOs have a tendency to overlap. This tendency has been mitigated 
to some extent in bioethics through the formation of the United Nations Inter-
Agency Committee on Bioethics. The committee was initiated by UNESCO, 
expressly to avoid duplication and promote collaboration and information 
exchange among its membership. According to then Director-General Koïchiro 
Matsuura, this action confi rmed the organization’s role as a ‘catalyst for 
international cooperation’ in the fi eld of bioethics (UNESCO 2005i: 39). The 
Committee is made up of mainly UN agencies, but also other relevant regional and 
international IGOs, at UNESCO’s suggestion (interviews with F_01 and F2_03; 
UNESCO 2003i: 9–10). UNESCO provides the permanent secretariat, although 
members take turns to host meetings. The UN members are the Offi ce of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Labour Organization, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the 
United Nations University and WHO; the non-UN associate members are the 
European Commission, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the African Union, the Arab League Educational 
Cultural and Scientifi c Organization, the International Centre for Genetic 
Engineering and Biotechnology and the World Trade Organization (UNESCO 
2011m; UNESCO no date a). Henriette Abbing (1998: 155) recommended this 
kind of coordination in an article on the UDHGHR (1997) and similar texts:
From a point of view of effectiveness, effi ciency and transparency it would 
be more fruitful if international discussions could be centered around a 
particular subject, rather than being framed according to the statutory mandate 
of an international organization. Bringing together the various international 
organizations involved to discuss on equal footing a topical issue avoids a 
shattering of the debate, and guarantees an integrated approach of all aspects 
involved through the input of the particular focus of each single organization 
involved.
The fi rst task of the Inter-Agency Committee was to contribute to the drafting 
of the UDBHR (2005). Since then it has met periodically to tackle issues of 
common interest. Although the ethics of genetics has taken something of a ‘back-
seat’ compared with the UDBHR within the Bioethics Programme’s capacity-
building activities, this is not the case at inter-agency level. In 2008 the UN’s 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) requested that UNESCO investigate 
the possibility of an inter-agency coordination mechanism on genetic privacy and 
non-discrimination (ECOSOC Decision 2008/233). As per ECOSOC instruc-
tions, UNESCO consulted with UN agencies and member states, as well as 
other relevant international organizations and the Inter-Agency Committee. Via 
questionnaires (which, like those on the draft UDBHR, remitted low response 
rates), it found that, in several cases, both states and IGOs had legislation and/or 
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programmes in place to protect genetic data. As during the cloning debate, 
some states pressed for international initiatives to help build national capacities, 
on genetic privacy and non-discrimination (ECOSOC 2011: 4–8; Bioethics Pro-
gramme progress report, IGBC meeting, September 2011).
In 2010, ECOSOC requested that UNESCO defer its report for another year, to 
enable further consultation with member states and analysis by the Inter-Agency 
Committee (ECOSOC Decision 2010/259). At its tenth meeting, in May 2011, the 
committee discussed UNESCO’s fi ndings and heard from a variety of experts, 
who suggested that genetic data should not be treated in isolation, but as part of a 
broader concern with privacy and non-discrimination in health settings more 
generally. Both UNESCO and the committee concluded that there is a call for 
information exchange and collaboration in this area, but that a specifi c coordinating 
mechanism is not needed, as the Inter-Agency Committee is well placed to fulfi l 
this mandate (ECOSOC 2011: 9–10). At the July 2012 ECOSOC meeting, in line 
with UNESCO’s recommendations, the Council passed a resolution inviting the 
Inter-Agency Committee to continue to consider genetic privacy and non-
discrimination and to promote international cooperation in this area, with the 
issue to be removed from the Council’s agenda (ECOSOC 2012). A remarkably 
similar outcome, then, to the culmination of UNESCO’s four years of work on the 
governance of human cloning.
The 2008–9 IOS evaluation of UNESCO’s ethics activities found that UNESCO 
was the ‘lead agency’ internationally on bioethics, having established ‘comparative 
advantages’ in the fi eld (UNESCO 2010c: 2). In reality, there is as much cooperation 
as there is competition between organizations. UNESCO has worked with its inter-
agency partners and others on several initiatives. On the back of the JACOB 
conference in Mexico in 2009, the European Commission supported the publication 
of UNESCO’s NBCs in Action in 2010 (UNESCO 2010e: 9; UNESCO 2011m). In 
2010–11 UNESCO contributed to a WMA expert conference on the ethics of 
placebos, a CIOMS-hosted panel on how to integrate research and treatment and 
(alongside WMA and CIOMS) a meeting of the US Presidential Commission for 
the Study of Bioethical Issues, on human subjects protection (Bioethics Programme 
progress report, IGBC meeting, September 2011; PCSBI 2011).
Perhaps the UN agency with which UNESCO’s bioethics and genetics activities 
might be seen to overlap the most is the World Health Organization. The WHO’s 
2002 report Genomics and World Health, published after the adoption of 
UNESCO’s UDHGHR in 1997 and during negotiations on the IDHGD of 2003, 
described the WHO as ‘in a position to adopt a crucial leadership role in bioethics’. 
This would enable it to ‘exercise its normative function for setting standards and 
guidelines and harmonization of procedures’, partly through helping member 
states to regulate genomics (WHO 2002: 8 and 10–11). The WHO has indeed 
been active in bioethics, through its Ethics and Health Initiative, launched in 
October 2002. It produced the Research Ethics Committees: basic concepts for 
capacity-building manual in 2009 and Standards and Operational Guidance for 
Ethics Review of Health-Related Research with Human Participants in 2011. It 
also hosts the Opinions submitted by National Ethics Committees (ONEC) online 
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database, which contains details of both committees and their opinions (available 
at http://apps.who.int/ethics/nationalcommittees/). As of May 2012, there were 
107 committees listed (WHO 2012b).
ONEC was developed after the eighth Global Summit of National Bioethics 
Advisory Bodies in 2010. The Ethics and Health team provides the permanent 
secretariat to the Summit, which meets biennially (WHO 2012c). Perhaps ironi-
cally, considering the nascent IAEE, ten Have et al. (2011: 387) have questioned 
the usefulness of such international gatherings, claiming that they do little to build 
NBC operational capacity or stimulate knowledge exchange between meetings. 
The WHO has also recently established a Global Network of WHO Collaborating 
Centres for Bioethics. There are six centres so far, all in developed countries (the 
Joint Center for Bioethics in Toronto is one of them), but the WHO is encouraging 
partnerships between centres in high- and low-income countries (WHO 2012a).
While all these activities appear to duplicate UNESCO’s, the two organizations 
often work in partnership. It is the Ethics and Health Initiative that represents 
WHO on the Inter-Agency Committee. UNESCO, the WHO and the Council of 
Europe contributed to meetings on bioethics and research ethics in Cyprus and 
Lithuania in May 2004 and a regional meeting of NBCs in Cairo in 2007 was a 
joint WHO–UNESCO initiative (WHO 2005–6: 1–6; ten Have et al. 2011: 382). 
More recently, UNESCO’s input into the Standards and Operational Guidance 
for Ethics Review of Health-Related Research with Human Participants was 
considered by the WHO to be ‘especially valuable’ (WHO 2011: viii). This belies 
the claims of the 2005 Developing World Bioethics special issue on the UDBHR 
that, in promulgating the declaration, UNESCO was encroaching on the mandate 
of the WHO (see Landman and Schüklenk 2005: iii and Williams 2005: 212). In 
fact, ten Have responded in a SciDevNet article that the contributors were 
perhaps not au fait with how UN agencies work (Shetty 2005). Andorno also 
directly answered the Developing World Bioethics criticisms, claiming that the 
work of the two organizations can ‘perfectly coexist’, as UNESCO tends to 
elaborate general norms, whereas the WHO produces more technically focused 
guidance (Andorno 2007: 151–2).
Since Andorno made these comments, UNESCO has clearly expanded its remit 
to include provision of technical support. But the fact that UNESCO has produced 
guidebooks primarily aimed at NBCs, whereas the WHO’s guidance is targeted at 
institutional RECs, is indicative of what should be a clear-cut division of labour 
between the two organizations. It is the WHO’s work with NBCs, through the 
Global Summit, that muddies the waters. Another potential clash concerns the 
specialisms of each agency. At the discussion of future topics for IBC reports at 
the IGBC meeting in September 2011, a representative of the WHO’s Ethics and 
Health Initiative outlined how several of the suggested areas were already being 
covered by the WHO or other bodies, namely traditional medicine, biobanks and 
organ transplantation and traffi cking (personal observation). Since these topics, as 
well as activities with NBCs and RECs, were to be discussed at the Inter-Agency 
Committee meeting in May 2012, perhaps the overlap issue is being resolved 
(UNESCO no date e).
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In September 2011 the IGBC Chair had encouraged the two agencies to 
systematically work out their responsibilities, not only to avoid duplication within 
the UN, but also for the sake of end-users in hard-pressed ethics committees, who 
fi nd it tiresome to answer similar enquiries from different bodies. Álvarez-Laso, 
Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences, responded that the 
division of labour is clear, having been approved by the governing bodies of 
UNESCO and the WHO (personal observation). In contrast, a member of the 
Bioethics Programme secretariat felt that there needed to be further clarifi cation 
on which type of ethics bodies each organization works with, which could only 
come from a higher level. The matter was becoming urgent, having been raised by 
both the IGBC and member states more generally (interview with F2_03). If these 
uncertainties can be addressed, the organizations’ programmes will be mutually 
reinforcing, as per Young’s observations on international institutions.
Enforcement
UNESCO pursues its programme of encouragement through capacity-building 
activities in part because it does not have the power to compel its member states to 
adopt the declarations. Lenoir’s words on the draft UDHGHR (1997) illustrate the 
limitations: ‘The idea of the IBC is to propose a Declaration which could serve as 
a reference, a pattern or a source of inspiration to the States willing to adopt 
legislation on bioethics’ (Lenoir 1996; italics added). A Bioethics Programme 
member (F_01), interviewed in 2005, lamented that the organization is blamed by 
some for the lack of implementation of the declarations, when in fact it ‘cannot do 
much more than what the member states allow us to do’. Another member, 
speaking in 2011, similarly felt that states could do more to keep up with their own 
commitments. The secretariat can help, but it is states’ responsibility to implement 
the declaration (interview with F2_03). There has been a reluctance among states 
to even self-report to UNESCO on their bioethics and genetics activities. Allyn 
Taylor argued in 1999 that the lack of a formal supervisory mechanism for the 
UDHGHR (1997) was of ‘signifi cant concern’. She recommended that self-
reporting by states on their implementation of the declaration be combined with 
fact-fi nding and review by an independent body, to promote a ‘truly constructive 
dialogue’ and predicted that the ‘growing sense of urgency’ on the need for 
international cooperation on genetics might serve to ‘soften national opposition to 
substantial organizational supervision under a voluntary auditing process’ (Taylor 
1999: 480, 513, 527, 531 and 535–6). The negotiations for the UDBHR (2005) 
would suggest otherwise.
Early in the formulation of the UDHGHR (1997), it was decided that if the 
declaration was to have a ‘real impact’ a follow-up mechanism would be needed 
(that is, a system of implementation review or SIR) (UNESCO 1999a: 38). 
Implementation guidelines, endorsed by the General Conference in November 
1999, thus stipulated that an evaluation should be carried out fi ve years after the 
adoption of the declaration (UNESCO 2000b: 9–10). The IDHGD (2003) similarly 
suggests that states should submit reports to the IBC and IGBC on their 
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implementation of the declaration (article 25) and the IBC’s early recommendations 
on what became the UDBHR (2005) were that it should include such a proviso 
(UNESCO 2003h: 12). Whereas the 2002 evaluation of the UDHGHR duly took 
place in the form of a questionnaire, the proposals for the two later declarations 
met with resistance from member states (contrary to the trend identifi ed by Victor 
et al., that states are becoming more favourably disposed to SIRs). At the January 
2005 IBC and IGBC meetings (which discussed possible implementation 
guidelines for the IDHGD as well as the text of the draft UDBHR), several 
government representatives felt that reporting mechanisms were inappropriate to 
non-binding instruments, as did those attending the IGE meeting in June 2005. 
The states most vocal in their opposition to periodic reporting were the US, 
Canada, Germany and India (personal observations; UNESCO 2004i; UNESCO 
2005m: 8).
According to a member of the Bioethics Programme, the reaction of member 
states to the IBC’s initial suggestion that the UDBHR require biennial reports by 
states was, ‘Well, that’s out of the question’ (interview with F_01). This attitude 
was picked up on several years later, at the October 2010 IBC–IGBC meeting. An 
IBC member noted that dissemination seemed to be the main concern, even fi ve 
years after the UDBHR had been adopted. They attributed this sluggishness to the 
one-way communications between the secretariat and fi eld offi ces and harked 
back to the early drafts of the declaration, which had called for reports from 
member states. They suggested that, in lieu of an offi cial reporting mechanism, the 
secretariat should ask states for unoffi cial reports, which could go on the website 
as a form of information exchange. The IGBC representative from Romania 
proposed a special department in UNESCO to disseminate documents and collect 
information from all member states (personal observations). The issue was raised 
again at the IGBC meeting in September the following year. The IGBC Chair 
asked whether it was possible to have some kind of feedback system, to ensure 
UNESCO’s work is of benefi t. When the head of the Bioethics Programme replied 
that systematizing feedback when resources are limited is a big challenge, but that 
IGBC members could play an important role by providing information on their 
countries, the Chair put forward the idea of an electronic template (personal 
observations). The offi cial conclusions of the session include this suggestion:
[The IGBC] recognizes the signifi cant role Member States can play in 
assessing the impact of UNESCO’s action at regional and national level, and 
towards this end encourages the Secretariat to offer means to the Member 
States for providing feedback on a range of bioethics activities within their 
borders, including the promotion and dissemination of the Declaration, 
through a standardized and user-friendly template.
(UNESCO 2011c: 2)
This lack of a reporting mechanism for both the IDHGD (2003) and UDBHR 
(2005) would seem to render them weaker instruments than their predecessor. In 
reality, however, it makes little difference, because the 2002 evaluation exercise 
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on the UDHGHR (1997), like many SIRs, was something of a failure (despite 
being deemed an ‘essential ingredient’ of UNESCO’s bioethics work by the then 
Director-General [UNESCO 2002b: 2]). Around 2,500 questionnaires were sent 
to states, IGOs, NGOs, national ethics committees, universities and academic 
institutions, the private sector and prominent individuals. Since only 100 or so 
questionnaires were returned, with very few from states, the results were of 
limited signifi cance, as the Assistant Director-General for Social and Human 
Sciences acknowledged when reporting the results to the IGBC. He appealed to 
members to consider new evaluation methods that would engage stakeholders 
(UNESCO 2003i: 8–9). The offi cial report of the evaluation to the General 
Conference was not so candid, concluding that the survey provided a ‘rich variety’ 
of information on the impact of the declaration, which had clearly become ‘an 
authority in bioethics’ (UNESCO 2003f: 7).
The Bioethics Programme representative (F_01) interviewed in 2005, agreeing 
with the Assistant Director-General, felt that the evaluation process was too time-
consuming, given the poor response rate. They described how as a secretariat they 
were in something of a no-win situation: ‘They [member states] don’t want to be 
compelled to report on what they do. At the same time they’re always asking us, 
“How is the declaration impacting the member states?”’ They hoped that GEObs 
would enable the gathering of information on the implementation of the declaration 
independently of political processes and thus in a way that is non-threatening to 
member states. The member of the secretariat interviewed in 2011 (F2_03) 
confi rmed that GEObs was working as intended, in terms of data collection. They 
did not see it as an alternative to self-reporting, however, as the information is 
collected by the secretariat rather than submitted by governments (interview with 
F2_03).
Adoption by member states
All three UNESCO declarations require states to take ‘all appropriate measures’ 
to instigate their principles at national level. If they are not to ‘remain paperwork’, 
as non-binding instruments they must be effected by states (ten Have 2006: 343). 
Precisely because they are non-binding, however, there is no obligation on states 
to do so. That declarations can only persuade rather than compel states to modify 
their laws was reiterated by an offi cial at the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
A South African ethicist likewise said that as ‘merely declarations’ the UNESCO 
instruments serve to ‘remind governments of their responsibility’ (interviews with 
K_30 and SA_27). Lenoir (1998–9: 575) drives home this point in relation to the 
UDHGHR (1997): 
The implementation of the Human Genome Declaration depends, fi rst and 
foremost, on the will of states. For instance, it may be hoped that some states 
will publish the Human Genome Declaration in their offi cial gazettes or 
journals. It is for states to incorporate the principles of the Human Genome 
Declaration into their legislation, where appropriate. It is for them to set up 
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ethics committees which can refer to the Human Genome Declaration. 
Finally, it is chiefl y for states to develop curricula on bioethics. The fi rst aim 
of the text is to encourage the states deprived of any legislation on bioethics 
(including most developing and Eastern European countries) to legislate in 
the fi eld in accordance with the principles of the Human Genome Declaration.
The UDHGHR (1997), as the oldest of the three declarations, might be expected 
to have been enacted to the greatest degree. In this regard, at a Round Table at the 
2001 UNESCO General Conference, 53 ministers of science (or their equivalents) 
made the following statement:
In conclusion, we, the participating and represented ministers of science: 
(i) undertake to participate actively in the promotion of the principles set out 
in the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights and 
in its implementation, in particular by drawing inspiration from it in the 
formulation of our legislation or regulations, and by considering possible 
extensions to the Declaration when it is evaluated in 2002–2003.
(UNESCO 2003a: 12)
Since very few countries responded to the 2002 evaluation, it is diffi cult to 
measure whether they have fulfi lled this undertaking (the claim of the 2003 
IDHGD’s preamble notwithstanding, that its predecessor had received ‘fi rm 
support’ internationally and had been adopted by member states within their legis-
lation, regulations or ethical codes [UNESCO 2003b]). The IBC’s 2001 paper on 
solidarity between developed and developing countries reported a paucity of 
efforts to fulfi l articles 17 to 19 of the declaration, on disease research, knowledge 
sharing and capacity building: ‘States rapidly recognized the implications of the 
new scientifi c advances, but they have not always been so prompt in undertaking 
projects of solidarity and international co-operation as set out in the Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights’ (UNESCO 2001b: 14).
It is worth noting that the UDHGHR (1997) and the IDHGD (2003) do not 
appear on the agendas of IBC sessions after 2003. From that point, with regard to 
standard setting at least, all the attention appears to have fallen on the drafting and 
follow-up of the UDBHR (2005). A member of the Bioethics Programme 
explained that, although the two earlier declarations are not being very actively 
promoted, they have not been abandoned. They are always referred to in trainings 
and so on, but there is less of a focus on them because they cover a more restricted 
area than the UDBHR. The Programme can accomplish more through the broader 
bioethics declaration, which can then act as a stepping stone towards more specifi c 
legislation on genetics. Some NBCs are indeed working on this, according to their 
countries’ needs (interview with F2_03).
Lack of information from member states is not the only obstacle in assessing 
how far the declarations are being implemented at national level. Even when 
states enact legislation, it is diffi cult to measure how far this is a direct response 
to the declarations. The IOS 2008–9 evaluation found, ‘There is evidence that 
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national legislation (post-2005) in numerous countries refl ects the principles of 
the UDBHR. There is, however, insuffi cient evidence to attribute this to the work 
of UNESCO’ (UNESCO 2010c: 1). The member of the Bioethics Programme 
interviewed in 2005 (F_01) averred that it is whether the declarations are being 
adhered to that is important, not whether this is being done deliberately or not: 
‘Even if we don’t know if it’s post- or propter- the declarations, it is just what we 
want, because UNESCO is making the declarations to have more policies in the 
area of genetics, whether or not it’s our initiation of the whole process.’
If it is not the declarations that are inspiring regulatory innovations, it can be 
questioned whether they are really fi lling a gap, as UNESCO claims. A review of 
the legislation and guidelines database of GEObs reveals that, of the 54 domestic 
laws or guidelines from 19 countries cross-referenced with the IDHGD (2003) by 
July 2012, 45 had been developed before 2003, but only nine after. Of the 638 
instruments from 34 countries (134 from Australia alone) cross-referenced with 
the UDBHR (2005), only 57 had been developed after 2005 (GEObs, accessed 6 
July 2012). Some of the connections drawn are rather tenuous. Kenya’s 2008 
Water Act is cross-referenced with article 16 of the UDBHR on protecting future 
generations, for example. While this is a valid acknowledgement of UNESCO’s 
broad understanding of bioethics, it seems very unlikely that the Act will have 
been inspired by the declaration rather than other international instruments more 
directly addressing environmental issues. Perhaps tellingly, when states have 
taken the opportunity at IGBC meetings to report on their ethics activities, they 
have listed workshops, university programmes, translations, media engagement 
and NBCs, but not legislation (personal observations, IGBC meetings, October 
2010 and September 2011). The IBC meetings held in Kenya (2007) and Azerbaijan 
(2011) were different. In each case, the day of presentations devoted to informing 
the committee of activities to implement the declarations in the region (another 
means of fi nding out what is happening in states) touched on recent or needed 
legislative initiatives (UNESCO 2008e; UNESCO 2011p; interview with F2_03).
No documents in GEObs had been cross-referenced with the UDHGHR (1997) 
by July 2012 but an earlier initiative had conducted a similar exercise. General 
Conference resolution 29 C/17 (1997) had asked the Director-General to prepare 
a ‘global report on the situation worldwide in the fi elds relevant to the Declaration, 
on the basis of information supplied by the Member States and of other 
demonstrably trustworthy information gathered by whatever methods he may 
deem appropriate’ (UNESCO 1998d: 46). The Director-General duly wrote to all 
member states requesting information on legislation or regulations on bioethics, 
adopted or pending, with a particular emphasis on genetics and biotechnology 
(UNESCO 1998b: 58). The information provided and collected afforded a review 
of 41 states across all regions (UNESCO 1999b: 4). Arguably, then, this precursor 
to GEObs was a more fruitful enterprise than the 2002 evaluation.
Some states may be taking up the declarations’ principles selectively, or putting 
their own interpretations on them. Such adaptability could be seen as a weakness 
or a strength. Shawn Harmon (2005: 37) writes of the UDHGHR (1997), ‘By its 
frequent deference to domestic lawmakers, it fails to provide a universal response 
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that will guard against piecemeal legislation and a “race to the bottom”.’ Andorno 
(2002: 962), by contrast, believes that to impose a comprehensive legal framework 
on countries with differing sociocultural backgrounds would be both impossible 
and unfair. Echoing Victor et al., Christian Byk (1998: 237) sees the UDHGHR’s 
non-binding fl exibility in a positive light: ‘it facilitates adhesion to the Declaration 
by those states which have diffi culty satisfying the implementation of the 
principles, but which intend to go further that way’. UNESCO, for its part, 
endorses national contextualization. In a 2006 paper outlining all UNESCO’s 
bioethics activities, ten Have wrote: ‘As principles they are universally adopted, 
but in practice their application must be tailored in multiple ways to accommodate 
different types of research and health care, categories of patients and problems, 
and cultural settings and traditions’ (ten Have 2006: 342–3).
The lack of universal norms on cloning
In its June 2010 report, the IBC Working Group on Human Cloning and Inter -
national Governance gave a list of tenets that it would like to see in a convention 
or moratorium on human reproductive cloning. These included: rendering repro-
ductive cloning (defi ned as per the Working Group’s revised terminology) a crime, 
with the practice to be tried before the International Criminal Court and under the 
domestic law of ratifying states; penalties and denials of funding for offending 
corporations and institutions; ‘trade cross-retaliation’ and embargoes on research 
cooperation against offending states; a trade prohibition on cloned embryos (but 
not cloned tissues or cells for research); and disputes between states to be heard by 
the International Court of Justice. The instrument would also outline the ethical 
and human rights responsibilities of states, corporations and individual researchers 
(with particular reference to the vulnerability of embryos, foetuses and children) 
and, in similar fashion to the UN Declaration on Human Cloning, juxtapose the 
cloning issue with immediate challenges such as inequalities of health.
The report gave three reasons why the Working Group considered a robust 
instrument necessary. First, the norms in existing international instruments (such 
as the UN declaration and the Council of Europe protocol) are vague and 
inconsistent. Second, none are enforceable at global level. Third, they may impede 
benefi cial medical research while unintentionally sanctioning unethical practice 
(UNESCO 2010g: 11–12). The Group’s draft fi nal statement of 2011 added, ‘the 
current non-binding international regulations cannot be considered suffi cient in 
addressing the challenges posed by the contemporary scientifi c developments and 
to safeguard the interests of the developing countries that still lack specifi c 
regulations in this area’ (UNESCO 2011d: 3).
If this is the case, UNESCO’s inability to meet the need it has identifi ed is 
problematic, as Maimets, Chair of the Working Group, recognizes. At the IBC and 
IBC–IGBC meetings in October 2010, he implored the assembled delegates to 
consider what the two committees will say when (not if) cloning happens, as key 
global bioethics bodies. The representative of the Russian Federation made a 
similar point, asking how the IGBC will react when, in the near future, a human 
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clone is created in a jurisdiction without a moratorium (personal observations). 
Camporesi and Bortolotti (2008: e15) also highlight the urgency of the matter, in 
the Journal of Medical Ethics: ‘To conclude, we propose that in the time left 
before human reproductive cloning is attempted successfully, progress on the 
ethical debates should be made and good regulatory measures adopted as a result.’
The Working Group’s 2010 report declared that any international instrument on 
cloning would best be elaborated by UNESCO:
As an international organization that has a solid track record in standard-
setting and capacity building in bioethics, UNESCO provides the best global 
platform to initiate the processes towards a moratorium or a prohibition on 
human reproductive cloning under international law.
(UNESCO 2010g: 6)
The organization has failed to fulfi l this self-stated role on two counts. As neither 
the 2010 report nor the 2011 draft fi nal statement were formally adopted by the 
IBC, the fi nal offi cial verdict of the Working Group dates back to 2009. This 
means that all the Group’s work in the biennium 2010–11, including the revised 
terminology, has essentially come to nothing. Furthermore, this work does not 
appear to have hit the radar of the scientifi c and ethical communities, as neither 
the proposed defi nitions nor the initiative more broadly have been discussed in the 
relevant journals.1
With regard to therapeutic cloning, the Working Group’s draft fi nal statement 
suggested that this should continue to be dealt with at national level, because of 
countries’ different attitudes towards the status of embryos (UNESCO 2011d: 3). 
This could be seen as a cop-out, as was noted by one member of the IBC at its 
May–June 2011 meeting, where the statement was presented (personal observation). 
Isasi and Bartha Knoppers (2006) demonstrated the plethora of national approaches 
to embryonic and stem cell research in their review of policies in 50 countries. This 
diversity poses a challenge to international harmonization, but also makes it 
diffi cult for transnational research consortia to operate. In its 2008 interim report, 
the Working Group had sought to address this issue, recommending the development 
of guidelines at international level for states where human embryonic and stem cell 
research is legal, based on existing formulations by professional associations 
(UNESCO 2008h: 5). This idea did not survive in the later reports. The problem 
was that these plans, combined with a convention or moratorium specifi cally 
addressing human reproductive cloning, would have taken UNESCO very close to 
the initial proposals for the UN instrument, which proved abortive. Mindful of what 
had happened at the UN only a few years previously, member states chose the safe 
option, politically speaking. What this means is that the ‘black hole’ in international 
legislation on cloning that UNESCO has identifi ed remains to be fi lled.
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Member states of UNESCO have, arguably, shown more interest in the drafting of 
the three bioethics and genetics declarations than in their implementation, 
refl ecting the compromise attached to non-binding international instruments. 
Despite UNESCO’s considerable efforts to promote the declarations among 
policy-makers, experts and the general public, direct uptake by member states (as 
far as this can be measured) has been rather poor. This is partly because the 
declarations carry no legal obligations for sovereign states. It is also because, in 
some instances, states already have adequate policies in place. For those states 
that have not yet established bioethics systems, the declarations may galvanize 
them into doing so, or at least this is what the UNESCO Bioethics Programme 
hopes. Indeed, its capacity-building projects have engendered fl edgling national 
bioethics committees and ethics education programmes in several countries, 
particularly in the global South. Thus it may be that the ‘added value’ of the 
declarations lies more in the initiatives they have spawned than in the documents 
themselves.
6 Contextualizing bioethics
The declarations in Kenya and 
South Africa
In the preface to UNESCO’s volume on how the UDHGHR (1997) came into 
being, then Director-General of UNESCO Federico Mayor wrote, ‘It is now the 
responsibility of States to breathe life into the Declaration, inter alia, by refl ecting 
it in their domestic legislation’ (UNESCO 1999a: III). Seven years on from the 
adoption of the third declaration, the UDBHR (2005), this chapter outlines how 
far all three are refl ected in the laws, regulations and policies of two states in 
particular: Kenya and South Africa. First, though, we look again at the negotiation 
process for the 2005 bioethics declaration.1 The analysis takes a step back from 
the negotiations themselves, to see what, if anything, fi rst happened at national 
level to enable each country to work out its negotiating position. This is followed 
by a review of how stakeholders (geneticists, ethicists and so on) in Kenya and 
South Africa perceive the declarations and whether they see the governance of 
human cloning as an important issue. 
Negotiations at national level
The Director-General of UNESCO reported in 2002, ‘Despite the ever greater 
importance of bioethics worldwide, this discipline is still too often the preserve of 
a handful of specialists’ (UNESCO 2002b: 5). Refl ecting this, the UDBHR was 
drafted as a ‘practical application’ document rather than an academic one (UNESCO 
2005c: 3–4). At the June 2005 IGE session charged with fi nalising the declaration, 
the Director-General thanked member states for sending ‘strong, quality delegations’ 
(UNESCO 2005m: Annex II, 1). (Williams [2005], by contrast, sardonically refers 
to those who attended this meeting as ‘experts’.) The chief Kenyan delegate, 
a scientist, was selected as the country’s then UNESCO Chair in Bioethics (who 
later became Chair of the IGBC). They were accompanied to the June meeting by 
the Kenyan Deputy Permanent Delegate to UNESCO (based in Paris) and to the 
previous session in April by a member of Kenya’s National Council for Science and 
Technology. The chief South African delegate, a geneticist, was appointed by the 
Minister of Education and attended only the June meeting, although the South 
African Deputy Permanent Delegate to UNESCO was at both sessions. The Kenyan 
IGBC representatives at the January 2005 meetings were both from the National 
Commission for UNESCO (interviews with K_01 and SA_23; UNESCO 2005e: 1 
and 9; UNESCO 2005f: 5; UNESCO 2005o: 1 and 10).
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Although the majority of people from Kenya and South Africa interviewed in 
2005–6 were unfamiliar with the declarations, several had strong opinions about 
who should be representing them at international negotiations more generally. A 
Kenyan civil society actor (K_14) could fi nd no consistency from one meeting to 
the next: ‘The people who represent the government – today it’s this person, 
another month it’s somebody completely different from another ministry.’ A 
university researcher (K_26) also saw the appointment process as a capricious 
one, resulting in ill-informed government offi cials attending international meet-
ings at short notice, with little time to absorb the relevant facts and statistics. 
They asked, ‘Who is representing my views as a geneticist?’ South African 
participants were also of the opinion that representatives at international 
negotiations need to have a certain level of expertise, although they differed on 
where the requisite expertise lay. Some of those who conduct genetic research 
involving human subjects felt that experience ‘at the coalface’ was important. 
This would furnish an understanding of the intricacies of obtaining informed 
consent, for example (interviews with SA_12, SA_20 and SA_21). One (SA_21) 
commented, ‘I think it’s very dangerous to have a group of academics putting it 
[the UDBHR] together when they don’t understand what the issues are on the 
ground, because they can dream up things that are wonderfully ethically sound, 
but are totally impractical.’ A long-standing member of a research ethics committee 
also thought that practical experience was important, but in terms of ethical review 
rather than research. Having seen some registers of those involved in UNESCO’s 
bioethics activities, they expressed concern that very few of the people listed had 
sat on an ethics committee, remarking, ‘I found one South African representative 
that I know has no bioethics research experience on any committee in this country, 
but is regarded as an expert – and that worries me’ (interview with SA_19). Others 
thought that those with a background in the philosophy of bioethics had a vital 
role to play, because they have been trained in the logical construction of 
arguments. One said of the UDBHR, ‘I can’t see that there were bioethicists 
involved in the drafting of that thing. . . . I think it’s unusable’ (interviews with 
SA_08 and SA_16 [quoted]).
The tensions between these different positions were articulated by a prominent 
actor in South African bioethics:
So what does it mean to be ‘a bioethicist’? Should everybody who calls him 
or herself a bioethicist be consulted? Bioethics is a contentious fi eld populated 
by scholars, professionals and others from many disciplines, not all of whom 
have had an adequate training or experience. So whose voices should be 
heard?
(interview with SA_09)
Their words mirror what ten Have (2010: 14) has said in the context of the 
UNESCO Bioethics Programme:
It is not clear who are experts. As an established discipline, bioethics has a 
body of knowledge, validated experiences, textbooks, journals, and best 
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practices. In this sense, there is distinctive bioethics expertise. At the same 
time, as a public and policy-making discourse, bioethics is also a more 
general approach to particular issues, expressing, for example, political views 
on moral issues.
On being asked who should have put the declarations together, most partici-
pants thought a range of people essential, including scientists, ethics committee 
members and philosophically trained bioethicists, but also government represent-
atives, legal experts, civil society actors and those with previous experience 
of international negotiations (interviews with SA_05,08,10,14,21,22,24,30,31,
32,33). One government offi cial (SA_31) who had attended many such nego-
tiations commented, ‘The people who are prepared to explore the art of the 
possible are the people we should have in the room’ – the ‘art of the possible’ 
signifying compromise. To include at intergovernmental meetings a diverse 
range of stakeholders from each member state might prove impractical, but 
governments could seek the advice and opinions of such actors in deciding what 
views their delegations should take to the negotiating table. For one interviewee, 
whether there had been wide consultation on the draft UDBHR (2005) was more 
important than who actually made the fi nal decisions: ‘I think the process is key, 
rather than just the people’ (interview with SA_22).
Kenya’s role in the negotiation of the declaration was coordinated by the 
National Commission for UNESCO. In formulating its position, the Commis-
sion garnered opinions from various people it considered experts, namely 
members of its own Natural Sciences and Social and Human Sciences Com-
mittees and offi cials from the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the 
Kenya Medical Research Institute and the National Council for Science and 
Technology (interviews with K_02, K_13 and K_16). These expert views were 
sometimes overruled by the permanent delegates to UNESCO in Paris, who 
work with their counterparts from other African delegations to form positions on 
issues as a consolidated African Group (interviews with K_16 and K_30). 
Nevertheless, the chief Kenyan representative at the IGE meetings in April 
and June 2005 carried out a similar consultation process to the National Commis-
sion, in order to be able to present a ‘Kenyan position’ (interviews with K_02 
and K_16).
The tension between experts and states identifi ed at international level by IBC 
and IGBC members seems, therefore, to have been mirrored at national level. Two 
members of the National Council for Science and Technology (NCST) later 
explained that, because the Permanent Delegation to Paris had only recently been 
established at the time of the UDBHR negotiations, its connections to other bodies 
were uncertain. By 2012 the lines of communication with the National Commission 
were far better established, with Kenya’s IGBC representative able to get infor-
mation to the Delegation quickly and easily if unable to attend a meeting in Paris 
themselves. Furthermore, the Paris offi ce has proved very useful in strengthening 
relations (and therefore consensus) with other countries in the African Group, not 
least because, being on site, they are privy to corridor conversations (interviews 
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with K2_16 and K2_21; informal conversation with African delegates at the 
IGBC meeting, September 2011).
In both Kenya and South Africa, input into the negotiating positions for the 
UDBHR (2005) on the part of government offi cials appears to have been curtailed 
by lack of communication within and between departments. At the time of 
fi eldwork in 2005, both the Kenya National Commission for UNESCO and NCST 
fell under the Ministry for Education, Science and Technology. A member of the 
Commission described those at NCST as ‘very close partners’ and, indeed, an 
NCST representative attended the April IGE meeting (interview with K_16). 
Nevertheless, two members of NCST, who dealt with biotechnology and bioethics 
respectively, did not know of the declarations. The former (K_20) said that the 
connection with UNESCO had never been clear, the latter (K_21) that they had 
never heard of UNESCO engaging in any kind of bioethics activities. (K_21 did 
know about a proposed regional bioethics centre at a Kenyan university, but had 
not realized it was a UNESCO initiative.) Equally, the chief delegate to the IGE 
meetings (K_01) appeared unaware of ethical guidelines NCST had recently 
produced. It seems, then, that key information was not shared within and between 
the National Commission for UNESCO and NCST.
South Africa faced a similar problem, but between government units rather than 
within them, as it has separate departments for education and for science and 
technology. In 2005 UNESCO headquarters dealt directly with the Department of 
Education (where the South African National Commission for UNESCO was 
housed, now the Department of Basic Education), which did not consult with the 
Department of Science and Technology with regard to the UDBHR. A member of 
the latter (SA_26) complained, ‘Different government departments are not 
interacting enough, so that there is kind of an information gap between the 
different ones and not enough collaboration.’ The lack of coherence between 
government departments working on cross-cutting issues was also noted at an 
expert meeting on biotechnology held in South Africa in 2008 (NBAC 2008: 2).
Some South African government offi cials working on biotechnology policy in 
2006 were unaware of the declarations before being asked for an interview 
(SA_28 and SA_31). One of them, from South Africa’s Department of Science 
and Technology, corroborated the diffi culty highlighted by IBC and IGBC 
members at their 2010 meeting in ensuring information gets to the right ministries:
Basically we don’t track the UNESCO processes directly from the depart-
ment, which is something that made me think that we should do more, 
because the UNESCO relationship is owned by our Department of Education 
and they hadn’t briefed us or asked us for assistance in this particular 
declaration.
(interview with SA_31)
They deemed the three declarations, as a suite, to be good documents (having read 
them in preparation for the interview) and judged there was still time for them to 
contribute to the ‘enabling legislative framework’ called for in South Africa’s 
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2001 National Biotechnology Strategy, where there were still gaps in legislation 
or regulations (DACST 2001: 50). The gaps they referred to, however, were with 
regard to stem cell research and the use of embryonic tissue, to which there are no 
references in the UNESCO declarations and, moreover, were to be covered in 
forthcoming national regulation. Another member of the Department of Science 
and Technology (SA_26) thought that it was perhaps already too late for the 
declarations to have much impact on South African biotechnology policy:
Bioethics is obviously a key issue in growing a biotechnology sector, so it’s 
very important. It probably would have been useful if, at an early stage, we 
could have grappled with these things and taken them on board. Not that we 
haven’t, but we’ve now developed our own thinking . . . well, almost in the 
absence of the UNESCO documents.
(interview with SA_26)
There was little or no broader dialogue with scientists, civil society groups or 
the general public on what they thought should be in the declaration in either 
Kenya or South Africa. On this point, the chief Kenyan representative at the IGE 
meetings said:
No, there is not such a thing. Actually that’s an issue which myself and 
another colleague who also attended the April meeting raised when we came 
back, in our report: that before any of those meetings take place, there must 
be meetings to agree on our stand and formulate our agenda. And that one has 
not taken place.
(interview with K_01)
Echoing Chasek and Rajamani, they explained that internet access was slow and 
costly in Kenya, which may have put people off looking at the UNESCO 
documentation. They surmised, ‘So many people are not even interested to 
know – if you are not directly involved, why should you read about UNESCO?’ 
(Others interviewed in 2005 hoped new communications technologies would 
facilitate the country’s greater involvement in bioethics and genetics. A member 
of the National Commission [K_16] believed email would enable Kenya to assert 
itself more strongly on the IGBC, while in regard to capacity development in 
science and technology, a scientifi c advisor to the Commission and the Kenyan 
government [K_13] averred, ‘We don’t need to build new buildings, we can com-
municate through the internet.’ NCST is cautious in this regard, noting the digital 
divide as one of the challenges to harnessing the full potential of science and 
technology for development in its Strategic Plan 2009–13 [NCST 2010c: 19].)
In South Africa, the only input – albeit of a limited fashion – came from the 
South African Medical Association’s Human Rights Law and Ethics Committee 
(interviews with SA_16 and SA_23). A quote from a senior member of a university 
bioethics department (SA_17) serves to illustrate the paucity of consultation: 
‘You know, UNESCO has never contacted me with anything, so it’s basically 
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fi nding out from our bioethics circles as to what’s happening in UNESCO and 
then looking up things on our own. But I have never been contacted by UNESCO.’ 
Combined with the lack of governmental input, this left the chief delegate to the 
June IGE meeting with what Chasek and Rajamani would term a ‘hollow mandate’ 
as to how they were to represent South Africa. They commented, ‘In hindsight, I 
attended the meeting poorly equipped to voice the opinions of the country’ 
(interview with SA_23). 
The declaration will need a wider support base than was evident during its 
negotiation if it is to be implemented fully at national level. This was recognized 
by participants in the UDBHR (2005) IGE meetings from both countries. The 
chief Kenyan delegate (K_01) thought it necessary to share the declarations 
beyond those few who had attended the international negotiations. ‘Otherwise,’ 
they remarked, ‘we go to those meetings, we keep quiet, that’s the end of it.’ 
When interviewed in 2005, they were planning to hold a meeting to raise awareness 
about the declaration and to discuss how it might be domesticated, to which they 
would invite ‘the experts, the communities and interested parties’. This they duly 
did in 2008 (see below). Their South African counterpart (SA_23) likewise 
commented that the declaration’s principles needed to be promoted among the 
general public:
We all have a responsibility to ensure – not just as scientists, but as members 
of the general public – that this sort of best practice is part and parcel of the 
very core of our moral values. It doesn’t matter that you only try to aspire to 
these when you’re doing genetic research, it should be core principles and 
perhaps we should have some education around it.
To achieve this, they said, the relevant government departments – the Department 
of Science and Technology, the Department of Health and the Department of 
Education – would have to work in partnership. Communications between the 
three departments and the South African National Commission for UNESCO 
have improved of late. The Commission, based in the Department of Basic 
Education, has a unit that coordinates its work in relation to 10 different 
government departments, including Higher Education and Training, Science and 
Technology and International Relations and Cooperation. The Department of 
Health is not one of the 10, but liaises with the Department of Science and 
Technology on ethics matters (email from National Commission, 24 July 2012).
Perceptions of UNESCO in Kenya and South Africa
The declarations
In 2005–6, 53 interviewees in Kenya and South Africa unconnected with UNESCO 
were asked to what extent they knew the three bioethics and genetics declarations. 
Thirty had come across them, of whom 18 only peripherally. One geneticist 
suggested that UNESCO publish the declarations in scientifi c journals, to heighten 
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awareness among their community (interview with K_05). (Six interviewees did 
have UNESCO connections. Of these six, three were unaware of the declarations 
before being invited to become involved with UNESCO activities.) Once informed 
of the content and purpose of the declarations, interviewees had varying opinions 
on their potential usefulness. Two South African geneticists said the declarations 
would need action behind them to move them beyond being merely ‘a nice 
statement’ (SA_27) or ‘nice platitudes’ (SA_20). A Kenyan geneticist (K_29) 
similarly commented, ‘Of course, the implementation is quite different from the 
declarations themselves.’ On this point, speaking in 2011, the former Kenyan 
Chair in Bioethics regretted that the UDBHR was adopted as a declaration rather 
than a convention, as this has made implementation diffi cult. They would have 
liked states to have had to submit to monitoring and evaluation (interview with 
K2_01).
The translation to national and local levels was the key determinant for several 
people. One South African supporter of the declarations (SA_01) said, ‘I think 
that this [the UDBHR] has been a helpful document and now it’s just a matter of 
how it fi lters down to more of a grassroots level.’ Less positively, a South African 
geneticist (SA_18) ruminated,
They seem to take the way out always of talking of the regulations in the 
individual countries or the laws of the individual countries and so on. So it 
can only be an advisory sort of document and I think that’s fi ne, but it would 
seem as though they don’t have any teeth.
A scientist who advises both UNESCO and the Kenyan government (K_13) 
believed it would be ‘dangerous’ to adopt the declarations without translating them 
into ‘what is happening locally’. Several others said that universal principles should 
not be embraced unthinkingly; working out their practical application in particular 
contexts is often the most challenging aspect of implementing international 
instruments (interviews with K_15,16 and SA_10,17,24,25). One long-standing 
ethics committee member (SA_19) went further, believing there to be too much 
variation between countries for universal norms to be useful. They asserted, 
‘I believe strongly that national, local ethics guidelines are the things to follow.’
Some valued the declarations as benchmarks that could be referred to in 
lobbying for the introduction of internationally agreed standards at national level 
(K_16 and SA_13,23,30), or, like UNESCO, saw additional guidelines as 
necessary in an era of new technologies and scientifi c developments (K_10,19,29 
and SA_32). A member of two Kenyan research ethics committees (RECs) (K_25) 
was particularly interested in the genetics declarations, because they thought it 
likely their committees would have to assess a growing number of protocols for 
research in this area in the future. Writing soon after the adoption of the UDHGHR 
(1997), Abbing (1998: 157) saw it as having this potential:
The Declaration, in providing a framework which is based on general 
consensus, certainly will support developments in those countries where 
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human rights in relation to genetics are not yet suffi ciently guaranteed by the 
law nor applied in practice. It can be called upon in case of practices not in 
line with the principles layed [sic] down in the declaration.
Several participants welcomed all three declarations as reinforcing and fl eshing 
out important principles of social responsibility, benefi t sharing and capacity 
building (K_17,19 and SA_01,12,24,33). One (SA_11) said that the declarations 
are important as a ‘global signpost’, but that people must be given the opportunity 
to recognize this. A 2012 questionnaire respondent, who had come to know of the 
declarations through UNESCO’s dissemination activities, corroborated this view. 
They believe the UDBHR (2005) provides important support for the human rights 
espoused in the South African constitution and being realized in society.
Most 2005–6 participants with an involvement in bioethics did not see the 
declarations’ intergovernmental origins as distinguishing them signifi cantly from 
other ethics documents. They (and their institutions) referred mainly to the 
WMA’s Declaration of Helsinki and the CIOMS guidelines for international level 
guidance (K_06,07,08,09,17,19 and SA_04,05,10,14,19,24,30). Particularly with 
regard to the UDBHR (2005), several people saw what to them was simply 
another international bioethics declaration as unnecessary, or thought that people 
might become confused as to which guidelines (and the norms contained therein) 
to follow (interviews with K_07,09,17,28 and SA_04,05,08,10,14,20,22,25,27,
33). One (K_06) lamented, ‘There is a plethora of different guidelines that people 
are trying hard to get to grips with.’ Another (SA_17), who sits on several RECs, 
was of the opinion that there are too many ‘talk-shops’ coming up with declarations, 
to the detriment of implementation ‘on the ground’. One person (SA_32) 
opined that, although the declarations might be useful as a reference point, by 
and large RECs in South Africa were already aware of the principles enshrined in 
the declarations’ articles. Others thought the declarations complementary to pre-
existing instruments or that it was useful to be able to draw on different perspectives 
(interviews with SA_06,24,26,30,31). Researchers at the Kilifi  KEMRI-Wellcome 
Trust Collaborative Programme in Kenya and the South African National 
Bioinformatics Institute, for example, when faced with a particular ethical 
problem, would look to synthesize all the relevant resources in order to reach the 
most appropriate solution (interviews with K_07 and SA_02).
The concern about overlap was still present in 2011–12. Although not dismissive 
of the declarations, a member of KEMRI (K2_17) did not see them as automatically 
becoming the main reference documents on ethics: ‘UNESCO, for many of us, is 
a new kid on the block . . . for myself it would just be like any other thing I might 
be interested in.’ A representative of the Regional Documentation Centre at 
Egerton University (see Chapter 7) recognized that it would be some time before 
knowledge about the declarations spread beyond those who attend UNESCO-
sponsored conferences and workshops (interview with K2_32). Among the small 
number of people who returned follow-up questionnaires in 2012 (11 from South 
Africa, four from Kenya, with an even split between scientists and ethicists from 
both countries), only two used the declarations in their work, with the chief 
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international reference points remaining the Declaration of Helsinki (used by 11 
people), the CIOMS guidelines (nine) and the US’ Belmont Report (seven). One 
person added, ‘It is to some extent a time issue’ and suggested that the declarations 
could be posted on the website of the Southern African Society for Human 
Genetics, to make them more easily accessible. More encouragingly, although 
opinions on the signifi cance of (a) the declarations having been agreed by states 
and (b) the UDBHR addressing bioethics in a broad sense (rather than just research 
ethics) ranged from ‘not at all signifi cant’ to ‘very signifi cant’, there was a positive 
leaning on both counts, 10 people apiece opting for ‘quite signifi cant’ or ‘very 
signifi cant’. One person elaborated on their apparently contradictory responses, 
explaining that, although their institution did not currently use the declarations, 
they believed them to be potentially important documents. Another will refer to 
the declarations on an upcoming project establishing a biobank for Africa. (Note 
that the questionnaire was not sent to members of the Kenyan National Bioethics 
Committee, as the aim was to see what infl uence the declarations had had beyond 
those involved in the ABC programme – see below.) 
Human cloning
Views on the governance of human cloning in Kenya and South Africa refl ect those 
of IBC and IGBC members and sub-Saharan National Commissions and Permanent 
Delegations, in content and diversity. Kenya does not as yet have an offi cial position 
on whether or not human reproductive cloning should be banned (interview with 
K2_21). One NCST member (K2_21), interviewed in 2011, felt that the issue is 
presently only of peripheral importance to Kenya and other developing countries, 
but as the technology is likely to be developed soon it is important to be ready, as 
cloning legislation could have a big impact. Another (K2_16) felt that a meeting 
with politicians was necessary to educate them on the issue, so that they would not 
take misinformed positions, as some had done on genetically modifi ed organisms 
(GMOs). A Kenyan scientist and public policy activist (K2_31) was concerned that 
research would move faster than legislation, leaving responsible researchers 
without guidance and resources and rogue scientists to do as they please. They thus 
supported an international convention to regulate cloning. Echoing the comments 
of Maimets and the Russian Federation delegate about how UNESCO’s silence on 
the issue might be perceived, they went on:
You know, unless the same international bodies become bold enough and 
have a convention, based upon which countries can draw their policies and 
legislations, then you will potentially be leaving very delicate and important 
research and development, especially in the area of human genetics and 
reproductive cloning, to decisions by individuals. . . . So a convention would 
be a good start. What I’m just wondering is, who are the lead opponents of 
not having a convention? I mean, why wouldn’t we have a convention to 
regulate activities in reproductive cloning? . . . they don’t have to wait for – 
what I should say – rogue research, or research that does not intend to be 
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benefi cial but commercial. They don’t have to wait for certain negative 
outcomes before they decide that a convention is necessary. I think it would 
just be good to have a measure in place that researchers in various countries 
can use to regulate themselves.
Among questionnaire respondents, only four supported an outright ban of 
human reproductive cloning, while nine thought that research in this area should 
be carefully regulated (two did not answer the question). A Kenyan scientist 
(K2_32), interviewed in 2011, displayed a similarly cautious optimism:
All these technologies have benefi ts, but they also have risks. . . . So what I 
would say is to just take a precautionary approach. We cannot say a complete 
no, but we can also not say an open yes. It’s just a matter of learning from 
what’s going on elsewhere, but also taking precaution.
Thirteen and ten questionnaire respondents respectively thought that therapeutic 
and reproductive cloning were important issues, warranting UNESCO’s attention. 
They were less sure that cloning technologies have the potential to make an impor-
tant contribution to addressing development needs, several fi nding themselves 
perplexed by this notion. Most supported international dialogue as a means to 
improve the international governance of human cloning. One geneticist elaborated 
that this would help to create essential awareness about the difference between 
therapeutic and reproductive cloning (and thought that cloning could contribute to 
development ‘when used correctly and in a scientifi cally safe and ethically sound 
environment’). Another, like the IGBC delegate from Switzerland, reasoned that 
intense dialogue would raise awareness and thus lead to better regulation and 
monitoring. Fewer respondents favoured a convention, mirroring the IBC’s 
preference for dialogue.
Adoption of the UNESCO declarations in Kenya and 
South Africa
Both Kenya and South Africa are upholding the UNESCO declarations to a 
greater or lesser extent, through their regulatory frameworks for bioethics and 
genetics. The ethics systems in both countries have developed substantially over 
the last decade. Both adopted national guidelines on bioethics in 2004: Guidelines 
for Ethical Conduct of Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects in 
Kenya and Ethics in Health Research: Principles, structures and processes (South 
Africa). Both countries also have more specifi c guidelines, on HIV/AIDS vaccines 
and clinical trials: the Kenya National Guidelines for Research and Development 
of HIV/AIDS Vaccines (2005), the Guidelines on Ethics for Medical Research: 
HIV preventive vaccine research (produced by the Medical Research Council of 
South Africa in 2003 and adopted as national guidelines) and the Guidelines for 
Good Practice in the Conduct of Clinical Trials in Human Participants in South 
Africa (second edition, 2006). As might be expected, these documents articulate 
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well-established bioethical principles such as informed consent, autonomy, 
privacy and confi dentiality and the need for risk/benefi t analyses. They also deal 
to some degree with several of the issues discussed in Chapter 2 around the ethical 
dilemmas generated by genetics and research in developing country contexts. In 
this they draw on the Declaration of Helsinki, the CIOMS guidelines and other 
international ethics documents, but not the UNESCO declarations existing at the 
time of their publication.
Kenya in 2005
Under the 1977 Science and Technology Act, the National Council for Science 
and Technology was established to advise the government on ‘all matters relating 
to the scientifi c and technological activities’ (NCST 2012b). It was given ultimate 
control over what research takes place in Kenya and the power to ensure it is 
conducted ethically. Some of these powers were devolved to institutional ethics 
committees, such as the Ethical Review Committee of the Kenya Medical 
Research Institute (KEMRI). The 2004 ethical guidelines (produced by NCST) 
described this system as ‘weak with many loopholes’ (NCST 2004: 2). Certainly, 
the regulatory framework was far from clear in 2005, when the fi rst period of 
fi eldwork in Kenya was conducted. A member of the Council explained that ethics 
were not a major concern when the Science and Technology Act was promulgated 
and thus do not feature prominently within it. NCST had been pushing for many 
years for the Act to be updated to include current ethics issues, but as several acts 
were awaiting amendment this was likely to take some time (interview with 
K_21). The KEMRI ethics committee had gone one step further and recommended 
a ‘stand alone’ act for biomedical research involving humans, seeing the Science 
and Technology Act as too generalized (interview with K_19). The KEMRI-
Wellcome Trust Collaborative Programme at Kilifi  was using the NCST guidelines, 
but was assuming these were still in draft, having not heard otherwise (interviews 
with K_06, K_07 and K_09). On being asked whether the guidelines were legally 
binding, one member (K_06) commented that this ‘would be quite a useful thing 
to know’. A member of NCST (K_21) confi rmed that they could not be binding, 
by their very nature as guidelines.
Fieldwork revealed some ambiguity as to the status and purpose of certain 
ethics committees in Kenya. The Science and Technology Act (1977) made 
provision for a medical sciences committee. This became the Health Sciences 
Specialist Committee in 1983 and took on responsibility for research ethics policy, 
regulating institutional committees (such as the KEMRI committee) and reviewing 
proposals from foreign researchers (interview with K_21; NCST 2010a: iii). 
Several interviewees in 2005 agreed that, in practice, the KEMRI committee 
functioned as a national ethics committee, as it is mandated to review protocols 
from researchers based outside KEMRI (K_07,15,19,21,22,25). Indeed, the 
KEMRI website reads, as it has done for several years, ‘The Committee is 
accepted by the Ministry of Health as a National Ethical Review Committee’ 
(KEMRI 2012). It seems strange, then, that the Ministry decided to set up its own 
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ethics committee. In January 2001, following recommendations in the National 
Health Sector Strategic Plan, it established a Health Standards and Regulatory 
Services Department to, among other things, ‘provide the priority medical 
research agenda’ and ‘review medical research protocols in Kenya’ (Ministry of 
Health, Republic of Kenya 2001: 1–2 [quoted]; interview with K_27).
As noted by Daniel arap Moi, then president of Kenya, the new department’s 
mandate included the launch of a national ethics committee (Ministry of Health, 
Republic of Kenya 2001: 6). The National Medical Research, Ethics and 
Traditional Medicine Committee was duly created in 2002, ostensibly including 
KEMRI and NCST among its membership (Ministry of Health 2003). On the 
relationship between this new committee and KEMRI, a member of the latter 
(K_17) said in 2005:
The Ministry of Health wanted to start their own. It would be a year ago, we 
all met together, the Director of Medical Services and some visitors from the 
Walter Reed [a US-based institute] and they said that they wanted to start 
their own. But, notwithstanding, we decided we would not wait for them. 
If they started their own, that’s fi ne and they’d tell us how we would relate to 
them. But we consider ourselves the National Ethical Review Committee.
They also explained that, as a consequence of the proliferation of committees, 
it was possible that some research went unapproved, because people could plead, 
‘I got confused, I didn’t know where to go, so I decided not to go anywhere.’ 
A Ministry of Health report (2003) similarly acknowledged that stakeholders 
needed to be educated on the relationships between KEMRI, NCST and its new 
committee.
Despite the profusion of committees described above, in 2005 the National 
Commission for UNESCO, with the then Bioethics Chair, was looking to form a 
National Bioethics Committee (interviews with K_01 and K_16). Their rationale 
was the same as that behind UNESCO’s Assisting Bioethics Committees initiative: 
they would start with a committee and perhaps push for a bill ‘later on’ (K_01). 
(Interestingly, however, the Chair was unaware at the time of UNESCO’s 
guidelines on how to set up just such a committee.) A member of the Commission 
did not think the new committee would overlap with Kenya’s pre-existing ones 
because it would engage primarily in sensitizing people about bioethics and the 
three UNESCO declarations in particular, rather than ethical review. They said, 
‘I don’t think there’s any other committee that is doing that.’ Furthermore, it 
would include among its membership representatives from the relevant govern-
ment bodies (interview with K_16). Not everyone was convinced. A member 
of NCST (K_21) welcomed the idea of working with UNESCO to promote 
knowledge sharing and capacity building, but thought that a new committee was 
unnecessary.
As for the declaration being adopted into Kenyan law, those connected with 
UNESCO explained why it might be a long time before this happened. A member 
of the National Commission (K_16) outlined the diffi culties of fi rst raising the 
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necessary political will: ‘How are you going to sell it to your country? How do 
you advise? Do you wait until there’s a problem, then you say, “Okay, let’s refer 
to . . .”? Or do you need to sensitize people in advance?’ Even if this were to be 
achieved, the legislative process is a slow one, involving negotiations between 
several ministries. It can also be somewhat capricious. A scientist who was advisor 
to both UNESCO and the government (K_13) warned that if the desk offi cer 
assigned the portfolio for adoption of a declaration was a ‘middle of the roader’, 
nothing might happen for several years. The National Commission representative 
lamented the slow rate of legislation in Kenya, which meant the system was 
clogged with pending bills. Also, they pointed out, if the government changes, 
sensitization of ministers has to begin all over again. In spite of such diffi culties, 
they believed the sensitization of policy-makers worth pursuing, to gain backing 
for the fi nancial support of the Commission’s programmes. If policy-makers 
believe an issue to be important, they said, they will provide the resources to 
recognize this importance (interview with K_16). A long-standing member of a 
Kenyan REC (K_19) described what could be achieved by engaging with 
government: ‘Our policy-makers here are fairly open, yes, they are quite open to 
new ideas. But as I say, you just need to empower them with the information, they 
need to know what you are talking about.’
Kenya in 2011
There have been signifi cant changes in the research ethics regulatory framework 
in Kenya since 2005. A National Bioethics Committee (NBC) has indeed been 
formed, but through NCST rather than the National Commission, replacing the 
Health Sciences Specialist Committee (HSSC). The Ministry of Health’s ethics 
committee, created in 2002, has also become part of the new NBC. NCST realized 
that its ethics provision was no longer adequate, as there are several more research 
institutions in Kenya now than when it was established in 1977. Thus in 2009 
the HSSC took on the task of ‘transforming itself’ into the National Bioethics 
Committee of Kenya, broadening its mandate in light of the UDBHR of 2005 
(UNESCO 2009a: 1; NCST 2010a: iii and 1 [quoted]; interviews with K2_21 and 
K2_25). Here the declaration’s intergovernmental origins played a part; it was felt 
that, because it sits closer to law than WHO and CIOMS guidelines, it would be 
easier to domesticate and use in legal activities (interview with K2_21). The 
committee’s new mandate includes advising the government on ethical issues, 
such as traditional medicine and use of technology; providing a forum for 
consultation and public debate; ensuring the highest ethical standards in research; 
training and accrediting institutional ethics committees; publishing guidelines (on 
materials transfer, for example); and liaising with corresponding bodies in other 
countries (NCST 2010a: 1–4; interview with K2_21). 
The committee has 17 members and is multidisciplinary (in line with article 19 
of the UDBHR), to save procedures ‘from being mere rhetorical gambits’ (NCST 
2010a: 1 [quoted]; interview with K2_21; NCST 2012a). By November 2011, 
when the second period of fi eldwork was conducted, it had met six times and its 
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members believed it had achieved a lot in a short period (interviews with K2_21 
and K2_25). It had also gone through UNESCO’s ABC programme, becoming the 
fi rst committee to complete all three stages of the training. Like the founding of 
the new committee, the training was organized through NCST, which had 
established a direct connection to the UNESCO Bioethics Programme secretariat 
in Paris. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed with what had become 
the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, NCST’s parent 
ministry (separate from the Ministry of Education, the parent ministry of the 
National Commission) (UNESCO 2009a: 1; ten Have et al. 2011: 385; interview 
with K2_21).
The fi rst training, held in November 2009, was attended by members of the 
HSSC, as well as representatives of Kenyatta National Hospital, KEMRI and 
other universities and research institutions, some of whom were destined to sit on 
the new committee. As well as discussing ethical issues of particular concern in 
Kenya (including regulation of traditional healers, use of genetic samples and 
review of multi-centre research), participants drafted the mission, role, mandate 
and rules of procedure of the new NBC (UNESCO 2009a: 2–4). As per the ABC 
model, the third training session in November 2011 dealt with issues of particular 
relevance to the country, including accreditation of institutional RECs and 
materials transfer agreements (conversations with participants, November 2011). 
Over the year 2011–12, the NBC would also be deciding whether ethics committees 
are needed at provincial level (interview with K2_21).
The NBC has devised a comprehensive system for the accreditation of 
institutional RECs. The relationship between NCST and these committees was 
unclear in the past, but has improved (interview with K2_25). As the inaugural 
edition of Bioethics Info-Net, a newsletter produced by the Kenyatta National 
Hospital-University of Nairobi REC, notes:
In the past the NCST could only note the existence of committees and several 
did not inform the NCST of their existence. . . .  Accreditation will reinvigorate 
ethics review in the country and ensure sustainability as the national research 
system continues to grow.
(KNH-UoN REC 2011: 4)
The accreditation application form (NCST 2011) asks for information on the 
genders, qualifi cations and specializations of committee members and whether 
they have had ethics training. It also asks for a copy of a committee’s standard 
operating procedures. To pass, a committee must have at least seven members, 
a variety of expertise, at least one member from outside the institution, a lay 
member and a gender ratio of no more than 2:1 either way. Accreditation lasts for 
three years and committees must send in annual reports, to include details of 
research protocols reviewed and any training, monitoring or diffi culties 
encountered (NCST/NBC 2011: 4–5).
All institutions with RECs were required to apply for accreditation by October 
2011, including ‘those that have been in existence for a long time’ (NCST no 
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date). As of July 2012, 12 RECs had been accredited, from both public and 
private institutions, out of 15 applications and an estimated 30 to 35 committees 
in the country in total (NCST 2012a; interview with K2_21). At present there is 
no absolute legal obligation for committees to apply, but they would have 
to under a revised law. A member of NCST (K2_21) was confi dent that more 
RECs would come forward once the structure was wholly in place, as most 
have already gained the US Federal Wide Assurance, which is required of 
any institution receiving research funding from the US federal government. 
Under the new system, research protocols can be submitted to any accredited 
committee. It was hoped this would lighten the KEMRI committee’s burden, but 
this effect is yet to materialize. Both national and international applicants have 
so far stuck with KEMRI, as they are familiar with its processes (interview 
with K2_17).
Another task the NBC is undertaking is a review of the 2004 ethical research 
guidelines. This is necessary, states the NCST website, because ‘research activi-
ties have grown in quantity and the global arena has shifted towards favoring the 
conduct of research in countries that have weak research infrastructure’ (NCST 
2012a). (Note also that the guidelines do not specifi cally cover genetic research.) 
The review sits alongside the broader effort to revise the Science and Technology 
Act, which fi nally progressed, after much ‘forwards and backwards’, after the 
adoption of the new constitution of 2010 (interview with K2_21). Several acts are 
being revisited to ensure they comply with the constitution, particularly with 
regard to human rights, as well as a more regionalized form of government. The 
draft of the new science and technology act was formulated by a taskforce and 
adjusted in light of public comment and debate, before being put before Parliament. 
NCST members hoped that the new act would be in place by 2013, but once a 
piece of legislation reaches the political level it is out of their hands. Given the 
number of acts being deliberated, in function of the new constitution, it may take 
some time (interviews with K2_16 and K2_21).
There are also plans for an act specifi cally on ethics and committees, as the 
current provisions are not well grounded in legal terms. This will draw on the 
UNESCO declarations (interviews with K2_16, K2_21 and K2_32). They are 
useful in countries where the requisite ethical structures do not exist, a member of 
NCST (K2_21) explained, unlike in Europe and the US, where ethics systems 
have been developing since the Second World War. The UDBHR (2005) is 
especially pertinent, said their colleague (K2_16), because Kenya participated in 
its drafting. Even though it is rather weak, as a non-binding instrument, that active 
involvement has an impact on a nation. Again, the timeframe is uncertain, but the 
NBC was to use 2012 to lay the groundwork by talking to the government about 
how the UDBHR should be understood.
What has seemingly changed little since 2005 is the relationship between 
NCST and the National Commission for UNESCO. One member of NCST viewed 
the relationship positively, seeing the work of the two bodies as complementary. 
For one thing, NCST provides advisors for the Commission’s specialist science 
committees. They explained:
Declarations in Kenya and South Africa  111
So you can see the Council and the Commission have no choice other than to 
work together, because one is a national institution – competent institution – 
for science issues. KNATCOM, or National Commission, has mandate over 
those science areas that are handled by UNESCO.  . . . So any committees of 
KNATCOM, then the Council sits in, depending on the area. So the Council 
sits on that to provide the advice. Now, when we have issues that cut across a 
couple of ministries and it’s not necessarily a UNESCO issue on its own, then 
we take it up as a Council.
(interview with K2_16)
Yet this does not appear to be how the relationship works when it comes to 
bioethics. Another member of NCST (K2_21) said that all three ABC trainings 
had already taken place and the National Commission had not been involved: 
‘I think that tells you everything you need to know.’ They saw the Commission as 
a primarily diplomatic rather than ‘hands-on’ body that focuses mainly on basic 
education and did not think the imminent reintegration of the education and 
science and technology ministries would make a difference to the relationship. 
The former Bioethics Chair (K2_01), who had been peripherally involved with 
the formation of the NBC and had attended the second ABC training at the 
invitation of the Bioethics Programme secretariat in Paris, was more hopeful in 
this regard, but was irked that the Commission had not been invited to join the 
NBC or attend the training. In his view, the National Commission, as a UNESCO 
body and therefore broad-ranging, was better placed to deal with cross-cutting 
bioethics issues than NCST, which falls under a particular ministry. They also felt 
that the Commission needed a new paradigm of operation that would see it being 
more proactive as a link between the government and the people.
Given the lack of communication between NCST and the National Commission, 
it is perhaps not surprising that Kenya’s progress report to the 2011 UNESCO 
General Conference, delivered by the Minister of Education, did not mention the 
setting up and training of the NBC (Republic of Kenya 2011). But despite their 
reservations about the Commission, the NCST representative would be happy to 
work with the Bioethics Chair and Regional Documentation Centre at Egerton 
University (see Chapter 7) to run training courses for institutional REC members 
(interview with K2_21). What has improved since 2005 is Kenya’s participation 
in the IGBC, which has become more structured. Whereas before ‘consultation 
was quite narrow and to a few individuals who are in the know’, the IGBC 
representative (a member of NCST) will now be able to refer issues to the NBC. 
Some issues may also be referred, where relevant, to the new National Biosafety 
Authority, which is independent but was ‘a baby of the Council’ (interview with 
K2_16).
The National Biosafety Authority is an outcome of the National Biosafety Act 
of 2009. At the time of fi eldwork in 2005, Kenya was awaiting the adoption of a 
Biosafety Bill, which was fi rst promulgated in 2003. Interviewees could see 
neither the Bill being expanded to cover human genetics, nor a separate bill on the 
human side being drawn up in the near future (K_01,13,18,21). In 2006 the 
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National Biotechnology Development Policy was published: ‘The Government 
will initiate appropriate steps to nurture platform biotechnologies for the benefi t 
of Kenyans and, ensure that Kenya becomes a key stakeholder in the international 
biotechnology enterprise within a decade’ [sic] (Republic of Kenya 2006: 5). The 
policy specifi es six priority areas, including medical biotechnology (to include 
molecular diagnostics, but expressly not human cloning or the unethical use of 
stem cells) (ISAAA 2009).
It is agricultural biotechnology which has received the most attention, both 
from policy-makers and the public, with the National Biosafety Act being adopted 
after more than a decade of wrangling about GMOs (Karembu et al. 2010). The 
National Biosafety Authority oversees the handling and use of GMOs, thus 
implementing the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (National Biosafety Authority 
2012). Kenya has also been devising a Biosciences Framework, which was due to 
be fi nalized by June 2012. The framework will deal with non-human research, 
promoting biosecurity, biosafety and the bioeconomy; that is, the safe, sustainable, 
developmental and fair use of biological materials (NCST 2012c; conversation at 
NCST, November 2011). Broader still is Vision 2030 (‘A Globally Competitive 
and Prosperous Kenya’), launched in 2007, which seeks to transform Kenya into 
a middle income country by 2030. ‘Science, Technology and Innovation’ is one of 
six foundations of the policy, as refl ected in the government’s signifi cantly 
increased funding of research in recent years (Republic of Kenya 2007: i–ii; 
NCST 2010b: 30; NCST 2010c: 33; interview with K2_31).
South Africa in 2006
The South African bioethics framework was somewhat more coordinated than the 
Kenyan one in 2005–6. The South African Constitution of 1996 entrenches the 
rights and dignity of all, including the right ‘not to be subjected to medical or 
scientifi c experiments without their informed consent’ (Cleaton-Jones and 
Wassenaar 2010: 710; Dhai and McQuoid-Mason 2010: 2). According to the 
National Health Act of 2003, implemented by the Department of Health, 
a National Health Research Ethics Council is to carry out a variety of tasks, 
including writing guidelines for RECs and setting norms and standards for 
research with humans; disciplining those found to be in violation of these 
guidelines or norms; registering and auditing RECs and adjudicating complaints 
about them; and advising the national and provincial departments of health on 
issues in research ethics (Clause 72 (6)) (Republic of South Africa 2004: 74). The 
2004 ethical guidelines, Ethics in Health Research: principles, structures and 
processes, were written by an interim committee, which subsequently disbanded. 
At the time of fi eldwork in early 2006, the permanent council had not yet been 
appointed (an invitation for nominations had been issued) (Republic of South 
Africa 2006).
In terms of implementation of the UNESCO declarations, the chief South 
African IGE delegate (SA_23) acknowledged, ‘The translation post the declaration 
[UDBHR] has been absolutely pathetic and somebody needs to drive it in a 
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forceful sort of way. And I don’t believe that the infrastructure is there for that to 
happen.’ On returning from the IGE meeting in June 2005, they recommended in 
their report to the South African National Commission that the country should 
have a central committee to deal with ethics. This committee would engage with 
the various RECs around the country, to bring them under one ‘umbrella’ within 
a virtual structure. National guidelines would ‘serve as a framing document that’s 
a “one-stop shop” for anyone wanting to apply to ethics committees to conduct 
research’, thus ensuring that people would be following the same rules, whether 
they were based within a university, an NGO or any other institution. These 
proposed functions are in fact very similar to those set out in the National Health 
Act for the planned National Health Research Ethics Council.
South Africa in 2012
The permanent National Health Research Ethics Council (NHREC) was 
established in October 2006 and met for the fi rst time in January 2007. Its mandate, 
as set out above, is very similar to that of Kenya’s National Bioethics Committee: 
standard setting, accrediting and monitoring RECs and advising the government. 
It can also take disciplinary action against anyone contravening the National 
Health Act (and any related norms, standards or guidelines) and draft or advise on 
amendments to relevant sections of the Act (namely Chapter 8 on human samples 
and Chapter 9 on research). The committee has 14 members, appointed by the 
Minister of Health (the Department of Health provides the committee secretariat). 
The members, with other appropriate persons, also form various working groups 
on pertinent topics, such as vulnerable populations and materials transfer 
(Department of Health 2010; NHREC 2010: 4; NHREC 2010–11: 8–9 and 13; 
NHREC 2012c).
The composition of the NHREC and its rules of procedure are regulated under 
the National Health Act. Section 72 specifi es aspects such as the number of 
members (no more than 15) and the nomination process, but regulations published 
in September 2010 expand on these stipulations. (Draft regulations for public 
comment were published in February 2007, but appear to have been fi nalized only 
several years later, a few months after the committee’s second term of offi ce 
began in 2010 [Republic of South Africa 2007d and 2010a; NHREC 2010–11: 9]. 
The draft and fi nal regulations for the National Health Research Committee, 
which decides on and coordinates health research by public bodies, identifi es 
priority areas and advises the Minister on strategy, were published in the same 
months [Republic of South Africa 2004: 73, 2007c and 2010b].) Under the 
regulations, NHREC members must include a range of experts in ethics and law, 
as well as representatives of the community and the pharmaceutical industry. 
Nominations are to be sought via the Government Gazette and one or more 
newspapers, ‘enjoying circulation in the entire Republic for appointment’. The 
committee must meet at least four times a year (Republic of South Africa 2010a: 
4–5 and 7). Chapter 11 of the Act, ‘Regulations’, makes provision for the Minister 
of Health to constitute regulations relating to any aspect of the Act, after public 
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comment, with any on human subjects research to be made in consultation with 
the NHREC (Republic of South Africa 2004: 88–90).
The REC accreditation requirements are very similar to those in Kenya. Using 
language that mirrors strongly article 19 of the UDBHR, the 2004 ethical 
guidelines stipulate that RECs should be ‘independent, multi-disciplinary, multi-
sectoral and pluralistic’. They must have a minimum of nine members, including 
at least one lay person and neither gender is to have more than 70 per cent of seats. 
Accreditation will be re-assessed every three years (Department of Health 2004: 
13 and 15). The application form (NHREC no date) requires details of stakeholders 
(organizations) which can submit applications to the REC, number of applications 
processed, terms of reference and working procedures. All RECs were to register 
with the NHREC by 30 April 2008, but an evaluation carried out in October 2009 
(by which time 22 had registered) showed that the NHREC still had to identify 
and register some committees, primarily those recently established or in private 
organizations (NHREC 2008; NHREC 2009: 5 and 13). By July 2012 there were 
33 RECs on NHREC’s online register (NHREC 2012a). Where the process differs 
from Kenya’s is that accreditation in South Africa is offered at two levels. 
Level 1 committees can only review research that is likely to be of minimal risk 
(that is, low budget research not involving drug testing or human tissue), whereas 
Level 2 committees can review all types of health research, including multi-
centre studies involving collaboration within South Africa or beyond. Level 1 
accreditation is considered a ‘stepping stone’ towards Level 2, hence committees 
are encouraged to build the capacity required for the higher level within fi ve years 
of registration (Department of Health 2004: 12).
As in Kenya, the 2004 guidelines are under review. By 2010–11, the NHREC’s 
Ethics in Health Research Working Group had examined the fi rst four chapters of 
the guidelines and sent out revisions for wider stakeholder input. The NHREC 
2010–11 report (p. 19) reads:
The guidelines ‘Ethics in Health Research: Principles, Structures and 
Processes’ (blue book) was last updated in 2004. Since then numerous 
changes had occurred in NHREC and the National Health Act prompting a 
need to review and revise the ethical guidelines. It was also noted that 
NHREC played a national role in coordinating activities in research ethics 
and so had a responsibility to debate and deliberate important substantive 
issues in research ethics with a view to formulating a policy document on 
these issues. It is on this basis that this working group was constituted.
Section 71 of the National Health Act (‘Research on or experimentation with 
human subjects’) came into effect from 1 March 2012. This introduces some new 
requirements for health research, such as the categorical need for written consent. 
A statement posted on the NHREC website (NHREC 2012f) acknowledges that 
the 2004 guidelines are in confl ict with these legal requirements and pledges that 
detailed regulations, including guidelines for RECs, will be issued in due course. 
In May 2012 the Department of Health issued a policy framework for health 
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research approval, consolidating the basic requirements of the South African 
Constitution, the Health Act, the 2004 ethics guidelines and the 2006 clinical 
trials guidelines (Department of Health 2012).
Brief regulations had already been released in 2009 with regard to ‘research on 
human subjects’, which contained several of the provisions on consent referred to 
in the NHREC’s 2012 statement, including the need for ministerial consent 
for non-therapeutic research with minors. These do not appear to have been 
formally adopted, however, as they are no longer available in the South African 
Government’s online document repository. Draft regulations (which remain in the 
repository) had fi rst been released for public comment in February 2007 (Republic 
of South Africa 2007b and 2009). The NHREC’s 2006–9 progress report notes the 
drafting of these regulations as one of the activities of the Human Subjects in 
Research Working Group. In 2008 the Group was awaiting ministerial approval 
and translation to the vernacular and in 2009 consolidated the fi nal version in light 
of public comment (NHREC 2010: 6–7). In the NHREC’s second term of offi ce, 
the Group merged with the Vulnerable Persons Working Group, to form the 
Regulations Related to Protection of Vulnerable Human Research Participants 
Working Group. Activities in 2010–11 included ‘development of draft amendments 
to s71 of the National Health Act, and submission to the Legal Unit in the 
DoH’ and a meeting with said Legal Unit to debate the regulations on human 
subjects (NHREC 2010–11: 13–14). This appears to have been a separate process 
to the review of the 2004 guidelines. (No further update was available as of 
July 2012.)
Unlike Kenya’s 2004 guidelines, South Africa’s contain chapters on human 
genetic research and the use of human samples. These mirror many of the articles 
of the IDHGD (2003). The chapter on human genetic research recognizes that 
individuals share genes with relatives and other members of the population 
and may be subject to genetic discrimination or stigmatization. It stipulates, 
‘Researchers should consider the social and cultural signifi cance of their research, 
especially in the areas of complex socially signifi cant characteristics and the 
genetic characteristics of collectivities’ (Department of Health 2004: 42–5). 
‘Collectivities’ are defi ned as:
Groups distinguished by: common beliefs, values, social structures and other 
features that identify them as a separate group; customary collective decision-
making according to tradition and beliefs; the custom of leaders expressing a 
collective view; members of the collectivity being aware of common activities 
and common interests.
(ibid: 28)
Despite these synergies, the UNESCO genetics declarations do not appear to have 
inspired this chapter, as they are not cited in the guidelines’ list of key international 
texts. As the guidelines were published in 2004, it is possible that the chapter on 
genetic research had already been drafted when the IDHGD was adopted in 
October 2003.
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The chapter of the 2004 guidelines on human samples simply repeats section 68 
of the National Health Act (‘Regulations relating to tissue, cells, organs, blood, 
blood products and gametes’), with the added provision that ‘additional ethical 
issues that arise in genetic research using human tissue need to be addressed in 
conformity with human genetic research (Reproductive Biology and Genetic 
Research [MRC Book 2])’ (Department of Health 2004: 38). This book forms part 
of the Medical Research Council of South Africa’s Guidelines on Ethics for Medical 
Research. Echoing some of the philosophical objections to human reproductive 
cloning outlined in Chapter 2, the book states, ‘The pre-embryo [the stage from 
fertilisation to 14 days] should be treated with the utmost respect because it is a 
genetically unique, viable human entity. . . . The production of excess embryos for 
the sole purpose of research should be discouraged’ (MRC 2002: section 2.2). It 
also recommends that human reproductive cloning through somatic cell nuclear 
transfer (SCNT) be prohibited, on the grounds that the risks to the potential child 
outweigh the benefi ts (ibid: section 3.7.3). The National Health Act prohibits human 
reproductive cloning by any means (Republic of South Africa 2004: 63).
Since 2006 there has been a whole raft of regulations to further enact the 
National Health Act, particularly section 68. Some were presented as drafts for 
public comment in 2007, but never came to fruition. Instead, new drafts on the 
same section were produced in 2011, with the fi nal versions coming into force on 
2 March 2012, as outlined in Table 6.1. The delay in instituting these and other 







Regulations regarding the use of human DNA, 
RNA, cultured cells, stem cells, blastomeres, 
polar bodies, embryos, embryonic tissue and 
small tissue biopsies for diagnostic testing, health 
research and therapeutics
68 5 Jan 07 N/A
Regulations relating to research on human 
subjects
71 23 Feb 07 N/A
Regulations relating to human stem cells 68 4 May 07 N/A
Regulations relating to the use of human 
biological material
68 1 Apr 11 2 Mar 12
Regulations regarding the general control of 
human bodies, tissue, blood, blood products and 
gametes
68 1 Apr 11 2 Mar 12
Regulations relating to the import and export of 
human tissue, blood, blood products, cultured 
cells, stem cells, embryos, foetal tissue,a zygotes 
and gametes
68 1 Apr 11 2 Mar 12
Regulations relating to stem cell banksb 68 1 Apr 11 2 Mar 12
Regulations relating to tissue banks 68 1 Apr 11 2 Mar 12
a the words ‘foetal tissue’ did not appear in the title of the draft version of the regulations.
b the draft title was ‘Regulations relating to stem cell institutions or organizations’.
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parts of the Act was a cause of concern for scientists and legal experts alike in 
South Africa, who wrote in the country’s medical and legal journals of their 
frustration at the lack of up-to-date legislation, the most relevant promulgated act 
being the Human Tissue Act of 1983 (Pepper 2009: 505; NBAC 2010: 2; 
Swanepoel 2010: 3; Sithole 2011: 56–7).
In January 2007 the South African government invited comment on proposed 
‘Regulations regarding the use of human DNA, RNA, cultured cells, stem cells, 
blastomeres, polar bodies, embryos, embryonic tissue and small tissue biopsies 
for diagnostic testing, health research and therapeutics’, another adjunct to the 
National Health Act (Republic of South Africa 2007a). These gave comprehensive 
instructions on the collection, processing, storage and use of DNA, RNA and so 
on. The draft regulations relating to research on human subjects of 2007 also 
contained a chapter on genetic research, but this was dropped from the unadopted 
2009 version (Republic of South Africa 2007b and 2009). The 2012 regulations 
on biological material cover the collection and use of material from living and 
dead persons, for genetic testing and research, sex selection (prohibited except for 
medical reasons) and stem cell research and therapy (allowed, including the use, 
but not creation, of embryonic stem cells), as well as storage and disclosure of 
genetic information (Republic of South Africa 2012d).
The other 2012 regulations (see Table 6.1) expand on those on biological 
material. Those on bodies, tissues and so on outline how and for what purposes 
these can be procured; those on import and export give detailed guidance on the 
circumstances under which permits will be issued; and those on stem cell and 
tissue banks deal with donation, handling, storage and record keeping (and, for 
tissue banks, registration and inspection). All fi ve sets of regulations carry 
penalties of fi nes and/or imprisonment for contravention or non-compliance 
(Republic of South Africa 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e). While all these 
regulations mean that the whole of Chapter 8 of the National Health Act has now 
been enacted, the legislation is not suffi cient to deal with stem cell tourism or 
therapies being offered that have not been fully tested (Pepper 2012: 60). The 
infl uence of the UNESCO declarations on the formulation of these regulations, if 
any, is unclear. When interviewed in 2006, one member of the team that drafted 
the 2007 version (on DNA, RNA and so on) was unfamiliar with the UNESCO 
instruments, while another said that the 1997 and 2003 declarations had ‘defi nitely 
assisted the writing of the regulations for the genetics that’s going to come through 
soon’ (interviews with SA_04 and SA_17 respectively).
As well as the regulations for genetic research that fall under the National 
Health Act, South Africa has a National Biotechnology Strategy (2001), admini-
stered by the Department of Science and Technology. (The strategy was published 
by the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, which split into the 
Department of Arts and Culture and the Department of Science and Technology in 
2002.) The strategy includes a National Biotechnology Advisory Committee, 
which was in the fi nal stages of composition at the time of fi eldwork in May 2006. 
The proposed function of the committee was to advise the Minister of Science 
and Technology on the progress of biotechnology development in South Africa, 
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particularly in terms of innovation and commercialization, but also ethics and leg-
islation. Initially a separate bioethics committee was also planned, but after consul-
tation with the South African Medical Research Council, the Department of Health 
and experts in the fi eld (including a member of the Interim National Health 
Research Ethics Committee), it was decided that this would only duplicate existing 
initiatives. Instead, the advisory committee was to include ethicists among its 
members, to keep it informed of relevant bioethics issues or developments (inter-
views with SA_28 and SA_31). Solomon Benatar was appointed (NBAC 2006).
The National Biotechnology Advisory Committee met for the fi rst time in 
November 2006. Since then it has held four workshops, on South Africa’s 
biotechnology sector (2008), the biotechnology policy environment (2009), the 
biotechnology pipeline (2010) and bioprospecting for the bioeconomy (2012). 
The Committee has also produced position statements bemoaning the lack of 
regulations on stem cells and ‘genomic sovereignty’ (that is, matters of access to 
and benefi t sharing from human genetics, including import and export of 
materials). The statements are undated, but it seems reasonable to deduce that 
they played a part in bringing about the regulatory push of 2011–12. At the 2008 
workshop, Benatar put forward the view that bioethics should not be seen as a 
‘handmaiden’ to biotechnology, to be used as a convenient support for arguments 
for scientifi c advancement, but as an opportunity to ask important questions about 
what research should be done and why, in the context of addressing inequalities of 
health, poverty and human rights (NBAC 2008: 6–7).
Also under the auspices of the National Biotechnology Strategy, the Department 
of Science and Technology produced two sets of guidelines (legal and ethical) on 
biotechnology research in 2006, in partnership with the Health Professionals 
Council of South Africa (HPCSA). These are still referred to by some researchers, 
according to 2012 questionnaire respondents, yet are not available on the 
department’s website, nor can they be found via an internet search. The HPCSA 
produced a series of booklets in 2008 on a plethora of ethical issues, one of which 
is on biotechnology research. It does not include the UNESCO declarations in the 
list of local and international documents used in compiling the guidelines (the 
Declaration of Helsinki, the CIOMS guidelines and the Belmont Report all 
feature), but article 2 of the UDHGHR (1997) is quoted, which states that 
everyone’s rights and dignity must be respected, regardless of genetic characteristics. 
As the booklet was written with funding from LifeLab, one of the Biotechnology 
Regional Innovation Centres set up under the National Biotechnology Strategy, it 
appears it has subsumed the 2006 guidelines (HPCSA 2008a: 3). Both it and the 
one on health research ethics more generally (HPCSA 2008b) are posted on the 
NHREC website (NHREC 2012g). It seems likely that they will need to be updated 
in light of the 2012 research regulations.
Stakeholders in ethics and genetics in Kenya and South Africa had minimal input 
into the negotiation process for the UNESCO declarations, with the knock-on 
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effect that their acceptance of the declarations has been rather slow. Generally, 
they feel that translation to the national context will be the key test of the 
declarations’ validity. Both countries have now adopted many of the provisions of 
the declarations; for instance, they each have a national bioethics committee that 
accredits RECs, which must be independent and pluralistic (see UDHGHR, 
article 16; IDHGD, article 6; and UDBHR, article 19). What is interesting is that 
Kenya has drawn explicitly on the UDBHR in developing its ethics systems, 
whereas South Africa’s efforts have been independent of UNESCO. As might be 
expected, given that only a few of the questionnaire respondents from South 
Africa use them, the declarations do not appear on the webpage where the NHREC 
makes available copies of several ethics documents, including CIOMS, Helsinki 
and Belmont (NHREC 2012g). The difference in approach may be due to the fact 
that Kenya has played a far more prominent role in the UNESCO Bioethics 
Programme than South Africa. Kenya has held a seat on the IGBC since the 
committee’s inception in 1999 (and chaired it from 2007 to 2009) and has 
championed bioethics at the General Conference (interviews with K2_01 and 
K2_16). Furthermore, a Kenyan medical researcher has been a member of the 
IBC since 2008. By contrast, no South African has sat on the IBC since 2003 and 
the country has never held a seat on the IGBC. Of late, the only involvement it has 
had with the two committees has been to send a Paris-based Permanent Delegate 
to some of their meetings as an observer.
7 Contextualizing bioethics
Mapping progress in Kenya and 
South Africa
In 2005–6 fi eldwork participants identifi ed certain interconnected issues, relevant 
to both genetic research and research with human subjects more broadly, which 
are particularly pertinent to Kenya and South Africa. These can be categorized as: 
protection of research subjects; health development, capacity building and benefi t 
sharing; capacity for ethical review; and public understanding and engagement. 
This chapter assesses how effectively these issues are being dealt with by the two 
countries, through their reinvigorated ethical systems. It also considers the impact 
of UNESCO’s capacity-building programmes in Kenya, particularly in the area of 
education and asks whether further activities in both Kenya and South Africa 
would be well received by the genetics and bioethics communities.
UNESCO bioethics activities in Kenya
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the UNESCO Bioethics Programme has 
had more of an infl uence on Kenya’s ethics systems than South Africa’s. This 
extends beyond the ABC programme. The 2008–9 evaluation of UNESCO’s 
ethics activities by its Internal Oversight Offi ce (IOS) showed that an active 
UNESCO chair can be the linchpin of a country’s engagement with the Bioethics 
Programme. This has been the case in Kenya. In 2005 the Kenya National 
Commission for UNESCO laid plans for a regional bioethics centre at Egerton 
University, which holds the Bioethics Chair, having recognized that Kenya did 
not have the facilities to implement the articles in the declarations concerning 
ethics education (interviews with K_01, K_13 and K_16). The plans were 
approved at the 2005 General Conference (resolution 33 C/DR.53) and the 
Regional Centre for Documentation and Research on Bioethics was inaugurated 
in May 2007 by the Director-General of UNESCO himself (UNESCO 2005t: 193; 
UNESCO 2007d; interview with K2_01). The Centre’s remit extends beyond 
research ethics, its ultimate aim being to increase understanding of what bioethics 
means among as many policy-makers, stakeholders and citizens as possible 
(interview with K_13).
In August 2008, the Centre hosted a conference on ‘Bioethical Perspectives and 
Practices in Research, Medicine, Life Sciences and Related Technologies in sub-
Saharan Africa’. Participants came mostly from Kenya (and the majority from 
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Egerton), but there were a few from elsewhere in Africa and further afi eld. 
Speakers gave papers on patient autonomy, HIV/AIDS, GMOs, traditional 
medicine and bioethics issues in Africa, among other subjects (UNESCO 2009c). 
In his opening speech, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education 
expressed the wish that Kenya would become the fi rst country to initiate 
UNESCO’s Core Curriculum in its public universities (ibid: vii).
Members of KEMRI and NCST had welcomed the plans for the Centre when 
interviewed in 2005, seeing it as a good opportunity for information sharing 
(interviews with K_17, K_19 and K_20). Yet it is currently under-used. An 
Egerton staff member interviewed in 2011 explained that borrowing of the 
Centre’s resources had mainly been restricted to Egerton lecturers and students, 
because there is no inter-library loan system (interview with K2_32). This was a 
disappointment to the former UNESCO Bioethics Chair (who moved on from 
Egerton in 2011) and members of the National Commission, who considered the 
establishment of the Centre a very important moment in Kenyan bioethics 
(interview with K2_01 and National Commission members). 
When interviewed in October 2005, the Bioethics Chair was unaware of 
UNESCO’s Ethics Education Programme (EEP) (interview with K_01). Less than 
two years later, the EEP ran a pilot Ethics Teachers’ Training Course (ETTC) at 
Egerton, the Centre having been launched a few months earlier (UNESCO 2007a). 
This was the second pilot of the course, after the fi rst was held in Romania 
in 2006. The course was advertised via National Commissions, Permanent 
Delegations, GEObs and the UNESCO website. From 20 applications, 16 people 
were invited to participate and seven were able to do so. There was a preference 
for African participants and the seven included three from Kenya, one from 
Uganda and one from Tanzania (the other two were from Iran and Italy).
All the students found the course useful, not least because it afforded an 
opportunity to exchange ideas with colleagues from other countries. Participants 
had to pay travel costs only, but lack of resources to cover even these prevented 
several invited students from participating, so it was decided that future courses in 
developing countries would focus on recruitment from within the host country 
(UNESCO 2007b). Again bearing out the fi ndings of the IOS evaluation, one of 
the participants, when interviewed in 2011, did not as yet teach bioethics at 
their institution, because there was no suitable course in their department 
(although the science department had asked them to give a lecture on the UDBHR 
as part of a new course on biotechnology). A second ETTC at Egerton was due 
to take place in January 2012, but has been postponed indefi nitely (interview 
with K2_32).
Views on UNESCO’s capacity-building activities
When interviewed in 2005–6, most participants in Kenya and South Africa knew 
as little of UNESCO’s capacity-building activities in bioethics as they did of the 
declarations; as with the declarations, once apprised of the nature of these 
activities, levels of enthusiasm varied. The 2012 questionnaire respondents 
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demonstrated a slightly better knowledge of (and as wide a range of opinions on) 
the Bioethics Programme. Two 2005–6 interviewees (SA_10 and SA_24) 
welcomed the guidelines on establishing bioethics committees. One (SA_24), 
who taught on a regional research ethics training programme, described them as 
‘very, very useful’, as for many students their fi rst task on returning to their home 
countries was to form an ethics committee. Other interviewees were ambivalent, 
because they did not see ‘a big gap in literature’ (SA_01). They were concerned 
that the guidelines would duplicate national and international documents that deal 
specifi cally with RECs (interviews with K_21, SA_05 and SA_17).
These concerns were echoed by one questionnaire respondent in 2012, who 
believed UNESCO to be wasting limited resources by encroaching on the WHO’s 
territory, given the latter’s recently updated guidelines for RECs. They also saw 
the majority of the IBC reports as superfl uous to requirements, as what is really 
needed is harmonization, above more guidance documents. Few respondents 
knew of the fi ve ethics committee guidebooks or the IBC reports on ethics issues 
and even fewer had used them, but several indicated that they might refer to them 
in the future. One wrote, ‘I think all ethics committees should be aware of these 
guides and understand how they can implement guidelines aligned with local 
cultural and legal frameworks.’ Of the topics in the IBC’s 2012–13 Work 
Programme, biobanks and HIV/AIDS proved the most popular, with nanotechno-
logies, regenerative medicine and neuroscience the least popular (although 
opinions were relatively scattered). This refl ects the views of two South African 
interviewees of 2006, one a geneticist (SA_20) and one an ethicist (SA_14), who 
were unenthused by the IBC’s reports on cutting edge technologies, the latter 
describing them as ‘totally irrelevant to the vast majority of the world’. 
The Bioethics Programme’s other information source, the Global Ethics 
Observatory database (GEObs), was better received in 2005–6. Several South 
African participants welcomed the initiative, partly because it would provide data 
they did not have access to elsewhere (interviews with SA_01,05,08,10,24). One 
ethics lecturer (SA_14) asserted, ‘It would be very useful, absolutely. I certainly 
don’t know of anything like that.’ A second (SA_16) thought the section on 
education would help people enrolling in ethics programmes to ensure that they 
were going to be taught by suitably qualifi ed teachers (rather than ‘fl y-by-night’ 
ethicists who ‘waltz in and start teaching ethics without proper training’) and might 
also highlight where courses were lacking and thus encourage more funding. One 
person (SA_09) who had been asked to provide information concerning their 
institution’s interest in the GEObs programme was less keen, as this would require 
devoting considerable time to the ‘bureaucratic organization’ of research ethics, 
rather than more important scholarly aspects. In 2012, only one questionnaire 
respondent was aware of GEObs, whose experience was that it gets outdated 
rapidly. They compared it unfavourably with the MARC database of RECs 
(Mapping African Research Ethics Review Capacity), funded by the EU’s European 
and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP) and Pfi zer, which 
allows entrants to update data themselves (see www.researchethicsweb.org and 
Ijsselmuiden et al. 2012). Of the other respondents, four-fi fths thought it likely that 
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they would access GEObs in the future and half would consider making their 
details and/or details of their institution or teaching programme available to the 
database.
2005–6 interviewees were mixed in their reception of the EEP. A South African 
ethics teacher (SA_24) and the head of a research institute in Kenya (K_07) 
thought that, while there was clearly a need for more ethics training in some 
places, UNESCO would have to fi nd a niche, because there were already several 
organizations working in this area. The teacher suggested that UNESCO involve 
Africans in designing a curriculum that included African philosophical perspec-
tives, while the research institute head commented:
One of the ironic things now is, I probably get more circulars for workshops 
for training in ethics than any other area. . . . Every organization seems to be 
organising capacity building in ethics, which you can’t say is a bad thing, but 
I just wonder how much of it is duplicated, how high quality some of it is and 
how well coordinated everything is.
A South African research ethicist (SA_22) made a similar point with regard to 
ethics initiatives more generally:
I think there are quite a lot of parallel activities going on globally – not maybe 
all as wide in scope as the UNESCO one, but, for example, working with 
UNAIDS and WHO and the EU – and there seem to be lots of parallel 
initiatives to set up guidelines, to create networks, to create inventories. And 
I suppose initially it’s going to be a good thing, but ideally one day some of 
them should be collapsed, because it’s obviously quite expensive. But I think 
the good thing is that ethical issues in research generally are suddenly being 
quite substantially funded and I think that’s quite important and especially in 
developing country related stuff.
Perhaps UNESCO has found its niche with the ETTC, with its focus on training 
university ethics teachers (as SA_16 intimated was necessary) rather than REC 
members, at whom most ethics courses are aimed. Like with GEObs, most 2012 
questionnaire respondents had not come across either the ETTC or the bioethics 
Core Curriculum previously, but were largely in favour of both. They also mostly 
agreed with the IBC and IGBC members who thought that bioethics should be 
taught at all education levels, although one cautioned that, while it is important to 
create awareness from an early age, there are already many pressing needs within 
the South African school system. Respondents cited existing ethics courses for 
researchers and ethics committee members, but felt there could still be a call for 
UNESCO’s offerings, if these were to take account of the sub-Saharan African 
context and address the need for societal education on the social value of research, 
how participants are protected and ethical and moral values more broadly. 
A member of KEMRI (K2_17), interviewed in 2011, was also supportive, as their 
team was discussing a possible ethics curriculum at the time. They also welcomed 
124  Progress in Kenya and South Africa
the ETTC initiative, saying, ‘The curriculum is already there for trainers of 
trainers – why should we sit down and crack our heads when we can just look at 
it and say, “Okay, we can do this, we can do this, we’ll take out this, we’ll use 
this”? And, you know, we are good to go.’
Ongoing ethics issues
Protection of research participants
Both Kenya and South Africa decided that their national ethics guidelines of 
2004 were needed in part to protect poor and marginalized people from being 
exploited by unscrupulous researchers. Both sets duly give specifi c instructions 
concerning vulnerable groups such as pregnant women and prisoners (Department 
of Health 2004: preamble and 24–30; NCST 2004: 2 and 10–14). When 
interviewed in 2005–6, several people saw such provisions as necessary to 
prevent vulnerable people being subjected to undue inducement to take part 
in research projects of no relevance to them (interviews with K_25 and 
SA_12,19,30,32). In a 2011 draft report on vulnerability, South Africa’s National 
Health Research Ethics Council (NHREC) expressed concern that these 
protections are not afforded by South African law at present, as the only 
vulnerable group to which section 71 of the National Health Act makes special 
reference is children. The report mentions the 2007 draft regulations on research 
with human subjects, which are based on section 71, but not the phantom 2009 
version that went unadopted (see p. 115). The 2009 regulations made provision 
for several vulnerable groups, including pregnant women, prisoners and users of 
indigenous medical systems. They did not, however, include those rendered 
vulnerable due to ‘broader, rights-based factors (such as social marginalisation, 
or illiteracy)’, an omission in the 2007 draft regulations of which the NHREC 
report is critical (Republic of South Africa 2009: 5–6; NHREC 2011: 13). The 
draft report also criticizes the Act’s insistence on written consent, which it sees 
as restrictive (ibid: 14). Relatedly, Caroline Kithinji and Kass (2010: 15) have 
expressed concern at the lack of oversight of the readability of consent forms 
translated into Kiswahili in Kenya.
Ethics committees in both countries take particular care that projects which 
involve research into Africa’s ‘treasure store’ of diseases or evolutionarily 
signifi cant DNA are not exploitative (interviews with K_17 [quoted] and SA_04), 
although some Kenyan NGO representatives (K_10 and K_11) expressed concern 
about vulnerable people being asked to give blood samples without being 
adequately informed of their rights. There is also the problem of tradition being 
used as a justifi cation for denial of human rights. In 2009 the Chair of the KEMRI 
ethics committee raised the issue of same-sex couples being ignored in HIV 
interventions because of widespread opposition to homosexuality in the country 
(Kaberia 2009). This issue was also raised at Kenya’s fi rst ABC training workshop, 
in terms of how RECs should handle situations whereby the personal beliefs of 
members about same-sex relationships make the review of research protocols 
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diffi cult (UNESCO 2009a: 2). With regard to marriage, the Kenyan guidelines 
aim to strike a balance between universal and local values:
In most rural communities in Kenya due to sociocultural arrangements, 
women, particularly married ones, may not give their consent to participate 
in research without the express permission of their husbands. In such 
circumstances, while the husband may give his “consent”, the woman should 
still be allowed to give her individual consent. If after the husband has given 
his consent but she decides not to participate in the research, her decision not 
to do so must be respected. Kenya has as many as 42 tribes, and there are 
bound to be unique sociocultural backgrounds for each tribe.
(NCST 2004: 11)
While this provision may ensure that no woman will be induced to take part in a 
research project against her will, it does not indicate what should be done if a wife 
wishes to participate against her husband’s wishes.
One means to guard against exploitation of vulnerable people is to engage with 
the communities within which it is hoped research will take place. Both the Kenyan 
and South African guidelines of 2004 call on researchers to be aware of and respect 
the cultural traditions of the communities in which they wish to conduct research 
and to liaise with and seek permission from their leaders where appropriate 
(Department of Health 2004: 25 and 28; NCST 2004: 11 and 14). As Danie du Toit, 
Chair of South Africa’s NHREC, puts it, ‘Informed consent that is based on the 
language, idiom and culture of the participant is empowering, not only to the subject 
but also to the investigator’ (NHREC 2010: 2). Researchers, ethicists, policy-
makers, NGO representatives and those with commercial interests alike, when 
interviewed in 2005–6, saw this type of interaction as tremendously important, 
partly because of the culture in many African societies that decisions should be 
‘ratifi ed communally’, often by chiefs (K_08 [quoted], K_01,02,04,05,06,09,19,
20,25 and SA_01,02,04,12,13,21,22,30,32). Almost as many expressed reservations 
about the ethos of community consent and engagement, because defi ning who or 
what ‘the community’ actually is and who should be representing it is very diffi cult.
A further danger is that insisting on community consent may reinforce repressive 
hierarchies, denying women and young people an equal voice (interviews with 
K_03,07,08,11,18 and SA_05,10,19,33). Said one participant (SA_16), ‘I think it 
sounds very nice, but I don’t know how one does it. Often it’s lip service, because 
I mean the problem even before that is, what is the community, where do you fi nd 
it?’ Another (K_07) felt that the UDBHR (2005) would have to deal with these 
subtleties to be of any use. It simply states, however, that for a research project on 
a group or community, agreement from representatives may be sought, in addition 
to that of individual participants (article 6). The subsequent IBC report on consent 
(2008) expands on this, but still in rather generalized terms, summarized as follows:
Seeking consent from an individual is indispensable even if his/her community 
is consulted, but the actual value of the consent of an individual, once the 
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community has given its approval, may sometimes provoke questioning. 
Decision-making in the family unit might pose similar problems as well. 
However, it should be noted that although it is important to observe and 
respect values of different cultures, these values should not infringe upon 
fundamental freedoms.
(UNESCO 2008g: 49)
One 2006 South African participant (SA_24) suggested that guidelines on 
‘community preparedness’, which goes beyond community consent to see what 
community members think about a proposed research project and what they might 
want from it, would be useful. In 2012 the NHREC published its Guidelines for 
Community Advisory Groups, which meet this remit. Intended to ‘promote the 
development of a mutually benefi cial and meaningful partnership between health 
researchers and community stakeholders within a vibrant human rights environ-
ment’, the guidelines explain:
In many instances, community engagement may serve to increase the relevance 
and quality of proposed research, and its acceptance by affected communities. 
One way in which community engagement can occur is via Community 
Advisory Boards (CABs). CABs can provide a mechanism to harness the 
expertise of key stakeholders and offset potential power differentials that may 
exist between researchers and participating communities, amongst other 
functions.
(NHREC 2012b: 1)
Like the 2005–6 interviewees, the guidelines recognize that ‘community’ is a 
complex term and, echoing Held’s ‘overlapping communities of fate’ (Held 2003: 
167), suggest that people can belong to multiple communities. They recommend 
that CABs should be involved at all stages of the research process, from protocol 
development, to the research itself, to the dissemination of results, one of their 
crucial roles being to help researchers understand the potential impact of cultural 
norms (NHREC 2012b: 1–2).
These are practices that the KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative Programme 
at Kilifi , Kenya, has spent several years developing. By involving communities in 
the planning of research, it can try to ensure projects are performed in ways 
appropriate to the local context. At the time of the fi rst set of Kenyan fi eldwork, in 
2005, it had recently set up a network of community representatives from a wide 
range of backgrounds, through an exhaustive two-year recruitment process 
involving already existing community-based organizations. This culminated in 
large-scale meetings organized by local chiefs, to gain the endorsement of those 
nominated as representatives and promote their new role within the community. 
The system has led to better communications between the Collaborative Pro-
gramme and its local population, in both directions; the representatives have been 
able to disseminate information on the Programme’s work and feed back to it 
specifi c recommendations on research planning, as well as community concerns 
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(interviews with K_06, K_09 and K_23; Marsh et al. 2008: 727–8). The 
community representatives have also helped the Programme’s Consent and 
Communication Committee, constituted in 2005, to develop consent form 
templates from scratch in the local languages (Kiswahili and Kigiriama), rather 
than translate them from English (Boga et al. 2011: e1001089).
The Collaborative Programme’s broader community engagement strategy 
involves continuous evaluation and adaptation, with regular consultations and 
workshops with local leaders and health workers and training for research staff 
(Marsh et al. 2010). On a longitudinal genetic study involving 12,000 infants, for 
example, it held 40 public meetings (attended by 8,000 people) and 32 smaller 
meetings with religious leaders in 2006–7, as well as its regular (quarterly) meetings 
with the 14 groups of community representatives. There were also consultations 
with local chiefs, who correctly foresaw that the heel prick procedure for taking 
blood samples would be met with consternation by parents (ibid). The Programme 
has published widely on the challenges and complexities of community engagement 
in its particular setting, including overcoming mistrust, the ‘therapeutic misconcep-
tion’ (when participants confl ate research and treatment) and the often underrated 
but diffi cult role played by locally recruited fi eld workers (see Gikonyo et al. 2008; 
Marsh et al. 2008, 2010 and 2011; Molyneux et al. 2010; and Kamuya et al. 2011).
Health development, capacity building and benefi t sharing
The Kenyan and South African ethical guidelines of 2004 require research to be 
relevant not only to study populations but also to each country as a whole, by 
addressing ‘health needs’ and ‘broad health and development needs’ respectively 
(Department of Health 2004: 3; NCST 2004: 13 and 16). The South African ones 
deem it necessary for multinational collaborative research to be linked to capacity 
building in healthcare and economic and educational empowerment in the host 
country and to embrace the social responsibility ethos thus:
With recognition of the role of social conditions in shaping the world, and 
how privileged people view the world and themselves, comes the realisation 
that research cannot be considered in isolation. Medical research, health care, 
conditions of life around the world and how humans fl ourish may seem 
disparate, but all are interdependent.
(Department of Health 2004: 7)
That the guidelines should include this ethos is perhaps not surprising, given that 
Benatar was on the editorial team. In fact, this passage is almost identical to one 
from his commentary in the journal Bioethics, ‘Justice and medical research: 
a global perspective’ (Benatar 2001: 337). The South African National Health Act 
(2003) stipulates that the National Health Research Committee (a sister committee 
to the NHREC) must ensure that research addresses priority health issues, taking 
into account disease burden, cost, capacity and the needs of vulnerable groups and 
communities.
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In 2005–6, several participants agreed that research should address the health 
and development needs of the country in which it is to be conducted 
(K_07,08,14,17,19,25 and SA_01,08,09,17,19,21,32). This is something that 
RECs in both countries were taking into consideration when reviewing protocols 
(interviews with K_17 and SA_19). A member of KEMRI (K_17) explained that 
they were not trying to limit basic research, but wanted to see this integrated with 
social aspects: ‘We would like people to write more practical protocols.’ Similarly, 
the Biotechnology Regional Innovation Centres (BRICs) that fell under the South 
African National Biotechnology Strategy of 2001 were not to invest in ‘purely 
white elephant science development’, but in strategic basic research that addressed 
national priorities (interview with SA_26).
Through such measures South Africa appeared to have embraced what the 
social responsibility article of the UDBHR (2005) deems to be a ‘central purpose’ 
of government, the promotion of health and social development (UNESCO 2005s: 
article 14). The BRICs were in place from 2002 to 2009, but did not produce the 
hoped-for return on investment and were absorbed into the Technology Innovation 
Agency (TIA), set up under the Ten-Year Innovation Plan and TIA Act of 2008 
(NBAC 2010: 1 and 8). The Department of Science and Technology has since 
been working on a Bio-economy Strategy, with cabinet endorsement to be sought 
in 2012–13. This will bring together various initiatives, such as the National 
Biotechnology Strategy and the From Farmer to Pharma Grand Challenge 
(which seeks to tap South Africa’s biodiversity by combining biotechnology 
with indigenous knowledge systems, for socioeconomic benefi t), with the aim 
of harnessing the potential economic, social and environmental benefi ts of 
the health, agricultural and industrial sectors (Department of Science and 
Technology 2012).
Ensuring research is socially relevant is a complex process. As noted by 
Geoffrey Lairumbi et al. (2008: 734), writing in a Kenyan context, ‘Ethical 
research should contribute to social value in the country where research is being 
carried out, but there is signifi cant debate around how this might be achieved and 
who is responsible.’ Debate also rages within the bioethics literature about how 
far research should address issues of social justice and inequality (Lairumbi et al. 
2011: 2). Some 2005–6 participants (K_09, SA_12 and SA_20) did not think 
health and social development should be a requirement of research, as this could 
limit basic or innovative research that might have massive long-term but 
serendipitous benefi ts. Although a few interviewees thought that there might be 
more effective means to address poverty than ‘high-fl ying scientifi c studies’ 
(SA_03 [quoted] and SA_09,18,20), many more believed genetic research worth 
pursuing, because of its potential to produce treatments or cures for the diseases 
of the global South (K_08,11,25,26 and SA_21,27,30,32). Two interviewees from 
South Africa commented that it should not divert resources from meeting basic 
needs in the here and now, but that the two approaches could be complementary 
(SA_01 and SA_18).
Two people questioned the practical applicability of the UDBHR’s social 
responsibility principle. The fi rst, a scientist and ethicist (SA_24), wondered how 
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far the responsibility extends, given the enormous challenges poverty in the 
developing world presents:
The needs, in developing countries, are of such a nature, you can’t provide it 
all. And if you don’t research, you’re also not going to bring something better. 
So this is a major, major debate. I mean, I have a confl ict in my own mind: to 
what extent do I have responsibility?
The second, a member of an ethics committee in South Africa (SA_10), approached 
the problem from a different angle. They said that while their committee was 
conscious that projects ought to have social value, in reality it would be diffi cult 
to reject one that did not, as this would mean turning down funding for the 
university. Similarly, Lairumbi et al. (2008: 744), in their study of the policy-
research nexus in Kenya, found that local health initiatives can be overshadowed 
by ‘the considerable power of the global health agenda’. The IBC’s report on 
social responsibility (2010), citing the ‘10/90 gap’, calls on governments and 
institutions in both developed and developing countries to address health 
inequalities through research, but adds little to the existing literature in terms of 
how the ensuing complexities can be managed (UNESCO 2010h: 24 and 31).
The principle of benefi t sharing, like social responsibility, is applied to both 
specifi c communities and the wider national contexts in the Kenyan and South 
African guidelines, particularly in terms of health services and products 
(Department of Health 2004: 3, 7 and 9; NCST 2004: 5 and 16). According to 
interviewees in 2005–6, RECs in both countries, when reviewing protocols, try to 
assess the extent to which participants will benefi t from a research project (K_25 
and SA_05,10,19). Several thought it important that communities taking part in 
research should benefi t in some way (K_10,14,18 and SA_04,12,13,17,19,25,33). 
One South African bioethicist (SA_09) said:
The question is whether research is ethical if the people and communities 
who are the subjects of research have not benefi tted from improvements in 
their health or their healthcare. If they have not benefi tted then I am sceptical 
of how ethical it is to do research in those places.
As with social responsibility, however, some people raised issues with regard to 
the practicalities of actually implementing benefi t sharing, in terms of making 
commitments to provide for communities before the results of research are known 
and determining exactly who should benefi t and for how long. There is a fi ne 
balance between appropriate compensation for time and inconvenience and undue 
inducement, particularly among poor communities where even a small amount of 
money or payment in kind will be of high value to participants (interviews with 
K_10,14,18 and SA_04,12,13,17,19,25,33). These are diffi cult issues for research-
ers and ethics committees alike to manage and adjudicate (Molyneux et al. 2012; 
interviews with SA_05, SA_10 and SA_22). In South Africa, the NHREC has 
produced detailed guidelines for RECs on how to determine the appropriate level 
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of payment for research participants under various scenarios specifi c to the South 
African context (NHREC 2012d).
Benefi t sharing can also take the form of capacity building for research. The 
Kenyan guidelines stipulate that externally sponsored collaborative research 
should develop research capacity in Kenya (NCST 2004: 16). In 2005–6 there 
was relatively little of this type of research taking place in either Kenya or South 
Africa. Geneticists in both countries (K_05 and SA_27) lamented the fact that, 
because developing countries were perceived as not having the capacity to deliver, 
funding for research tended to fl ow to Northern institutions. One scientist (K_13) 
commented, ‘I think there is a lot of talk of goodwill, but they have been slow.’ 
There was also insuffi cient local funding for research (interviews with K_05,10,14 
and SA_27). ‘Brain drain’ was an ongoing problem. Even if African scientists 
trained in the global South, many were likely to develop their careers in Northern 
institutions (interviews with K_05,10 and SA_20,22,26,28).
Participants generally acknowledged that research capacity building requires 
the support of developed countries, but had fi rm ideas about what form that 
support should take. First, capacity-building programmes should be designed 
with the input of African scientists and policy-makers (K_01,07,13,16 and 
SA_15,26,27). The former UNESCO Bioethics Chair (K_01) said, ‘Let the 
initiative come from our side. . . . If it comes from the other side, the success will 
be a little bit lower, because it is as if something is brought in.’ Second, programmes 
should ideally represent long-term investment, in terms of training, infrastructure 
and salaried posts, rather than ‘travel and tourism money’, whereby people are 
sent abroad for a few months’ training (interview with SA_27). Ethics committees 
preferred a project to train people to analyse data in-country where possible, 
rather than to ship samples abroad (interviews with K_17,21,25 and SA_19,21,30). 
The Kilifi  KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative Programme again provided an 
example of good practice. Capacity building is its raison d’être. Rather than 
following past models that saw ‘grateful African institutions’ being invited to join 
Northern-led projects, the centre falls under KEMRI management. The long-term 
vision, stretching over 25 years, is to build up a ‘cadre of international research 
leaders’ from Kenya and the East Africa region. To achieve this, the Programme 
aims to develop research facilities of international standing and ensure suffi cient 
funding to provide attractive career paths for scientists wishing to stay in Kenya 
(interviews with K_05 and K_07 [quoted]). The South African National 
Bioinformatics Institute has a similar vision, its ‘key underpinning’ being its aim 
to bring Africans to a competitive level in bioinformatics (interview with SA_02).
Questionnaire respondents in 2012 noted that brain drain and lack of funding 
remain problematic, but that there have been some improvements in human 
genetic research capacity, at least in the public sector (most felt unqualifi ed to 
comment on the private sector). Biotechnology activities have increased in both 
Kenya and South Africa since 2005–6. Through initiatives like Vision 2030, 
indigenous capacity has grown in Kenya, with many more Kenyan postdoctoral 
geneticists working in the leading public universities and specialist research 
institutes than fi ve years previously. The increased funding has given Kenya more 
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leeway in deciding what its research priorities should be, although the government’s 
contribution is still dwarfed by those of international institutions. The US Centers 
for Disease Control, for example, ‘has very signifi cant infl uence and impact on 
the direction of research’ (interview with K2_31). Human genetic research is done 
mainly within the national universities and KEMRI, in partnership with external 
research institutions in the US, Canada and the UK. A representative of the African 
Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum (K2_31), based in Nairobi, summarized 
Kenya’s progress thus:
So there is a lot more interest in genetics in this country than before, because 
there is realisation that through advanced research in genetics – human, 
livestock, crop – it is possible to start rolling out novel products that would 
do wonders in, for example, treating diseases that have proved so resistant to 
certain vaccines and drugs.
In South Africa, the H3Africa initiative has had a signifi cant impact, according 
to questionnaire respondents, by enabling geneticists to access international 
collaborative funding and encouraging research partnerships across African 
countries. An ethics committee member also observed that they were seeing more 
genetic studies attached to clinical trial protocols. Universities have developed 
capacity in genomic research through local and international consortia such as the 
Southern African Human Genome Programme (SAHGP), noted one scientist. The 
SAHGP, funded by the Department of Science and Technology, was launched in 
January 2011. According to one of its coordinators, it is ‘a ground-breaking 
national and regional initiative that aims to unlock the unique genetic character of 
southern African populations’ (Pepper 2011: 286). Among other activities, it will 
create a sustainable source of research material, by establishing a regional sample 
repository and database. Crucially, the initiative is led by Southern Africans, for 
Southern Africans. Hopefully this will help to combat a problem raised by one 
questionnaire respondent, who said that the number of genetic researchers in 
South Africa had gone down since 2006: ‘a lot of research is still being done 
on Africans without meaningful input from African scientists’. Like H3Africa (an 
allied project), the end goal of the SAHGP is to use discoveries to improve human 
health (ibid: 286–7).
Another issue that remains prominent in both countries is sample shipping. As 
intimated by the IBC member who complained that developing country scientists 
are often seen as little more than a ‘post offi ce box’, collaborations with research 
institutions overseas can have implications for ownership of materials and 
intellectual property rights (Wasunna 2008; interview with K2_32). A desire to 
stem the fl ow of biological material abroad by enabling more research to be done 
locally lay behind the founding of the SAHGP (Pepper 2011: 287). More 
problematic still is the unregulated transfer of materials, which one Kenyan 
scientist (K2_31) described as happening at a ‘very alarming rate’. They went on, 
‘I am of the view that if tissues and samples are being shipped out of the country, 
(1) it has to be done transparently and then (2) there has to be cause to indicate that 
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those samples cannot be tested here.’ They explained that people have complained 
about samples being taken from HIV households, for example, who see themselves 
as being used as guinea pigs, with no indication of what the samples will be used 
for or with what result. Papers in the South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 
have raised similar concerns about human tissue or data being shipped out of the 
country unregulated, instead of resources being poured into building research 
capacity in-country, to the advantage of researchers and pharmaceutical companies 
in the global North and to the detriment of vulnerable and poor populations in 
South Africa (Clarke and Egan 2008: 45; de Haas 2011: 26–7; Sathar and Dhai 
2012: 52–3).
Both countries are trying to address these problems, in South Africa through the 
promulgation of Chapter 8 of the National Health Act (note, however, that a 
provision in the draft regulations on DNA, RNA and other human samples of 
2007, stating that intellectual property rights shall apply to all forms of genetic 
research, except stem cell research, does not appear in any of 2012 regulations) 
and in Kenya through NCST and NBC initiatives. Simon Langat (2005: 538) 
highlighted Kenya’s need for specifi c guidance on the collection, use, storage, 
transfer and re-use of human biological materials several years ago, in the journal 
Bioethics. NCST’s 2009 research clearance guidelines meet this need, as follows: 
All experimental tests, analyses and investigational procedures of materials 
should be undertaken within Kenya, but where it is proven that no capacity 
for a particular tests [sic], analyses and investigation of a material exists in 
Kenya, or where exchange is needed for quality assurance purposes, the 
researcher wishing to transfer or export samples abroad for research purposes 
shall write a letter of request for the exchange, transfer, acquisition or export 
to the Secretary, NCST.
(NCST 2009: 4)
Building on this, at the fi nal ABC training session in November 2011, the Kenyan 
NBC drafted a new materials transfer agreement template. Although the ABC 
facilitators had some input, the template was to be fi nalized by the NBC, to ensure 
its appropriateness to the local context. There will also be stronger monitoring at 
airports (interview with K2_25).
Ethical review capacity and ethics training for researchers
In 2005–6 interviewees in both Kenya and South Africa identifi ed several ways in 
which research ethics could be strengthened. RECs had suffi ciently diverse 
memberships, they felt, as stipulated in the two sets of national guidelines, but 
they highlighted defi ciencies in capacity (interviews with K_06,09,17 and 
SA_10,19). (By contrast, a 2003 study of the 12 major health RECs in South 
Africa found that committees were well organized, given resource constraints, but 
did not have suffi ciently diverse memberships in terms of race, gender and 
expertise. Those committees based in institutions that had been disadvantaged 
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under apartheid had less capacity than others. The investigators feared these com-
mittees would be further disadvantaged in the forthcoming NHREC registration 
exercise if they did not receive additional resources and training, thus forcing 
them to settle for the lower level accreditation [Moodley and Myer 2007].) Kenya 
needed more people with expertise in research ethics, not only to constitute new 
committees but also to relieve those who sat on existing ones, which were under-
trained and overburdened (interviews with K_21, K_25 and K_27). At the time of 
fi eldwork, there were no suitable courses in East Africa, so people were having to 
travel to South Africa if they wished to undergo training (K_17 and K_21). Not 
only REC members required instruction, but also scientists and students. Several 
people commented that Kenya did not have suffi cient university courses in 
research ethics, which adversely affected the standard of applications for ethical 
review. One participant made a similar comment about South Africa, although it 
had more university courses than Kenya (K_01,02,03,17,19,21 and SA_17).
Both countries have since seen several initiatives to expand research ethics 
capacity, but the demands on RECs have grown in tandem. 2012 questionnaire 
respondents felt there had been progress in most areas – protection of vulnerable 
research participants, community engagement, the number of trained REC 
members, ethics training for scientists and students, training in African philosophical 
perspectives and ongoing monitoring of approved projects by RECs – but that 
there was still room for improvement. As one person put it, ‘critical mass’ had not 
yet been achieved. The review burden varies widely from committee to committee 
in South Africa. A 2009 NHREC report noted that the 22 RECs registered by 
February of that year had received a total of 3,682 protocols for approval in a 
12-month period. Five committees had received more than 500 proposals, 756 
being the highest number and fi ve the lowest (one committee had not received any) 
(NHREC 2009: 3–4). 
The busier South African committees are comparable with the Kenyatta 
National Hospital-University of Nairobi REC, established in 1974, which 
processes over 450 research proposals from local and international researchers 
each year (KNH-UoN REC 2011: 2) and the KEMRI ethics committee, which has 
seen a huge growth in applications, from an average of 55 a month in 2010 to 100 
a month by November 2011. The KEMRI committee would like to expand its 
membership to accommodate this increase, but this requires more training 
(interview with K2_17). South Africa’s oldest REC, the Witwatersrand Human 
Research Ethics Committee (Medical), is also straining to cope with its increase 
in general applications, which rose from 440 a year in 2002 to 685 in 2011, with 
an expected increase of another 250 per year in 2012–14 (clinical trial applications 
number another 100 per year) (Cleaton-Jones 2012: 44 and 38).
As several of the South African committees audited by the NHREC were not 
able to review all the applications they received, the report called for more RECs 
to share the load, as well as training to increase REC capacity. Of the 353 members 
of the 22 registered RECs, 64 per cent had undergone ethics training. Again, there 
was diversity among the committees; in some committees all members were 
trained, whereas in others very few were (two out of 11, for example) (NHREC 
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2009: 4 and 6–7). The NHREC’s Training Subcommittee, tasked with deciding 
what basic competencies should be required of REC members and researchers, 
has drawn up minimum curricula for both groups, in consultation with stakeholders 
from academia, industry, private trainers and the HPCSA (NHREC 2010–11: 14 
and 2012e).
The KEMRI ethics committee similarly requires all internal applicants for 
ethical approval to show that they have undergone ethics training (an online 
course, for example), which sometimes delays applications. In terms of general 
REC capacity in Kenya, a KEMRI member (K2_17) was concerned about 
maintenance of standards suffi cient to protect research participants, given the 
recent proliferation of ethics committees and the possibility of decentralized 
control of RECs under the new Kenyan constitution:
People just imagine that you throw CITI [an online ethics course] at 
somebody . . . and they are good to go. They aren’t good to go. They really 
need to be with other people who have been doing it for a while . . . I just 
wonder about the quality – the depth – of review and whether we shall be able 
to maintain a minimum and whether we shall be able to be consistent. And, 
you know, the minute people realize they’re not consistent, then they’ll start 
shouting, won’t they?
The courses in South Africa that Kenyan REC members, interviewed in 2005, 
had attended were run by SARETI and IRENSA, both sponsored by Fogarty 
International, of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH). Fogarty’s rationale is 
to build capacity for ethical review that is appropriate to the local context. 
IRENSA, the International Research Ethics Network for Southern Africa, was 
based at the University of Cape Town and received funding up to 2010. SARETI, 
the South African Research Ethics Training Initiative, is run by a collaborative 
partnership between the University of KwaZulu-Natal, the University of Pretoria 
and Johns Hopkins University and is funded up to 2017. From 2011–16 Fogarty 
is also sponsoring the ARESA programme (Advancing Research Ethics Training 
in Southern Africa) at Stellenbosch University, which partners with the University 
of North Carolina. IRENSA ran a postgraduate diploma, as does ARESA, while 
SARETI offers a Master’s degree in health research ethics. Shorter courses and 
workshops also form part of the programmes. Participants are primarily members 
of RECs from South Africa and other countries in the sub-Saharan region, but also 
number scientists, journalists, government offi cials and people from private sector 
companies. The aim is to have a good balance of working disciplines, genders and 
ethnic backgrounds (Benatar and Vaughan 2008: 440–1; Fogarty 2010 and 2012c; 
ARESA 2011a; SARETI 2011; Wassenaar 2011: 107–8; interviews with and 
SA_09 and SA_22).
Beyond the Fogarty initiatives, the Steve Biko Centre for Bioethics at the 
University of the Witwatersrand offers a Master’s programme in Bioethics and 
Health Law (incorporating environmental and research ethics) to a similarly broad 
range of students from across the continent, as well as a yearly fi ve-day course in 
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research ethics for REC members and researchers (Dhai 2011: 109; Gardner 2011: 
102–3). The SARETI and IRENSA programmes have had a signifi cant impact on 
health research ethics capacity in South Africa and further afi eld, having 
collectively trained several hundred people (Benatar and Vaughan 2008: 441; 
SARETI 2008–10; Nyika et al. 2009: 190; Ijsselmuiden et al. 2012: 76). 
A by-product has been the development of a network of REC chairs in South 
Africa, which has enhanced consistency and thus reduced the tendency for 
‘shopping around’ for ethical approval (Benatar 2007: 595). ARESA will further 
build on the informal networking engendered by SARETI and IRENSA by 
establishing an online forum for REC members, to ‘create a defi ned space for 
research ethics in Southern Africa outside the regulatory framework of RECs’, to 
include a list of resources and online training (ARESA 2011b). The NHREC 
Training Subcommittee also has a mandate to ‘facilitate the sharing of best 
practices in ethics training’ and ‘investigate the feasibility of web-based/on-line 
training’ (NHREC 2012e).
While this growth in research ethics capacity building over the last decade or so 
is undoubtedly impressive, one ethics lecturer (SA_24), when interviewed in 
2006, identifi ed a gap in provision. No programmes taught African philosophical 
perspectives on ethics. They said:
The one thing that I think is lacking in all these training programmes is that 
we don’t often access African philosophers . . . because there is defi nitely a 
clear distinction between African philosophy and Western philosophy and I 
think that needs its space.
A member of the KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative Programme (K_09) 
detected a similar Western bias. They expressed the hope that people in Kenya and 
Africa as a whole might become more engaged in ethical debates and so progress 
from trying to make guidelines produced in the global North work in their settings 
to taking the ‘slightly more challenging stance’ of developing ‘new ideas about 
what the guidelines should be’.
This need for a more holistically African perspective is perhaps being met 
through SAREN (Southern African Research Ethics Network), an initiative 
funded by the EDCTP. Recognizing that, through programmes like the Fogarty 
ones, Africa now has considerable expertise in research ethics, the project aims to 
harness this in the form of a textbook focusing explicitly on the African context. 
The project summary reads,
Great care and attention will be spent in ensuring that this textbook 
incorporates issues especially relevant to Africa, such as the challenge of 
integrating a western model of informed consent into communitarian and 
patriarchal societies and issues particularly relevant to the review of both 
public health research and clinical trials in the areas of HIV, malaria and 
tuberculosis.
(EDCTP 2011d)
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A workshop held in Stellenbosch in 2011 brought together REC members from 
11 countries across Africa, including Kenya, to plan the contents. The book was 
due to be published in English at the end of 2012, with translations into French, 
Portuguese and Swahili to follow (ibid). The ARESA diploma programme also 
aims to be ‘locally relevant’ and includes both Western and African philosophies 
of ethics in its fi rst module (Moodley 2011: 105).
Kenya has likewise benefi tted from Fogarty and EDCTP support, enabling 
REC members to now train in-country. The Indiana University-Moi University 
Academic Research Ethics Partnership received Fogarty funding for 2008–12. As 
well as its Master’s programme, the partnership offers annual workshops on how 
to teach research ethics, with training materials to be distributed online in collabo-
ration with CITI, the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (Fogarty 
2012b). It thus mirrors UNESCO’s EEP very strongly. In 2012 the grant was 
renewed until 2017. The new phase will see the partnership develop topic-based 
short courses and extend the teaching workshops to other East African researchers 
and institutions (Fogarty 2012a).
EDCTP-funded Kenyan initiatives of recent years include two capacity-
building programmes at KEMRI and a nationwide project to strengthen RECs 
(EDCTP 2011b). The KEMRI-EDCTP Research Oversight Project ran from 2009 
to 2011. It aimed to train KEMRI researchers and ethics committee members, 
together with members of the Expert Committee on Clinical Trials of the Pharmacy 
and Poisons Board (established under the Pharmacy and Poisons Act), in the 
ethical review, practice and oversight of research and to set up a joint electronic 
clinical trials registry (EDCTP 2009). Adili, a new Bioethics Center within 
KEMRI, has been funded from 2011 to 2013 and is specifi cally targeted at dealing 
with the KEMRI ethics committee’s increased workload (EDCTP 2011a). Again 
providing training for researchers and reviewers, it is hoped this will simultaneously 
enable the committee to expand and lead to an improvement in the quality of 
submissions, so that less ‘back and forth’ with scientists is required. Some of these 
developments have been inspired by the South African model: ‘they seem to be 
quite ahead’, said a KEMRI member (interview with K2_17).
KEMRI had previously relied mostly on online ethics courses for its researchers 
(such as those offered by NIH, CITI and AMANET, the African Malaria Network 
Trust), but Adili staff believe that face-to-face training tailored to the Kenyan 
context will be more appropriate. In this they draw on the fi ndings of a recent 
study by Rakesh Aggarwal et al. (2011), which showed that online ethics courses 
are good for delivering information, but are less effective than face-to-face 
training when it comes to application (interview with K2_17). (This also ties in 
with the fi ndings of The Open University’s study for UNESCO on the possibility 
of online ABC training.) A KEMRI member (K2_17) gave the following example 
of the type of teaching they hope to offer on a regular basis:
I tell them, ‘What if you go into the fi eld and you’re doing a study on ICTI, 
which is a preventive malaria treatment for women . . . you go into a home 
and you start consenting a pregnant woman because she’s eligible to be in 
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your study. And you’re a third way through and the man comes in and says, 
“Get out. You’re not going to.”’ So I ask them, ‘What do you do?’ . . . So 
that’s the whole idea, because once you give people examples that they can 
relate to, then the concepts actually sink in.
The nationwide EDCTP-funded project ran from April 2011 to April 2012, with 
the hope of further funding. Awarded to the Kenyatta National Hospital-University 
of Nairobi REC, in collaboration with NCST, it tied in closely with the NBC’s 
accreditation process, two of its aims being to take an inventory of all RECs in 
Kenya and to standardize ethical review processes (EDCTP 2011c; interview with 
K2_21). While visiting RECs to explain the roles of NCST and the NBC (some 
committees were unaware of these bodies), project members were able to conduct 
an assessment of training needs, which fed into a bioethics course held in January 
2012 for 60 REC members from across the country. The idea was to have at least 
two people from every REC attend, to provoke a multiplier effect (KNH-UoN 
REC 2011: 4 and 6; interviews with K2_21 and K2_25). Another aim of the 
project was to create a database of approved studies, to reduce duplication 
(EDCTP 2011c). In an age of multi-centre trials, both in-country and international, 
coordinating ethical review is an increasing challenge, as picked up by the 
fi rst Kenyan NBC training session (UNESCO 2009a: 3). A member of KEMRI 
(K2_17) explained:
Ethics committees do not talk to each other and it becomes quite diffi cult 
when we are having multi-centre trials.  . . . What happens now is that 
everybody does their own thing and then now we are busy trying to incorporate 
other people’s changes. And sometimes you don’t agree with them and it 
becomes . . . you keep delaying. You keep delaying the process.
They went on to express the hope that the NBC would play a coordinating role, so 
that RECs would have a better idea of what each other were doing and thus avoid 
‘re-inventing the wheel’.
There remain some gaps in ethics provision in both countries. In Kenya, there 
is still little university education on bioethics. Few courses are available and they 
lack a defi nite pattern, with different practices being taught to different years in 
different institutions. The former UNESCO Bioethics Chair would thus like to see 
UNESCO’s Core Curriculum rolled out in all universities teaching medical and 
life sciences, with an emphasis on practical application of ethical theory. They 
would also like to see UNESCO develop a postgraduate certifi cate in bioethics for 
the sub-Saharan region (interview with K2_01). An area where RECs in both 
Kenya and South Africa need support is the monitoring of research projects once 
they have been approved. One prominent Kenyan ethics committee had only 
recently carried out its fi rst on-the-spot inspection at the time of the 2005–6 
fi eldwork. Prevented by fi nancial constraints from conducting such inspections 
more frequently, committees in both countries generally relied on reports from 
investigators and word of mouth (interviews with K_17,19,25 and SA_14,19). 
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Members of two South African RECs described this as ‘passive monitoring’ 
(SA_10 and SA_17). The situation had not changed by the time the NHREC 
carried out its 2009 evaluation, which found that only 55 per cent of the 22 RECs 
surveyed actively monitored whether researchers were complying with their 
submitted protocols (NHREC 2009: 8). Another 2006 interviewee (SA_09) said 
that, in general, committees are inadequately funded:
Even though thousands of millions of dollars are spent on research every 
year, the support that ethics committees receive for their evaluation of 
research is relatively skimpy. Scholars and professionals are expected to 
work on those committees in their spare time, as though it’s work not worthy 
of any remuneration. In my view much lip service is paid to ethics, with 
inadequate commitment to providing the resources required to support the 
onerous work that needs to be done.
In October 2011, KEMRI started charging external applicants for ethical review a 
one-off fee of USD 1,000, to enable monitoring. Legislation might act as a further 
deterrent to unethical conduct, as the committee has no power to shut research 
down at present, meaning that follow-up can be an empty gesture: ‘essentially it’s 
just an exchange of words and we move on’ (interview with K2_17).
Public engagement
The lack of input into the drafting of the UNESCO declarations among non-state 
actors in Kenya and South Africa may be partly attributable to a low level of 
engagement in bioethics and genetics policy-making generally, among both 
scientists and the general public. Although several geneticists, when interviewed 
in 2005–6, were sceptical of the declarations’ legitimacy because they felt their 
views had not been adequately represented during negotiations, they were hesitant 
to involve themselves in policy-making. Their priorities were research and 
teaching, hence they had little time to spare for other endeavours, particularly 
given the small size of the scientifi c community in each country (K_03,05 and 
SA_03,04,05,07,21,30). Lairumbi et al. (2008: 746) made a similar observation in 
their investigation into the impact of research fi ndings on health policy in Kenya: 
‘Importantly, our study points to a sense of isolation from the processes of agenda 
setting among local researchers and policy implementers and a disregard of policy 
implementers as a target for knowledge sharing.’ Two interviewees (K_03 and 
SA_27) suggested that scientists would be more inclined to contribute to an 
initiative if they could see that the people behind it were serious and that it was 
going to translate into concrete outputs.
One organization that does represent scientists in policy debates is the 
African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum (ABSF), an umbrella organiza-
tion for institutions working in all areas of biotechnology. ABSF would expect 
to be included in the process of domesticating the UNESCO declarations, said a 
representative (K2_31) in 2011, having been intimately involved in drawing 
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up Kenya’s Biosafety Act and Biotechnology Development Policy and as a 
member of various NCST committees and the National Biosafety Authority. 
A member of NCST (K2_16), also interviewed in 2011, explained that the 
system of public consultation on science and technology issues had improved 
since 2005:
So now, as a Council, we have that mandate, we have some resources, so that, 
when we have such hot issues [GMOs, for example], you can call people and 
invite a debate and invite experts to come and share from their expert view; 
let other people who are not experts come, listen, ask questions; and, at the 
end of it, come up with a policy paper.  . . .  As the Council, that’s how we get 
the position to advise the government.
They hoped that, with the rejuvenated NBC, consultation on bioethics issues 
would become much more thorough.
With regard to the general public’s involvement in policy-making, the picture 
was somewhat mixed in both Kenya and South Africa in 2005–6. In South Africa, 
the mechanisms were in place for people to make comments on impending 
regulations or legislation (interviews with SA_04,10,16,22,24,29,33). Interviewees 
sensed that it was mostly activist groups taking advantage of these, however, rather 
than the public at large (SA_10,16,21,27,33). The problem, they felt, was poor 
understanding of ethics and genetics, a recent survey having shown that South 
Africans were ‘woefully ignorant’ about biotechnology (SA_26 [quoted] and 
SA_21,29,30,33). One geneticist (SA_27) commented, ‘they wouldn’t know what 
to ask’. To address this situation, the Department of Science and Technology 
launched the Public Understanding of Biotechnology (PUB) programme in 2003 
(under the National Biotechnology Strategy), which engages in a wide range of 
activities, such as drama presentations, seminars and workshops, exhibitions, 
science fairs and supporting schools’ curricula (PUB 2011; interviews with SA_26 
and SA_29). The Africa Genome Education Institute (AGEI) also has a mandate to 
increase public knowledge about genetics and biotechnology (AGEI 2007; 
interview with SA_11).
Hardy et al. (2008a: S21) describe the AGEI, rather than PUB, as having ‘taken 
the lead’ in educating a public, nervous of researchers in the aftermath of apartheid, 
about genomic science. A study commissioned by the National Biotechnology 
Advisory Committee (NBAC) in 2008 found that awareness of the PUB 
programme beyond the scientifi c community was very low (NBAC no date a: 4). 
It also found that, while South Africans had fewer religious or moral objections to 
biotechnologies than people in other countries, concepts such as genetic screening 
and stem cells were foreign to many consumers. The authors thus concluded that 
‘the views of the general public regarding the development of such technologies 
are largely irrelevant at this stage due to the abstract nature of what is communicated’ 
(ibid: 3 [quoted]; NBAC 2009: 4). This lack of awareness could have been because 
of under-reporting of biotechnology in South Africa, as identifi ed by a second 
NBAC study, on biotechnology and the media (Gastrow 2010: 3). Questionnaire 
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respondents in 2012 confi rmed that the public’s knowledge of genetics was still 
very basic, having improved a little through national awareness raising pro-
grammes, but not suffi ciently.
In Kenya, the Ministry of Health’s 2005 guidelines for research into HIV/AIDS 
vaccines were developed in consultation with NGOs, community representatives, 
faith-based organizations and professional societies (as well as government 
offi cials, researchers and healthcare workers) (Ministry of Health 2005: vii). 
These recently published guidelines notwithstanding, several 2005 interviewees 
were of the opinion that there was little public participation in bioethics and 
genetics matters in Kenya, with discussions tending to be confi ned to certain 
specialized circles (K_01,02,14,18,19,21,26). Some (K_17, K_19 and K_25) 
intimated that public education would help to demystify the research process and 
enable people to engage with ethics and genetics issues. Others remarked that the 
connection between genetics and development, in terms of the opportunity to 
alleviate poverty through better health, had not been made by the public at large 
(K_04, K_08 and K_14).
An editor at Biosafety News (a newspaper and website active in the 2000s but 
now defunct, which aimed to provide a bridge between scientists and the general 
public) said of the UNESCO declarations, ‘At the moment, even if we carried 
something like that on our paper, I think people would be like, “Whoa, what is 
this?” I can tell you that for sure’ (interview with K_14). Other initiatives include 
ABSF, which (alongside its policy work) endeavours to provide credible, balanced 
and up-to-date information on biotechnology and NCST’s National Biotechnology 
Awareness Initiative (BioAWARE), launched in 2008 to develop ‘a well-informed 
and knowledgeable society that can make informed decisions on the use of 
biotechnology and its products’ (Karembu et al. 2010: 49–50; NCST 2012c 
[quoted]; interview with K2_32). As in South Africa, questionnaire respondents 
thought that there had been some progress in public understanding through such 
initiatives, but that there was still a long way to go. They also noted that fi nding a 
way to accurately measure whether there has been a signifi cant change in 
awareness would be diffi cult.
One biotechnology issue that has captured the Kenyan public’s interest in 
recent years is GMOs (interviews with K2_01,16,31,32). A member of ABSF 
(K2_31) attributed the higher public awareness of crop genetics, compared to 
human genetics, to the relative openness of institutions such as the Kenya 
Agricultural Research Institute, which holds “seeing is believing” tours to 
demonstrate its work to the public. They said:
So the reason why there has been less public awareness about human 
genetics is because the relevant institutions and scientists do not have an 
open system to interact with the public and tell them what they are 
doing. Either this is because they are doing it deliberately, because they 
know that it could be alarmist to the public, or maybe it is just by 
ignorance – they think the public may be too naïve for such an advanced level 
of research.
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Human genetics did hit the public sphere, albeit briefl y, when news of the cloning 
of Dolly the Sheep broke in 1997. The media went into ‘a frenzy’ and the Catholic 
Church organized demonstrations in Nairobi and other areas, denouncing both 
human and animal cloning as morally wrong (interview with K2_31). Religious 
groups and civil society representatives remain strongly opposed to human 
reproductive cloning (interviews with K2_01 and K2_16). Broader attention may 
since have waned, but it is still a ‘no go’ in Kenya, in terms of public acceptance 
(conversation at NCST in November 2011).
The GMO debate has led some scientists to reassess their level of engagement 
with the public, including members of the NBC. As one attendee at the third ABC 
training session (K2_32) commented:
What I think is very critical is knowledge . . . because the debate on GMOs 
actually took a completely different direction and yesterday [at the session] 
we were discussing among ourselves, what did we do? And we realized that 
we did nothing – we left everything to the politicians.
A member of KEMRI also felt that better public engagement on ethics issues is 
sorely needed. This would help prevent exploitation of research subjects, as RECs 
can only do so much. If people knew how the informed consent process should 
work, for example, they would be able to refuse to participate in research when it 
is not conducted properly. This would be far more effective than ‘having a whole 
bunch of people running around the country looking at people’s informed consent 
documents’ (interview with K2_17). Garnering public attention is by no means 
easy, however. The NBC held a press conference after its third ABC training 
session, but as it took place outside central Nairobi no-one attended. One 
possibility is the teaching of bioethics in schools through the domestication of 
UNESCO’s Core Curriculum (interviews with K2_01, K2_21 and K2_32). But, 
as one 2011 interviewee (K2_17) pointed out, once a subject is formalized into the 
national curriculum there is a danger that it will become ‘just another thing they 
[children] have to learn’, rather than something they really take to heart.
Both Kenya and South Africa have made signifi cant strides forward in the last six 
to seven years in several areas of bioethics governance. Some initiatives have 
tackled issues that are of particular concern to the UNESCO Bioethics 
Programme, such as community preparedness, social responsibility in research 
and ethics training and education, yet few have drawn on UNESCO resources. 
Other areas remain a serious challenge. Interviewees and questionnaire 
respondents, as well as South Africa’s NHREC, have expressed concern about 
the level of protections offered to vulnerable populations in research projects. 
Whether or not the IBC’s 2011 report on vulnerability provides states with the 
guidance they need on this issue remains to be seen. Also of concern are the 
shipping of biological samples to overseas laboratories and the low levels of 
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public understanding of genetics and bioethics. Since the IBC’s Work Programme 
for 2012–13 includes an investigation into biobanking (on the back of requests 
by several states, particularly those in the global South) and the Bioethics 
Programme secretariat will be looking to reach out to the public in new ways in 
the same period, it may be that UNESCO can engage with both Kenya and South 
Africa to try to address these problems.
8 Conclusion
Bioethics and genetics stretch beyond national borders in several ways. 
Multi-centre research projects are increasingly common and require a coordinated 
system of ethical review. Tissue samples and genetic data frequently traverse 
national boundaries. Inequalities of health are considered a global injustice. The 
human genome has been designated the ‘heritage of humanity’ and so should be 
of benefi t to all. As such issues are inherently global, they cannot be dealt with 
effectively at national level alone. Hence UNESCO’s efforts to provide an 
international framework for their governance. Pablo Sader, Chair of the 
government experts charged with fi nalizing the draft UDBHR, made the following 
statement at their last meeting in June 2005:
A bioethics-related event makes the international headlines nearly every 
week. It is a diffi cult topic. As we have all seen, there have been deep divisions 
in other meetings on specifi c bioethics issues. There are points of divergence 
within individual countries too. For this reason, it is doubly important for us 
to give a clear signal that we are capable of reaching agreement on important 
issues. If we do so, the declaration will be proof that multilateralism works, 
and that will be a boon to our Organization.
(UNESCO 2005m: Annex III, 1)
This chapter assesses whether the UNESCO Bioethics Programme and its three 
declarations are indeed proof that multilateralism works, in the deliberation and 
implementation of bioethics.
Deliberation
The UNESCO Bioethics Programme encompasses several interweaving sets of 
relationships between different categories of actors: between member states; 
between state and non-state actors; between international and national bodies; and 
between diplomats, experts and civil society, at international and national levels. 
The ways in which these relationships played out in the drafting of the three 
UNESCO declarations on bioethics and genetics, in terms of the interface between 
power, interests and knowledge, render the declarations classic exemplars of a 
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formal international regime in several respects, not least the degree to which 
compromises on their nature and content proved necessary in order to facilitate 
agreement. This begs the question whether relations between actors can be 
improved, to foster stronger agreements in the future.
Drawing on the work of Chasek and Rajamani, Held argues that relations 
between states are often unequal in international regimes, despite formal parity, 
because developed countries are able to send larger and more expert delegations 
to meetings than are developing ones (Held 2004b: 95–6). This was indeed the 
case during the negotiations for the UNESCO declarations. Although procedures 
were followed scrupulously in terms of giving all countries equal voice and vote, 
delegates from the global North were both more numerous and more experienced 
than those from the global South. These trends have continued to a degree. Only 
26 of the 36 member states of the IGBC attended its September 2011 meeting 
(UNESCO 2011k). Among those missing were four of the eight from Group Va 
(African states): Mauritius, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia. Yet of the 23 non-
member states that sent observers, fi ve were from Group Va, four from Group III 
(Latin American and Caribbean states) and four from Group IV (Asian and Pacifi c 
states). Group I (Western Europe and North American states), with fi ve observers, 
again had the highest proportionate number, being one of the smaller groups 
(UNESCO 2011j). Nevertheless, that developing countries felt it worthwhile to 
send delegates to both this IGBC session and the public hearings on human 
cloning in 2008 perhaps indicates that their interests in bioethics are growing. 
Questionnaire respondents in 2012 from sub-Saharan African National Com-
missions (NCs) and Permanent Delegations (PDs) confi rmed that some of the 
problems affecting meeting attendance are ongoing. In answer to the question ‘Do 
you think that all member states have the opportunity to participate equally in 
UNESCO meetings on bioethics?’, one West African NC wrote, ‘Yes, because the 
invitation is open to all member states to attend either as members or observers.’ 
Several others acknowledged this, but noted that states may not be able to take up 
this invitation due to limited resources; for example, a Southern African NC rea-
soned, ‘Yes – however, only those that have the resources attend more often and 
their voices are heard more than those without the resources.’ An East African PD 
made a similar observation about the capacity of Paris-based offi ces:
It highly depends on the availability of staff at the Mission. Very often 
developing countries do not have a budget for the participation of experts in 
such technical meetings. Many of the delegations are understaffed and cannot 
cover all the meetings taking place at UNESCO.
A second Southern African NC pointed out that those states with seats on the 
IGBC have more opportunities to participate and that these will tend to be those 
states for which bioethics issues are a priority. A third cited both the lack of 
resources and the lack of concern with bioethics (which means that low-income 
countries ‘have little or nothing to contribute in the meetings’), while a West 
African PD commented on the want of both resources and expertise: ‘No – the 
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main reason, particularly for African Member States, derives from either not 
having the appropriate experts or lack of funds to sponsor their participation 
or both.’ A Southern African PD combined all three reasons: ‘In theory yes, in 
practice no. Impediments to equal participation are cost of attendance at meetings, 
technical capacity to participate in debates and general interest in or awareness of 
the subject matter.’
In future endeavours, UNESCO might try to avoid such problems by 
implementing some pragmatic changes. It could help low income countries meet 
the travel costs of their delegations, for example, through a participation fund, as 
suggested by Chasek and Rajamani. Indeed, at its 2009 meeting the IGBC decided 
to invite the Director-General of UNESCO to look into the possibility of fi nancial 
provision to enable members from the least developed countries to participate in 
its meetings (UNESCO 2009f: 5). This move was primarily aimed at very small 
states, such as Samoa and Kiribati and would be applied on an ad hoc basis 
(interview with K2_01). It could be a positive step, providing it does not fall prey 
to some of the problems that the allocation of daily subsistence allowances (DSAs) 
to delegates can engender. Chasek (2010: 29), in her more recent studies of 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), has shown that, while DSAs 
enable developing countries to send representatives to negotiations when they 
would not otherwise be able to do so, they have generated something of an 
‘international MEA meeting “industry”’, which serves to exacerbate some of the 
problems she and Rajamani had earlier identifi ed and which are seen within the 
UNESCO Bioethics Programme. Government offi cials may vie for the opportunity 
to attend meetings, for example, in order to supplement meagre salaries, with the 
result that the chosen representative is not always the most appropriate: ‘such 
would be the case if a foreign affairs offi cial attends a scientifi c working-group 
meeting’. Alternatively, a state may opt to ‘share the wealth’ by appointing a 
different representative to each meeting, with ensuing continuity problems.
Subsidized travel alone would not address the problem of lack of expertise in 
delegations. Yet here, too, there have been improvements. Where IGBC 
representatives were, in the past, often from a country’s Permanent Delegation in 
Paris, some states are now appointing bioethics experts as their IGBC delegate for 
the duration of their membership of the committee (interview with F2_03). At the 
IGBC meeting in September 2011, for example, the majority of states sent at least 
one specialist alongside a Permanent Delegation member (UNESCO 2011j). This 
may help to promote a more symbiotic relationship between the IGBC and the 
IBC. At the joint meeting in October 2010, both chairs were keen to foster better 
communication and cooperation between the two committees. The following 
year, Evans, the outgoing IBC Chair, said in his presentation to the IGBC at its 
September session that the October 2010 meeting had seen a ‘sea change’ in the 
relationship, citing the IGBC’s input into the vulnerability report as an example 
(personal observations). What is more, the key difference between the two 
committees – one is independent, while the other represents member states – can 
be brought out in a complementary way. A member of the Bioethics Programme 
(F2_03) explained that the joint meetings can be a useful way for the IBC and the 
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secretariat to get an indication of what states’ reactions to a possible programme 
of action are likely to be (and hence its viability), ahead of the General Conference. 
This was the case with the proposed convention on cloning.
Although the formal procedures of IGOs cannot guarantee equality among 
states, they do offer some form of protection to the interests of weaker members. 
As Slaughter (2004: 28) acknowledges, the lack of ‘representation rules, voting 
rules, and elaborate negotiating procedures’ in less formalized government 
networks can result in the deliberate exclusion of weak states. Another boon for 
these states is the advent of group bargaining, offering strength in numbers. The 
negotiations for the UDBHR (2005) demonstrated how collaborations within and 
between regions of the global South afforded them a platform from which to 
demand an article on social responsibility. These collaborations formed around a 
special issue, as recommended by Chasek and Rajamani, but maintained the 
power of a broad coalition. The factions that formed during the UN’s cloning 
debate offer another, less salutary example of group bargaining. In this case the 
intransigence of both sides meant that the original aim of a binding convention 
had to be abandoned, in favour of the weak and ambiguous Declaration on Human 
Cloning of 2005, for which almost half of member states did not vote.
The difference between the resolution of the UN debate and any decision-
making within the UNESCO Bioethics Programme is that the latter always 
operates by consensus. This can be both a strength and a weakness. It means that 
the three bioethics and genetics declarations enjoy the backing of all member 
states, but this was only possible because decisions on diffi cult issues such as 
stem cell research, which came up in the deliberations on the UDBHR (2005), 
were postponed until a change in the international political climate should render 
agreement possible. Biller-Andorno (2005: 63), in her Journal of Medical Ethics 
editorial, drew a direct comparison between the two efforts:
If no meaningful universal agreement can be reached on reproductive cloning, 
at least not at the level of the United Nations, the prospect for reaching a 
global consensus on other issues in bioethics is rather bleak. It will be 
interesting to see if UNESCO will have more luck in its development of a 
declaration on universal norms on bioethics, which is currently in preparation.
Although this statement fails to recognize that it would be through leaving out 
controversial topics like cloning that UNESCO would be able to achieve consensus 
on ‘other issues in bioethics’, Biller-Andorno went on to make a pertinent 
observation about the need for ongoing discourse, which may be of greater long-
term benefi t. Echoing Slaughter’s call for positive deliberation, she wrote:
But no matter what the outcome is, it certainly makes us aware of the need to 
foster a genuine, world-wide discourse on bioethical issues (rather than 
leaving the fi eld to political power games), which may be even more important 
than reaching immediate substantive conclusions.
(ibid)
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Given that UNESCO, like the UN General Assembly, has failed to reach a 
consensus on cloning, we can ask whether there are limits to the power of 
deliberation, such that discussion cannot breed consensus where the lines are 
clearly drawn. An alternative reading would mirror the sentiments of the Swiss 
IGBC representative who called for a conference on cloning to deepen international 
dialogue on the issue. Discussions at UNESCO meetings are often rushed. At the 
May–June 2011 IBC meeting, for example, little more than an hour was spent on 
cloning at the public sessions, members having been asked to keep their comments 
brief (personal observation). A more in-depth consideration might allow the 
debate to move forward. Of course this is speculative, but that is the point: we 
cannot predict what the outcomes of a free-fl owing discussion will be.
Slaughter (2004: 27 and 203–4) advocates discussion and argument, developed 
in a positive, trust-building manner over time, as a means to achieve ‘reasoned 
consensus’. These developments are more likely, she says, in networks where 
membership is based on common professional standards and ethics, or ‘network 
norms’, than in fora characterized by interest-based bargaining, such as regime 
negotiations. In this respect, informality may be a strength, as illustrated by the 
following example. During the intergovernmental meetings of experts charged 
with fi nalizing the UDBHR in 2005, Chairman Sader arranged an extramural 
session, at which he requested that participants refrain from taking positions and 
instead engage in open discussion. This helped enable consensus, even on the 
previously fractious topic of social responsibility. Sader also produced a ‘non 
paper’ on how outstanding issues might be addressed, which he distributed to 
member states (UNESCO 2005g).
Another way to improve the quality of dialogue is to involve as broad a range 
of stakeholders as possible. As would be expected in a state-centric regime, it was 
government representatives who made the fi nal decisions on the UNESCO 
declarations, but non-state actors played a part in the various drafting stages, 
through written and verbal consultations. In line with Samhat’s observations 
about how IGOs have evolved, UNESCO has opened its deliberations to non-state 
actors to a signifi cant degree, directly and through documentation, most of its 
meetings being held in public and recorded in the public domain. Yet Williams 
and Macpherson have criticized the closed nature of the negotiations in prominent 
ethics journals and signifi cant numbers of bioethics and genetics specialists in 
Kenya and South Africa were unaware of the declarations when interviewed in 
2005–6, not having been asked to feed into their country’s negotiating position. 
The problem for these states, then, seems to have lain in their incapability 
(fi nancial or otherwise) to harness expertise, as much as a lack of expertise per se. 
ten Have (2006: 349) acknowledges that UNESCO and its member states could 
do better in this regard, but also warns that it should not be assumed that ethicists 
are willing to work with governments and IGOs.
Some of those interviewed were concerned not only that experts in the fi eld had 
not had input into the draft UNESCO declarations, but also that those who might 
be affected by their provisions, such as potentially vulnerable research subjects, 
had not been consulted either. The problem is that UNESCO cannot guarantee 
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how far those at the negotiating table actually represent their constituents. Chasek 
and Rajamani’s suggestions of national policy debates, strategic consultations and 
greater networking between relevant government ministries would seem relevant 
here (although the reluctance on the part of Kenyan and South African scientists 
to get involved in policy-making sounds a note of caution). On the challenge that 
the interdisciplinarity inherent in bioethics presents for UNESCO’s Bioethics 
Programme, ten Have (2010: 14) writes: 
The challenge here is to bring together policy-makers, scientists, health 
professionals and citizens, so that they engage in dialogue and debate in order 
to determine what is in the best interest of all. It is only by situating itself in 
a really global perspective that bioethics can be translated into practical 
activities that contribute to improving the condition of everyone.
This raises the question of what system of deliberation will best serve UNESCO 
in bringing together the required mix of people in a way that generates meaningful 
and fruitful dialogue. Slaughter recommends (2004: 225) that government 
networks – which the IGBC and the National Commissions arguably are or could 
be – should engage systematically with their counterparts in the corporate and 
civil society sectors. Similarly, under Samhat’s and Ellis’ schemata, regimes 
would be framed to include all those affected by a specifi c issue, through the 
conduit of civil society organizations. These suggestions are very close to the 
pleas of IBC and IGBC members themselves, who would like to see better com-
munications between the Bioethics Programme secretariat, National Commissions, 
national bioethics committees and other ethics bodies, to aid broader dissemina-
tion of the declarations and their principles.
Held’s model goes further, proposing a cosmopolitan democracy through ‘an 
overarching network of democratic public fora’, from the local to the global. 
A diverse range of public spheres would enable informed participation and 
deliberation, guided by the ‘requirements of impartiality’. ‘Being impartial here’, 
writes Held (2004b: 109), ‘means being open to, reasoning from, and assessing all 
points of view (especially those of people in urgent need); it does not mean simply 
following the precepts of self-interest.’ In reality, though, impartial and informed 
participation is diffi cult to guarantee, particularly among the broader public. This 
has been the case in Kenya and South Africa, where those who might be 
signifi cantly affected by decisions in bioethics and genetics (in vulnerable 
communities, for example) have little knowledge of these subjects. To address 
this, programmes like South Africa’s Public Understanding of Biotechnology aim 
to inform citizens about biotechnology, so that they can participate in policy-
making. The programme tries to be neutral in the information that it gives, but 
fi nding the right balance has proved diffi cult, particularly in terms of assessing 
how best to offset information given out by interest groups (interviews with 




Each of UNESCO’s declarations on genetics and bioethics was adopted by 
acclamation at its designated General Conference. Yet it does not necessarily 
follow that all member states immediately rushed to align their national laws, 
regulations and policies with the provisions of the declarations, particularly as 
these are non-binding. On this point Lenoir (1998–9: 550–1) writes:
For some, the achievement of consensus on a declaration is a short-lived 
victory, because declarations are not binding and there is nothing to prevent 
states from later revoking the commitment they made when the text was 
adopted. For others, on the contrary, the contrast between treaty law and 
declaratory law is artifi cial. In their view, what matters is the formalization of 
common principles whose moral force arises from their solemn and public 
acceptance by the community of states.
Do the declarations (and their associated activities) indeed have the moral force to 
effect signifi cant change in bioethics practice? Victor et al. (1998: 18) advocate 
systems of implementation review (SIRs) as a means to encourage states to honour 
their non-binding commitments. Precisely because the declarations are non-
binding, however, member states of UNESCO have seen even self-reporting 
requirements as something of an impertinence. This, like many instances of 
reluctance on the parts of states to fully uphold their international obligations, 
pours cold water on Held’s and Archibugi’s visions of a world in which coercive 
power is shared between government and meta-governmental institutions, which 
would enable UNESCO to enforce its declarations as human rights instruments.
It remains to be seen whether the Bioethics Programme secretariat will (and 
will have the capacity to) offer member states a ‘user-friendly template’ for 
providing feedback on dissemination and implementation of the UDBHR (2005) 
within their countries, as requested by the IGBC in 2011 (UNESCO 2011c: 2). 
More successful thus far has been the system of devoting a day of the IBC sessions, 
when held outside Paris, to presentations on bioethics activities in the host country 
and region (interview with F2_03). GEObs is another source of information on 
implementation. Slaughter (2004: 237) predicts that one of the merits of linking 
governments in ‘virtual space’ would be that government offi cials would know 
they were under scrutiny. It does not appear that GEOBs is having this effect as 
yet, but as its usage fi gures continue to grow it may gain the leverage common to 
long-standing regimes.
According to Slaughter (2004: 153), treaties and agreements trigger the 
formation of government networks as an ‘inevitable part’ of their implementation. 
In the new world order she envisages, IGOs would play something of a secondary 
role:
Imagine a global governance system principally composed of horizontal 
government networks of counterpart national offi cials, working on their own 
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behalf or to implement formal international obligations. . . . Many, if not 
most, of the international organizations dotting this landscape, regardless of 
form or title, are in substance largely facilitative ‘information agencies’; their 
job is to collect, distill, and disseminate information needed by network 
participants and to help the networks coordinate their work.
(ibid: 164–5)
There would appear to be no valid reason why UNESCO should drop its capacity-
building activities and become merely a facilitator, but it may be that it could draw 
on the government network framework to promote stronger implementation of the 
declarations among member states, if it could encourage the National Commissions 
to act as such. Rarely are the Bioethics Programme secretariat, National Com-
missions, relevant ministries in member states (of health or science and techno-
logy, for example), NBCs and IBC and IGBC representatives all communicating 
with each other to coordinate bioethics activities.
The potential for better networking within UNESCO has been recognized by 
two separate Internal Oversight Offi ce (IOS) evaluations. A 2011 review of the 
general relationship between UNESCO’s Secretariat (that is, the organization’s 
headquarters in Paris) and the National Commissions found that what could be a 
multilayered ‘array of fora’ à la Held (2004b: 115) is in fact disaggregated in an 
unhelpful way, mainly due to lack of resources. Calling for improved relations not 
only within UNESCO but also with other IGOs and non-state actors, it concluded:
While there are many examples of effective cooperation between the 
Secretariat and National Commissions, the network of National Commission 
[sic] presents opportunities to function better. Strengthening and retooling of 
cooperation arrangements between UNESCO’s Secretariat and National 
Commissions are needed. This includes efforts to clarify the roles of each 
partner and to establish organization-wide working processes, including those 
related to knowledge management and to cooperation with partners such as 
civil society, the private sector and other parts of the United Nations system.
(UNESCO 2012h: 2)
More specifi cally on bioethics, the 2010 evaluation of UNESCO’s ethics activities 
recommended better coordination between the Bioethics Programme secretariat 
and the regional fi eld offi ces, to generate ‘a more effi cient use of resources and an 
increase in operational synergies’ (UNESCO 2010d: 33). The Bioethics 
Programme does indeed appear to work best where this is happening. In the 
former Eastern Europe, for example, the Moscow Offi ce (the regional fi eld offi ce) 
worked to establish NBCs in all its cluster countries by 2007; from 2008, the 
focus shifted to networking and capacity building among these committees 
(UNESCO 2011p). At optimum, these different (but related) UNESCO networks 
might induce greater peer pressure on states to adopt the declarations, while at the 
same time providing them with a source of mutual support to do so, as Slaughter 
deems important.
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Given the diffi culties in enforcing compliance with non-binding norms, the 
UNESCO Bioethics Programme has chosen to concentrate its resources on a 
management approach to encouraging implementation of the declarations. The 
various capacity-building programmes – GEObs, the ABC initiative and the 
EEP – have been very active since the adoption of the UDBHR in 2005, especially 
in developing countries. As indicated by interviewees in 2005–6 and questionnaire 
respondents in 2012, the most favourable kind of capacity building is that which 
is planned in response to local needs, as identifi ed by those on the ground. Reinicke 
(1999–2000: 55–6) notes that global policy networks must be genuinely inclusive 
at all stages to be successful: ‘the mere façade of inclusiveness may prove their 
fatal weakness. . . . The inclusion of less powerful yet important groups from the 
developing world is critical not just for designing policies but even more so for 
implementing them.’
The problems of ensuring equal representation during deliberations 
notwithstanding, UNESCO appears to be doing reasonably well on this front 
when it comes to implementation. Requests for assistance come from the countries 
themselves and programmes are administered through national structures. 
Furthermore, training sessions on the ABC programme are tailored to the local 
context, and users of the Core Curriculum (which was written by people from all 
over the world) are encouraged to adapt the materials in whatever ways they see 
fi t to ensure applicability. This has implications for Slaughter’s model. She places 
great emphasis on capacity building as a means to improve compliance, but 
focuses almost entirely on initiatives designed and led by developed countries 
(Slaughter 2004: 229–30). She does acknowledge that knowledge could fl ow 
from South to North, but within an overall framework that hints at condescension: 
‘Where possibilities of genuine learning exist, representatives of even the world’s 
most powerful nations are likely to be surprised by what they do not know or have 
not thought of . . . successful mentoring can often produce students who turn the 
tables on their teachers’ (ibid: 229–30).
One hindrance to UNESCO’s capacity-building efforts is its reputation in the 
fi eld of bioethics. Faunce and Nasu (2009: 317) posit that the UDBHR should be 
seen to have ‘fundamental cosmopolitan normative ground’, concerned as it is 
with the ‘universal interests of humanity’, while ten Have (2010: 9–10) declares,
This new constellation of fundamental principles is not only the outcome of 
a process of internationalization of bioethics but it will also be the starting 
point for a true globalization of bioethics, – a global bioethics that cares about 
issues and problems in all areas of the world and that responds to the needs 
and concerns of all human beings on this planet.
The analogies with Held and Archibugi’s visions for cosmopolitan democracy are 
clear, but does the UNESCO bioethics declaration (and its predecessors) live up 
to these grand claims? Despite being the fi rst bioethics instruments to be adopted 
by an intergovernmental body, the declarations are usurped in some countries by 
longer-standing texts such as the Declaration of Helsinki and the CIOMS 
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guidelines. It is thus taking time for the UDBHR (2005), for instance, to become 
a ‘normative reference’ or a ‘reference text . . . for all the stakeholders concerned’, 
as intended by UNESCO’s IGBC and the April 2005 meeting of government 
experts respectively (UNESCO 2003i: 8; UNESCO 2005c: 3).
More broadly, the UNESCO Bioethics Programme is still establishing itself 
as a provider of bioethics capacity building. As ten Have (2010: 14) has 
acknowledged:
In the past period, emphasis has been on standard setting. The drafting and 
adoption of Declarations had a high profi le. Currently, the focus is on imple-
mentation activities; these have a larger span of time and are less visible at a 
global level.
This is typical of international regimes post-adoption. The 2010 IOS evaluation 
stated that UNESCO had gained the comparative advantage of ‘being recognized 
as an honest broker on bioethics issues by a large part of the international 
community of bioethics experts’ (UNESCO 2010c: 2). But only two of a recent 
spate of articles on training for RECs mention UNESCO’s efforts (Rwabihama 
et al. 2010: 245; Ijsselmuiden et al. 2012: 82). (In line with ten Have’s statement, 
people have been more inclined to write – often critically – about the negotiation 
and content of the UDBHR than its implementation.) In 2005–6 many stakeholders 
in bioethics and genetics in Kenya and South Africa were unaware of the 
organization’s activities in their fi eld, as well as of the declarations themselves. 
By 2011–12 a few more were familiar with UNESCO’s programmes, their 
reactions ranging from censure to ambivalence to strong interest. The most 
enthusiastic take-up was in Kenya, where the newly constituted National Bioethics 
Committee became the fi rst to complete the ABC training.
A member of the Bioethics Programme interviewed in 2011 (F2_03) believed 
that UNESCO’s reputation as an appropriate forum for bioethics had improved 
since 2005, when its suitability as a purveyor of bioethics principles had been 
questioned; where people used to refer to the Declaration of Helsinki, the CIOMS 
guidelines and WHO documents, they would now also add UNESCO. The 
difference with UNESCO, they said, is that it is not as narrow as the others, as it is 
positioned to look at ethical issues beyond research. Nevertheless, the proliferation 
of ethical guidelines at all levels has proved confusing and counter-productive for 
some practitioners (although a perceived need to comply with international 
standards as laid out in the Declaration of Helsinki and the CIOMS guidelines 
provided a catalyst for the strengthening of national systems in Kenya and South 
Africa in the mid-2000s [and later the UDBHR, in the case of Kenya]). Moreover, 
having to respond to requests for similar information from several different bodies 
(for databases of RECs, for example) can be burdensome for stakeholders.
This has implications for both Slaughter’s and Held’s models. Offi cials might 
consider it an ineffi cient use of their limited time to become involved in more than 
a few of the ‘countless government networks’ Slaughter (2004: 15) envisages. 
Held’s ‘overarching network of democratic public fora’ (2004b: 109) might face 
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similar problems, with the confusion of responsibility Held has identifi ed in the 
current international system simply being perpetuated. Slaughter (2004: 254) 
endorses ‘an affi rmative norm of friction and constructive ambiguity’, but the 
bioethics case demonstrates that friction and ambiguity may be neither affi rmative 
nor constructive. UNESCO has attempted to mitigate the overlap at international 
level by establishing the UN Inter-Agency Committee on Bioethics. As this 
committee is open to non-UN bodies, it may be a forum through which UNESCO 
and other organizations can coordinate their programmes and thus provide mutual 
reinforcement, in line with Young’s positive views on different institutions having 
similar mandates. But further clarifi cation on how the roles of the WHO and 
UNESCO should be split is needed, as became clear at the September 2011 IGBC 
meeting.
The overlap in remits at international level is mirrored at national level. In 
Kenya and South Africa in 2005–6, for example, there were poor communications 
within and between different government ministries working in related areas, 
namely health, education and science and technology. This meant that Kenya’s 
system for the regulation of bioethics was incoherent, while in South Africa the 
Department of Science and Technology had no opportunity to feed into the 
negotiations on the content of the UDBHR (2005). The situation had improved by 
2011–12, with the advent of the NBC in Kenya and the coalescence under the 
National Health Act in South Africa. IGBC members have been instrumental in 
promoting bioethics capacity building in Kenya (as UNESCO would like to see 
happen in other countries too), yet there is still some confusion over the respective 
roles of the National Commission and the National Council for Science and 
Technology.
Cosmopolitan democracy does not presume national governance capacity, but 
does require it; effective multilayered democratic governance would comprise 
accountable, responsive and meaningful politics at local to global levels (Archibugi 
1998: 209; Held 2004b: 102 and 113). Slaughter, similarly, recognizes that 
suffi cient national level capacity would be crucial to her vision of global governance 
through a lattice of government networks. Some states might struggle to meet 
these requirements, because of national level ineffi ciencies. Slaughter (2004: 5 and 
12–13), like some regime theorists, criticizes international relations scholars for 
seeing states as single units in the international arena and thus ignoring what 
happens domestically. Under her notion of ‘disaggregated sovereignty’, govern-
ment units within states would have discrete mandates to meet international legal 
obligations. But, for cross-cutting issues like bioethics, which ministry should 
house what mandate is not always obvious. Thus networking at national level 
between the disaggregated units would be essential, in order to avoid confusion.
When Slaughter (2004: 232) fi rst outlined her model, she seemed to believe this 
coordination would be straightforward, commenting only briefl y, ‘Regulators of 
all kinds, from health to education to the environment, would conduct their own 
foreign relations, subject to some kind of domestic interagency process that 
accepted this phenomenon but nevertheless attempted to aggregate interests.’ As 
the Kenyan and South African cases demonstrate, the existence or effi cacy of such 
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a process should not be presumed. Slaughter (2012) has since acknowledged this, 
stating that, for global governance through government networks to be effective, 
many governments will need to build ‘intra-government networks’, to enable far 
more unitary policy-making.
Kenya and South Africa
ten Have (2005: 746) writes of the UDBHR, ‘The Universal Declaration helps put 
bioethics on the agenda of States.’ This has been the case in Kenya, where a new 
NBC and attendant systems for the accreditation of RECs have been formed 
with explicit reference to the UDBHR and UNESCO’s Bioethics Programme. 
It appears to have had little or no impact in South Africa, however, on what 
is a growing and developing bioethics community. Meagre input into the 
drafting of the UNESCO declarations by the scientists and ethicists who must 
apply ethical principles in their everyday work, together with the lack of an 
in-country champion (a UNESCO chair or IGBC member, for instance), may 
have hampered take-up. Nevertheless, both countries have seen an increasing 
emphasis on ethics issues that UNESCO deems important, such as the need 
for more ethics training for students, researchers and REC members, tailored to 
the local cultural context. South Africa, in particular, is making signifi cant 
progress in this regard, playing a leading role in the development of an Africa-
specifi c ethics textbook.
Above all, there is an acceptance that ethics deserves to be more than simply an 
afterthought. This was captured by a Kenyan interviewee in 2011 (K2_17), in the 
context of the Adili Center and other changes at the Kenya Medical Research 
Institute:
You know how sometimes things just come together and then you’re in the 
right place at the right time? . . . I mean, we had been saying, saying, saying 
and then suddenly we said the last time and people said, ‘Of course you must 
have your own centre’ and ‘Of course you must have your own vote’ and ‘Of 
course you must charge’. And it’s something we’ve been saying for the last 
six years. So we now actually are in a position to do things fairly well – fairly 
correctly – and then we hope that others might look at our model and maybe 
think that there are some good things about it. . . . Because once that one 
person has done something it’s easier for others now to say, ‘Oh, okay, this is 
the way it was done. Why can’t we do that too?’
Where challenges remain – protecting vulnerable research participants, developing 
meaningful ways of sharing benefi ts, dealing with the complexities of sample 
shipping, ensuring RECs have the capacity to review and monitor research as 
demand for their services grows, increasing public understanding and engagement 
in ethics – the question for the UNESCO Bioethics Programme must be what role 
it might play in the continuing development of African bioethics.
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The governance of human cloning
When intergovernmental organizations are unable to agree on a piece of binding 
legislation such as a convention, they often compromise with a less demanding 
declaration instead. This is what happened at the UN in 2005 when negotiations 
on a convention on human cloning reached an impasse. UNESCO, in its bioethics 
standard-setting endeavours, has opted straight for a declaration each time, as 
these are considered quicker to draft, more fl exible and more likely to engender 
consensus. But this was not a viable option when it came to human cloning, since 
an international declaration already exists. UNESCO was thus faced with an ‘all 
or nothing’ choice – and it chose nothing. There was initially a tension between 
IBC members, who as independent experts supported a ban on human reproductive 
cloning and IGBC members, who as representatives of member states were fearful 
of entangling themselves in a fractious political debate akin to that at the UN a 
few years before. Eventually, though, both committees seemed to tire of the topic. 
As consensus on the issue both within and between them has become less rather 
than more likely, the idea of a convention to ban human reproductive cloning has, 
effectively, been shelved.
There are ethical and scientifi c consequences to this decision. Although 
controversial, human cloning has the potential to contribute to scientifi c and 
medical advancement, through the replacement of damaged tissue, for example. 
The debate over whether therapeutic cloning should be allowed spills over into 
reproductive cloning and vice versa, with disputes over terminology refl ecting 
deeper concerns with the moral status of the embryo and, more broadly, what it 
means to be human. As things stand, there is nothing at global level that either 
defi nitively bans human reproductive cloning or sanctions therapeutic cloning. 
This legislative ‘black hole’ is unhelpful for those states that would draw on 
international law in formulating their own national regulations or policies. As ten 
Have (2006: 339) states:
The desire to develop international frameworks therefore often is articulated 
by the least developed countries that are in need of normative guidance and 
that want to have the certainty that ethical principles are formulated on a 
global level so that the same standards are used everywhere.
Compared to other, more immediate concerns in developing countries, particularly 
in Africa, cloning may seem unimportant. This is often given as a reason for 
assuming that these countries will be uninterested in such issues, despite science 
being seen as key to development by NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development) and the African Union (NEPAD Offi ce of Science and Technology 
2006; Juma and Serageldin 2007). Yet the situation leaves African researchers 
(at least, those quoted in this book) who wish to pursue scientifi c advancement in 
a responsible manner frustrated at the lack of guidance and support and worried 
that they will be left behind by rogue scientists less concerned for the welfare of 
vulnerable populations, who may be cajoled into undergoing unnecessarily risky 
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procedures. Thus the continued inability of intergovernmental organizations to 
fi nd a way to reach an agreement on human cloning acceptable to all parties is 
deeply problematic.
Pragmatic suggestions
To change the nature of an organization’s governance structures to enable deeper 
deliberation and multisectoral decision-making is a big ask. But there are smaller 
adjustments that could be made relatively easily and yet have a signifi cant impact. 
It is rare, for instance, for a UNESCO bioethics meeting to start on time. This may 
seem a facile point, but the consequence of the perpetual tardiness is that debates 
which have already been allocated only a few hours (in which the 36 members of 
each committee, plus observers, must all try to have their say) are truncated even 
further, to the detriment of the depth and quality of the discussion. Of course, 
informal negotiations over coffee may be just as important and valuable as 
offi cially timetabled meetings, but ample time for this is already built into the 
programmes. Redressing this balance does not require a new theory of governance, 
only a more pragmatic outlook. Given the considerable resources that go into 
holding these meetings, they should be used to their full potential.
Other seemingly simple improvements might be possible with more funding; 
covering some of the participation costs for developing countries, for example. 
But these would be very diffi cult to instigate in the current climate. In 2011–12 the 
Director-General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, instigated a cost-saving drive, after 
the US withdrew its funding of the organization (which accounted for 22 per cent 
of the total budget) in the wake of the General Conference’s decision to admit 
Palestine as a member state. She also launched an Emergency Multi-Donor Fund 
to make up the shortfall. 18 countries, including several from the global South, 
had pledged contributions as of November 2012 (Algeria, Belize, Cameroon, 
Chad, Gabon, Iceland, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mauritius, Monaco, Namibia, 
Norway, Qatar, Republic of Congo, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Timor Leste and 
Turkey). These contributions ranged from USD 20,000 and 50,000 from Mauritius 
and Namibia respectively, to USD 2 million each from Oman and Gabon, to USD 
20 million each from Saudi Arabia, Norway and Qatar (UNESCO 2011n; 
UNESCO 2011o; UNESCO 2012c; UNESCO 2012f). While some of these 
amounts are tiny in comparison to a budget defi cit for 2012–13 of USD 167 
million, they may have symbolic relevance. If the organization can survive the 
immediate crisis and thus become less dependent on a single state for such a large 
section of its budget, the balance of power may shift. Signifi cantly, the US remains 
a member state of UNESCO, but if it is no longer contributing fi nancially, it 
cannot expect to have the infl uence it once did. Those countries which have 




Code Location and date Description or affi liation
K_01 Kenya, Oct 05 Kenyan representative at the UNESCO IGE 
meetings, April and June 2005
K_02 Kenya, Oct 05 Social and Human Sciences Committee of the 
Kenya National Commission for UNESCO
K_03 Kenya, Oct 05 Social and Human Sciences Committee of the 
Kenya National Commission for UNESCO
K_04 Kenya, Oct 05 African Technology Policy Studies
K_05 Kenya, Oct 05 KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative 
Programme
K_06 Kenya, Oct 05 KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative 
Programme
K_07 Kenya, Oct 05 KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative 
Programme
K_08 Kenya, Oct 05 KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative 
Programme
K_09 Kenya, Oct 05 KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative 
Programme
K_10 Kenya, Oct 05 African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum
K_11 Kenya, Oct 05 Inter Region Economic Network
K_12 Kenya, Oct 05 Attendee at a 2002 genomics policy course
K_13 Kenya, Oct 05 Natural Sciences Committee of the Kenya 
National Commission for UNESCO
K_14 Kenya, Oct 05 Biosafety News
K_15 Kenya, Oct 05 World Health Organization, Kenya offi ce
K_16 Kenya, Nov 05 Kenya National Commission for UNESCO
K_17 Kenya, Nov 05 Kenya Medical Research Institute
K_18 Kenya, Nov 05 Advisor on national biosafety policy
K_19 Kenya, Nov 05 Member of a research ethics committee
K_20 Kenya, Nov 05 Kenya National Biosafety Committee
K_21 Kenya, Nov 05 National Council for Science and Technology
K_22 Kenya, Oct 05 African Technology Policy Studies




Code Location and date Description or affi liation
K_24 Kenya, Oct 05 Africa Centre for Technology Studies
K_25 Kenya, Oct 05 Member of two research ethics committees
K_26 Kenya, Oct 05 Geneticist at a university
K_27 Kenya, Nov 05 Ministry of Health
K_29 Kenya, Nov 05 Geneticist at a research institute
K_30 Kenya, Nov 05 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
K2_01 Kenya, Nov 11 Former UNESCO Bioethics Chair
K2_16 Kenya, Nov 11 National Council for Science and Technology
K2_17 Kenya, Nov 11 Kenya Medical Research Institute
K2_21 Kenya, Nov 11 National Council for Science and Technology
K2_25 Kenya, Nov 11 Member of the National Bioethics Committee
K2_31 Kenya, Nov 11 African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum
K2_32 Kenya, Nov 11 Regional Documentation Centre, Egerton 
University
SA_01 By telephone, Jul 06 Center for the AIDS Programme of Research in 
South Africa
SA_02 South Africa, Mar 06 South African National Bioinformatics Institute
SA_03 South Africa, Mar 06 Geneticist at a university
SA_04 South Africa, Mar 06 Division of Human Genetics, University of 
Cape Town
SA_05 South Africa, May 06 Faculty of Health Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee, University of Pretoria
SA_06 South Africa, Mar 06 Senior member of a commercial genetics 
company
SA_07 South Africa, Mar 06 South African National Bioinformatics Institute
SA_08 South Africa, Mar 06 Centre for Applied Ethics, University of 
Stellenbosch
SA_09 South Africa, Apr 06 International Research Ethics Network for 
Southern Africa (IRENSA)
SA_10 South Africa, Apr 06 Member of a research ethics committee
SA_11 South Africa, Apr 06 Africa Genome Education Institute
SA_12 South Africa, Apr 06 Centre for HIV/AIDS Networking
SA_13 South Africa, Apr 06 LifeLab
SA_14 South Africa, Apr 06 School of Philosophy and Ethics, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal
SA_15 South Africa, Apr 06 National Research Foundation
SA_16 South Africa, Apr 06 Bioethics Division, University of the 
Witwatersrand
SA_17 South Africa, Apr 06 An academic in a senior position in bioethics at 
a health sciences faculty
SA_18 South Africa, Apr 06 Geneticist at a university
SA_19 South Africa, Apr 06 Human Research Ethics Committee (Medical), 
University of the Witwatersrand
(Continued)
Appendix  159
Code Location and date Description or affi liation
SA_20 South Africa, Apr 06 Geneticist at a university
SA_21 South Africa, Apr 06 Geneticist at a university
SA_22 South Africa, Apr 06 Research ethicist
SA_23 South Africa, Apr 06 South African representative at the UNESCO 
IGE meeting, June 2005
SA_24 South Africa, Apr 06 Geneticist, research ethics committee member 
and ethics lecturer
SA_25 South Africa, Apr 06 Senior member of an independent ethics 
institute
SA_26 South Africa, Apr 06 Department of Science and Technology
SA_27 South Africa, Apr 06 Geneticist at a research institute
SA_28 South Africa, Apr 06 Advisor on national innovation policy
SA_29 South Africa, Apr 06 Public Understanding of Biotechnology 
programme
SA_30 South Africa, Apr 06 Geneticist at a university
SA_31 South Africa, Apr 06 Department of Science and Technology
SA_32 South Africa, May 06 Advisor on national innovation policy
SA_33 South Africa, Apr 06 Council for Scientifi c and Industrial Research
F_01 Paris, Aug 05 UNESCO Bioethics Programme secretariat
F_02 Paris, Aug 05 Attendee at the UNESCO IGE meetings, April 
and June 2005
F_03 Paris, Sep 11 UNESCO Bioethics Programme secretariat
UK_01 By telephone, Sep 05 Attendee at the UNESCO IGE meetings, April 
and June 2005




1  The report generated commentaries in the journals Science and Nature Genetics. It was 
also announced in newspapers around the world, including The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, The Toronto Star, Financial Times, Agence France Presse, New Straits 
Times (Malaysia), The Independent (The Gambia) and Africa News (as revealed by a 
search of the database Nexis UK, 23 February 2007).
2  For simplicity, the term ‘Bioethics Programme’ is used throughout the book. At one time 
it was known as the ‘Bioethics Section’, led by a Chief of Section. In 2012 it became the 
‘Bioethics Team’, led by a Team Leader, although its homepage still refers to the 
‘Bioethics Programme’.
5 Implementing bioethics
1  A search of the following journals was made on 31 May 2012: Science, Nature, Nature 
Biotechnology, Nature Genetics, Nature Reviews Genetics, European Journal of Human 
Genetics, EMBO Reports, Annual Review of Genomics and Genetics, Trends in 
Biotechnology, British Medical Journal, PLoS Medicine, The Lancet, Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy, Bioethics, Developing World Bioethics, Journal of Medical 
Ethics, Social Science and Medicine, International Journal of Biotechnology, Journal of 
Law, Medicine and Ethics.
6 Contextualizing bioethics
1  The chapter focuses particularly on the UDBHR (2005) because more data were 
available on this declaration than on the previous two, not least because fi eldwork was 
conducted during and immediately after its negotiation, which meant that it was possible 
to interview some of those who had been involved. The various meetings leading up to 
its adoption are also better documented by UNESCO.
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